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The purpose of this vork is to discuss the post- World War II and present situation in Poland
as a background for establishing the phenomenon of renltency and stalemate existing in Poland
today. Polish political culture is then used as a model for explaining the continued opposition of
the Poles to Soviet rule and their resistance to socialist transformation on the Soviet model. The
discussion of Polish political culture and the identity of its essential Westernness then serves ^s a
start point for studying U. 3. national interest vith regard to Poland. The theory of national
interest is first revie^i/ed in the American context; a comparison of Soviet and U. 3. interest in
Poland then follows, using the Nuechterlein and Teti models of the national Interest. The vork
concludes \*ith recommendations for U..S. policy toward Poland based on Polish political culture
and U. S. national Interest as set forth In this work.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the summer of 1980, events in Poland captured the imagination .und attention of the
West as well as a large part of the world. A vast assemblage of vorkers, united in a movement
known as Solidarity, seemingly strove to cast off the invisible but real chains of Soviet bondage in
their homeland and challenged the nght of the existing government in the purported "People's
Republic" of Poland to exercise the- functions of government for the Polish people. In a sense
"captured" vould be better stated as "recaptured" for it vas not the first timie that similar events
in that country had captured the attention of the V/est.
In 1 41 Jn the forests and fields around Grunvald, the people of Poland had shocked the West
by defeating the great lords of Malbork, the seemingly invincible Teutonic Knights, vho had sought
to place all of the eastern Baltic lands vithm the long reach and efficient rule of their order The
Golden Age of Poland in the sixteenth century produced one Micolaus Copernicus, vho again
captured the attention of the learned West vith his theory of a heliocentric universe. Later, in
quick succession, the West stared east in 1 772, 1 793, and 1795 as three partitions of Poland
finally erased an Independent and long- present Poland from the map of Europe.
Poland gained a reputation as a country that refused to die. hovever , and it appeared again on
Europe's map as the Duchy of V/arsav under Napoleon, and then as Congress Poland, under Russian
rule, after his defeat. True to its tradition, Poland recaptured V/estern attention in 1830 and in
1 i363 v/ith gallant, though abortive uprisings that stirred democratic souls, but unleashed the fist
of the Russian master in reimiposing subjugation. Passionate voices of support for Poiana vere
raised even in the new Western land of America where Polish patriots had unforgettably aided the
cause of American independence a half-century earlier. But in the end, Poland seemed to slip back
into forgotten obscurity as the West looked to other more "pressing" events.
Folloving World V/sir I, 3 reconstituted Poland emerged in Europe .und immedi.'jtely '.vas
challenged by the forces of Bolshevism from the East. Western eyes gazed in fascination and then
admiration as the beleagured Poles fashioned a miraculous victory from the shadows of certain
defeat outside the very gates of Warsav/ itself. Those same eyes then turned avay and forgot about
Poland until a nev and monstrous shadow rose up in Germany to threaten the whole of Europe. For
a little over a month in the late summer of 1 939, all of Europe watched in an almost embarassed
fascination as Poland alone rose to challenge Hitler's war machine, before which all others had
cowered in submission or disarray. In the Jewish ghetto of 1 943 and in the betrayed uprising in
V'/arsaw in August 1944, the Poles revalidated human dignity and gave new meaning to courage,
evenin the face of cynical betrayal and savage brutality. The West v/atched, but then repayed the
Poled with acquiesence to a Yalta Agreement that spoke of a free and independent Poland but finally
only led to the West hiding its eyes from the post-war Soviet actions that would make a mockery of
such words. All the West had done was to give the Poles opportunity to again confront oppression.
The Poles were consistent: 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, 1960- -each gave rise to events that
would for a time recapture Western attention and imagination. But the West was consistent too as
it had watched, and then turned ass-ay. Each crisis has followed the long example of Polish rnstory,
Tlashing like lightening across a summer sky. The stark realities of the moment and the rumblings
of unrest that followed were revealed for all to see, and then forgotten as Poland again slipped back
into the gray fog that had been given the name of "Eastern Europe" after World War II.
The tendency to consign Poland to that fog is made stranger still when one realizes that Poland
lies in the geographic center of Europe, not on its eastern fringe. On Warsaw's Parade "j'quare,
beneath the Stalinist Palace of Culture, stands an ordinary signpost that gives the distance to other
European capitals: Berlin--51 3 km, Brussels-- 1 1 22 km, London-- 1 444 km, Moscow-- 1 1 22
km. The Poles realize they are as close to Brussels as to Moscow and have long claimed to be a
V/estern nation. The Russians have long known this as well, perhaps their realization of this fact
explains the vigor of Soviet actions to deceive the West and to redefine geography. But for the
West, Poland iieerns to lead a Bngadoon existence of brief .appearance and then recession into the
mists of the East. Perhaps the rumblings that follov/ each Polish "appearance" are actually the
sounds of a troubled Western conscience.'
In the belief that the West has too long and too often avoided the subject of Poland, vith this
paper I have sought to shed some light on the ever-present "Polish Question" that has been a
recurring theme in European historu, especially in the last tvo hundred years. In this era of
superpovers the Polish Question is just as important, for in many .vays it provides the same sort
of touchstone and linchpin as it did previously, but on a grander scale. Failure to address the
problem circumspectly- -or worse, at all--vill not cause its resolution, at least in our lifetime;
Polish history makes that abundantly clear.
As others have vritten at length about the peculiarly Soviet aspects of the problem, 1 have
chosen to focus instead on vhat I see as the heart of the problem, the Poles themselves Despite
Soviet efforts to reshape Poland into a fraternal socialist country after the Soviet mold follov/ing
World War II, the Poles have evidenced a renitency seemingly unexpected by their Soviet masters.
Such Soviet experience in Poland, and to varying degrees in the rest of Eastern Europe, has caused
many political scientists to turn anev to the idea of political culture as an explanation of v/hy the
indigenous cultures are successfully (or unsuccessfully) resisting Soviet do mil nation. A
significant portion of this vork vill thus be devoted to a discussion of Polish political culture, and
to the history and experiences that laid its foundations. In so doing, I hope to Induce the reader to a
'While the romantic tones that I have used to introduce Poland may seem overblov/n to the
sedate scholar, I v/ould venture to assert that such an image is more in agreement vith the Polish
"self-imiage" than the desslcated descriptions of Poland presented by many W'etern scholars today,
Chopin is, after all, still a Polish national hero today. For a much more eloquent statement of
"Polish- ness" I vould recommend James A Michener's Poland ( Nev York; Random House, 1 983)
.
At the risk of censure for my temerity in citing a novel, I vould maintain that Michener does the
best job of expressing the spirit that animates the vast sveep of history and life that is Poland.
A good complement to Michener's historical novel approach is Stev/art Steven's The Poles : Nev/
York: MacMillan, 1932) Steven emphasizes current Polish politics and everyday life (vhile not
forqetting historical roots) by addressing separate chapters to the Party, bureaucrats, the
Church, Solidarity, the intellectuals, the contryside, v/omen, the black market, etc. It too
provide? captivating reading.
8
better understandi uq of the -.pi rit of the problem that, i n the fi nal innal ysis, actual! y underlie::; ana
animates any discussion of the superpower aspects, v/hether acknvledqed or not. Specifically, it is
my firm belief that through a review of post- World War II Polish history and a general
consideration of Polish political culture, the current situation in Poland becomes more
understandable, especially in its characteristics of renitency and stalemate; Soviet interest is
briefly presented so that one does not perchance forget the geopolitical realities of Poland to v/hich
the Poles themselves often refer. The second part of this paper poses the question of U. S. national
interest in Poland, attempts to explain and categorize that interest, and then concludes vith
general recommendations for U. 3. policy toward Poland. Above all, it is my hope that this paper
will stir the reader's imagination and thoughts concerning Poland and will serve to pull back, at
least temporarily, the fog that too often shrouds the people of Poland living in this Bngadoon.
II. PQ LA N D : POST - VVO R L D V-/A R II H I STO RV
A. 1945-1970
Any attempt to understarid specific events in Poland today must ground itself first in the
Mstorii of Poli^nd, for there tradition combines with reality in the shaping of present events. As
one Polish historian wrote,
Poland has been troubled by a history in which myth is as potent
a brew to the Polish imagination as fact. There is not an event in
our current travails that cannot find some echo in our history.
But because that hi-Ttory is constantly distorted by the
authorities, it is also distorted in a completely different way by
the public. Because the Party is so terrified by the past,
ordinary people cling to it with a passion that is terrifying. We
have become a people who can live onl y i n the i magi nation of what
we believe to be the glorious past.^
Thus the events in Poland in 1 980, while continuing in a long tradition of resistance to foreign
oppression, found their specific context in the Sovletization of Poland following World War II.
The Soviets claimed Poland by right of possession after the Soviet defeat of Nazi German in
battle, and by vi rtue of the Yalta Agreement, which the Soviets viewed as a fruit of victory and as a
license for hegemony over what has come to be known as Eastern Europe.^ They immediately
embarked on a policy of Sovietization in their nev.' lands as a means of ensuring that hegemony;
Poland was no exception. The central feature of this policy and process of Sovietization was the
imposition of a Stalinist -style Communism on Poland, a monistic Communism that mandated the
renwv'al of all roots of pluralism from Polish society. Thisliquidation of "class enemies ' involved
the extirpation of popular political parties; the isolation and eventual elimination of
representatives of the previously- recognized Polish government-in-exile that had ?pent the war
^Steven, The Poles
, p 265.
^Arthur R. Pachv/ald, "Poland: Quo Yadisl*", Current Historu . November 1 982, p. 372.
yean in London; tfie compulsory incorporation of the Polish Socialist Party (PP3) into the
Communist-onqinated Polish Workers' Party (PPR) to form the Polish United Workers' Party
(P2RP);and the organization of any remainiriq political "parties" into a PZRP- dominated United
Front. Fraudulent elections vere used to ratify these nev arrangements. The Communists also
declared ideological war on liberal and religious values while pursuing policies of nationalization
and collectivization in the economic realm that served to emphasize the dependence of the
individual on the government.^
Through Soviet dictate, Poland's boundaries moved west to the old Curzon Line in the East
(yielding ancient Polish territories to the Soviet Republics Ukraine and Byelorussia) and to the
Oder-Neisse Line in the West (incorporating the old German lands of East Prussia, Pomerania, and
Silesia into the new Poland). Poland thus acquired over 100,000 square kilometers, including
important industrial and maritime areas, from Germany as compensation for the 1 60,000 square
kilometers, including Vilnius and Lvov, that were surrendered to the Soviet Union. These
territorial adjustments were accompanied bJj a' massive forced migration of populations in which
some three million Poles were removed from farms in the eastern territories and resettled into
the nev/ly- acquired western territories. The 2.5 million indigenous Germans of those western
lands were forcibly expelled to provide roomi for the new settlers. As a result of these migrations
and the Nazi extermination efforts against Poland's sizeable pre-war Jewish minority, Poland also
achieved a new ethnic purity. Whereas in 1 939 about 30 percent of Poland's population had been
comprised of ethnic minorities, by 1 950 the country v/as 96 percent ethnic Polish, of whom more
than 90 percent were Roman Catholic."*
The Poland that emerged then after World War 1 1 was largel y a product of Soviet thi nki nq. The
system established in Poland under Soviet tutelage was not as visibly repressive as the system in
^Rachwald, "Poland: QuoVadis?", p. 371.
'^Harold D. Nelson, ed., Poland
. A CountruStudu ("vVashinqton, DC: U. S. Government Printing
Press, 1983), p. 72.
the USSR under Stalin- -even .'at the height of Stalinism in Poland there vere no "^hov trials" and
executions or purged Communist leaders like those in the soviet union. Nevertneiess, the
oountrg's political and economic- systems, geographic configuration, and ethnic composition \v'ere
all shaped bg a Soviet Union that was traditionally hostile to Poland's viev of itself as a pro-
V/estern, Catholic, and democratic state. The Sovietization of Poland vas, in effect, an attempt to
de-Europeanize/de- Westernize Polish political culture.^
The forced introduction of the Soviet model into Poland soon resulted in a sharp political
cleavage betv/een the Polish nation and its government. Poles rightfully viewed the government,
i.e., the Party-government -security apparatus, as foreign and subservient at least in large part
to un- Polish (or worse, pro -Soviet) interests. The Soviet model imposed on a war-devastated
Poland a rigid, centrally- planned economy favoring Soviet needs. The initial Polish six- year plan
(covering the gears 1950-1955.) envisioned the pursuit of rapid industrialization in a Poland
that had been largely agricultural prior to World War II. The rigorous execution of such a plan in
itself would have caused treme-ridous strain, dislocation, and inefficiency through blatant disregard
of comparative economic advantage in favor of ideological principle. But as recent scholars have
suggested, Stalin Increased the burden by forcing Poland to further violate its national economic
interests by forcing it to organize a large military-industrial complex to Soviet specifications on
top of the fact of industrialization. Poland was ordered to revise its six- year plan to accomplish a
militarization of the economic and social life of the country in a three- year period. The result was
the victimization of civilian-oriented investment as the military aspects of the plan simply took
over a large portion of existing and much- needed civilian factories and reallocated resources und
production factors sorely needed in the nonmilitary sectors.^
^A. Ross Johnson, "Poland in Crisis", Rand Mote
.
H- 1 o91 -AF, July 1 932.
'=For a detailed discussion of the reasons, supporting statistics, and effects of this imposition
see Michael Checinski, '"Poland's Military Burden", Problems of Communism
.
May- June 1 9-33.
The separation of the qovernrnent from the people, and the inefficiency and distortion of Polish
economic life, are an enduring legacy of the post-var Sovletization program in Poland and are at
the heart of the last forty years of Polish history^ This legacy has generated a cyclical pattern of
revolt that has been punctuated by the events of 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and 19i50. The
course of the cycle is that of revolt, folloved by government promises to correct past mistakes,
brief lip-service to reform, and finally, an inevitable return to centralized, autocratic,
bureaucratic practices that once again generate unrest, resistance, and revolt.
Follov/ing the death of Stalin in V953, Khrushchev's de-3talinization drive culminated in his
February 1 956 address to the Twentieth Party Congress of the KPCC. This process, combined v/ith
the sudden death of P2PR first secretary Boleslaw Bierut in March 1956, set the political stage
for the 1956 crisis in Poland.^ For the Poles Stalinism and Sovletization v/ere one in the
3ame;talk of de-Stalinization aroused expectations of de- Sovletization as veil. Bierut's death
accentuated a deep split in the PZRP between strict adherents to the Moscow line and those vho
favored a more Polish identity. This political turmoil was complicated by a downward economic
trend, especially in the area of consumer goods and services, a result of the Soviet -imposed shift
from a pre-war agricultural economy to a post-war industrial one.
Rising food prices and work quotas eventually sparked a workers' strike in Poznan on 2S June
1 956. Within minutes the clamoring for bread assumed traits of a political revolt as Polish Hags
were unfurled and anti -Soviet slogans were combined with attacks on the local PZRP headquarters
'Jadv/iqa Staniszkis, "Economic Cycles and Politics in Poland", Osteuro pa, (Aachen, West
Germany), No. 3, 1982, p. 35 [cited in Checinski, "Poland's Military Burdern"). Dr Stamszkis
argues that most of Poland's post-v/ar economic difficulties and cyclical crises v/ere a direct
result of the phases of modernization of the 'vVarsav/ Treaty Organization.
'^Adam Ulam goes so far as to suggest that Bierut died of a heart attack from hearing
Khrushchev's speech; E.x pansion and Co -existence (New '/ork: Praeqer Publishing, 1974), p.
578. Erv/in Weit, Gomuika's personal interpreter, said later that Bierut actually committed
suicide as he could not force himself to obey Khrushchev's instructions to return to Poland and
dismantle the now discredited cult of personality v/hich he (Bierut) had so faithfully served;
Ostblock Intern
. (Hamburg: 1970), p. 37 as cited In Dallace L. Meehan, Poland: National
Autonomu or Soviet Invasion? Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 1 978, p. 19.
building. Khrushchev himself recognized and later mentioned the isnti -Soviet overtones of the
riots vn his memoirs.'^ Polish army infantrg and tank forces vere ordered into action and they
suppressed the riots that same afternoon and evening. Warsaw Radio reported some 48 persons
killed and another 424 vounded, but Western sources in Poznan during the riots (an international
trade fai r vas 1 n progress at the ti me) esti mated the dead at 200- 300.^ "^ The riots represented
a terrible challenge to the Polish regime and underscored the need for a new leader who could
restore unity to the party while gaining some measure of popular support for government policies.
The choice, advanced by the PZRP and later ratified after initial and vociferous protest by
Khrushchev, fell on Wladislaw Gomulka. Gomulka was a relatively popular leader of the "national"
wing of the PZRP (he had been in the Communist element of the Polish underground during V-Zorld
War 11 while Bierut had been in Moscow; Gomulka had been purged in 194S for "nationalism").
He proceeded to appease the Poles by announcing a "Polish road to Socialism". Gomulka's plan
involved the establishment of workers' councils, the reprivatization of most of the 10,500
collective farms, the removal of Marshal Rokossovsky' ^ and other Soviet -appointed officers in
the Polish high military command, rela.xatlon of censorship, and expansion of civil rights to pacify
membersof the intelligentsia and the Catholic Church.
Within SIX months Gomulka began a roll back policy. The workers" councils served as
Communist mobilization forums, censorship was revived, and civil rights were reduced. Against
the advice of his economists, who argued that economic decentralization was a necessitu and that
'^Nikitg Khrushchev, K h r us he hev Remem be rs
,
translated and edited by Stobe Talbott, (Boston:
Little, Brown -k Co., 1 974), pp. 1 98-200.
I'^ FcictsonFile
.
No. S13,June 27 -July 3, 1956, p. 217.
^ 1 Marshal Rokossovsky, although ethnically Polish, was a Soviet citizen and officer .•,•' ho v/as
the Polish minister of defense and commander-in-chief of the Polish armed forces at this time.
Marshal Rokossovsky, thirty other Soviet generals, and hundreds of other Soviet officers had been
placed directly into the Polish military command structure following the Soviet occupation of
Poland in the closing months of Vy'orld War II. These Soviet appointees were to ensure the
obedience of the Polish military to Soviet directives, and were to supervise the restructuring and
reorqanization of the Polish armed forces alonq Soviet lines.
Poland needed a more Dalanced economy, Gomulka rejected reforms that vould have liberalized the
Polish economic system. Fearing that decentralization of the economy vould veaken the leading
"role of the PZRP in Poland, Gomulka returned to strict centralized planning, pursued rapid
industrial grovth, and emphasized the production of capital goods. The cycle vas running true to
form- -after brief liberalization, Gomulka increasingly tightened political controls and
preoccupied himself and his government with the defense of Communist rule. For fourteen years
he managed to maintain control, appeasing nationalism and forging domestic consensus by skillful
manipulation of the issue of Poland's' border vith Germany, and maintaining good standing vith
Moscow through loyal support. Thus Gomulka became one of the leading advocates for socialist
fraternal intervention to repress the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 196i3; such a move to
combat the Czechoslovakian disease helped, of course, to maintain domestic "tranquility" in Poland
as well.
It is important to note, however, that while Gomulka demonstrated loyal support to Moscow in
his policies, Poland continued to deviate from .Soviet preference in certain matters. Specifically,
agriculture retained its private character and the Roman Catholic Church maintained a uniquely
strong national, as well as religious, role. Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, primate of Poland, had
been released from prison during the 1956 liberalization period (he had been arrested in
September 1 953 after confronting the Bierut regime on the issue of proposed government control
of Church appointments). Having successfully led the Polish church during the most difficult
times of the Sovietization period against attempts by the government to destroy the Church as an
independent institution, Cardinal Wyszynski directed his efforts in the Gomulka era to resisting
government efforts to circumscribe religious and Church-sponsored educational activities.^^
The Gomulka regime tried to weaken Church influence through increased Marxist
indoctrination in schools, atheistic propaganda compaigns, the introduction of social legislation




opposed by the Chnjch (e.g., abortion)
,
prohibitions on the construction of nev churches to serve
the needs or a population moving into urban centers as a result or industrialization, special taxes
for clergy, and even personal attacks on Cardinal V/yszynski. Each of these thrusts v/as blunted
through Cardinal Wyszynski's strong leadership, clerical solidarity, selective civil disobedience,
non-compliance with government regulation, and popular mobilization of Church members in
maintaining Church perogatives and in meeting Church needs. The Catholic clergy advocated a
people's Catholicism based on the premise that ordinary people were more reliable supporters of
theChurchthan were Catholic intellectuals; this permitted the Polish people, through traditional
Church celebrations, to manifest support for their Church and opposition to official state doctrine.
This curious blend of Church and nationalism enjoyed particular opportunity for expression in the
millenial celebration of Christianity in Poland in 1 966. Rival state celebrations could not capture
the imagination of the people like those of the Church. Although the Church celebrations focu-sed on
religious themes, they could not help but be a statement of Polish national identity and a reminder
of the role of the Church in the -foundation of both the Polish state and nation (in contrast to the
foreign -derived Gomulka regime).
The ijisillusionment with Gomulka continued to deepen in the 1 9603 as he moved further from
the liberalization that had marked his coming to power in 1956. Division within the PZRP
resulted in sniping at Gomulka from the technocrats (led by Edward Gierek) who pressured for
reform, especially economic reform. Attacks were also mounted by the Partisans, led by the
minister of internal affairs, Mieczyslav Moczar, who advocated even tighter central control over
the Party apparatus. In February and March of 1 96i3, thousands of Warsaw students took to the
streets to participate in sit-in strikes and demonstrations In protest over cultural censorship.
The Prague Spring heightened tensions as Gomulka used the situation to draw closer tn Moscow for
support since his legitimacy at home was failing. Moczar used the student disturbances to weaken
further Gomulka '3 Party control throughdiscovery of a "Zionist plot" that "incriminated" some of
Gomulka's closest associates and forced their removal from office. Poland under Gomulka slid into
i general atmosphere of intellectual repression, economic sluggishness, and general despair and
depressions^
B. 1970-1980
The dissatisfaction v/ith Gomulka reached critical mass In 1970. The autocratic and rigid
party control of the economy left the regime incapable of effectively managing the economic crisis
that it spawned in December of that year. Tvo consecutive bad years of poor crops (made vorse by
a shortage of fertilizer), combined' vith a long-standing neglect of and under -investment 1n
agriculture, had resulted in a decline in farm production and the necessity to import millions of
tons of grain from abroad. (Poland vas historically known as one of the breadbasket areas of
Europe.) V/hereas agriculture exports had previously been used to finance modernization and
investment In industry, such exports nov had to be cut. The Gomulka government decided to
Increase domestic food prices to slov domestic demand; the Increase (up to 33 percent on meat, Z5
percent on dairy products) took effect just before the festive Christmias .season. A nev, reduced
vage scale vas also 1 ntroduced.
The result v/as strikes and riots of Industrial workers In the Baltic cities of Gdansk, Gdynia,
Szczecin, and Sopot. Party buildings v/ere torched and strikers in Szczecin even took over the city
government. Polish regular army units were called in. When the strikers refused to disperse, the
troops attacked, killing 45 and Injuring 1200 (according to official publications). Reportedly
3 uffe ri ng from a ne rvo us b rea kdow n , Gom ul ka resi g ned as fi rst sec reta r y , ^ "^ 1 eade rs hi p passed to
Edward Glerek.
^^Johnathon Randal, "Power Struggle Persists Among Polish Communi-sts", New York Times
.
31 October 1968.
^^Secunty troops moved into isolate Gomulka in his villa three days before Ms resignation.
There is little doubt that he v/as forced from office by the Gierek/Moczar factions who had
challenged him earlier. See Meehan, Poland: National Autonom u or Soviet Invasion^ , p. 46.
Glerek vas known as a technician, a long -time member of the party hierarchy, vho had served
as Party secretary at Katowice, Silesia. Upon assuming control, he blamed everything on Gomulka
and calmed the nation by rescinding the price increases, boosting minimum pay rates, and
promising "socialist democracy" and "socialist v/elfare" (consumerism) Helped initially by
emergency Soviet credits and support, Gierek embarked on an ambitious strategy of
simultaneously forcing the pace of industrialization and satisfying consumer demands J ^
Gierek's "new development strategy" was keyed to large-scale import of capital and technology
from the West. Such investment would be used to restructure and modernize the economy while
stimulating an increase in consumption that was necessary to create incentives, without which it
would be difficult to achieve higher labor productivity. Western machines and equipment would be
used in new or newly- modernized plants to provide high-quality manufactured goods in accordance
with Western specifications for export to the V-/est; licensing from, or even occasionally,
cooperation with Western firms would be acceptable. The goal was to achieve quickly an excess of
exports over imports. Exports to fellow members of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA)^^ and to less -developed countries, as v/ell as to the West, were expected to increase the
scale of production. When combined wit-h modernized capital stock and increased labor
productivity, this program was expected to ensure an intensive pattern of development.^
"^
The implementation of the "new development strategy" produced a rapid increase of Poland's
ties v/ith the West, ties encouraged and made more acceptable in a period of budding East- West
^^Johnson, "Poland in Crisis", p. 2.
^^CMEA, also known as Comecon, was founded in 1949 Initially structured tn link the
economies of the East European countries into a Soviet-controlled socialist, economic bloc,
membership in CMEA today is the basis for inclusion in the Socialist Commonwealth of Nations.
Members today are Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Laos, Mongolia,
Poland, Romania, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union.
^"^For a more Jetailed analysis of Gierek's economic program see Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl,
"The Polish Economy in the 1970$' in U. S Congress, Joint Economic Committee, East European
Eco no miles Post- Helsinki
.
a compendium of papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee,
U.S. Congress (Washington, D. C: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1 979), pp. 81 6-864.
detente. Indeed, one uf Gomulka'? finrji acts in 1970 had been to sign a treaty v1th the Feder^jl
Republic of Germany that recognized the Oder- Ni esse line as Poland's vestern frontierJ^ The
Polish standard of living shot up also, but everything vas riding artificially on a flood of Western
credits; by 1975 Poland's hard- currency debt vas racing tov/ard $20 billion. Emphasis on
Industry had discriminated once again against agriculture, a relatively more efficient and more
productive earner of hard-currency through export. Declining agricultural production
necessitated food imiports, further deepening the balance-of- payment difficulties. Profitable
exports to non-socialist countries also proved difficult to expand, particularly in the
circumstances of a world economic slowdown occasioned by Middle Eastern oil price increases;
Such increases also prompted the Soviet Union to reduce its supply of cheap oil to Poland as the
Soviet Union sought to cash in on rising oil prices for its own hard-currency needs. Perhaps most
important, Gierek's programs did nothing to eliminate the bureaucratic inefficiencies and
economic rigidity of the Communist command economic system. Production bottlenecks remained
while wages increased, demand exceeded supply on the consumerism side of the strategy, and
domestic inflationary pressures added to the generally deteriorating economic situation.'''
By 1 976 the situation had becomie so bad that Gierek's government announced pending foodstuff
price increases (nearly 70 percent for meat, 40 percent for grain); the intent again was to
curtail consumption while stimulating production. Predictably, strikes and riots ensued in Plack,
Radom, and the Baltic ports. According to official Polish government sources, at least 75
policemen were Injured and two demonstrators were killed. Remembering the 1970 crisis,
^'^The signing of the treaty and the settlement of the frontier issue incidentally called into
question the fundamental premise of official Polish pojt-v/gr security policy, i.e., the argument
that Poland needed alliance with the Soviet Union in order to secure protection from " German
revanchism". Poland's alignment with the Soviet Union thus became more clearly a case of Soviet
interest than Polish, although the German threat provides n-iatenal for government propaganda to
this day, and at time? clouds Polish relations even with the Democratic Republic of Germany,
especial! y on the public level
.
^'For further analysis of Gierek's policy and its reasons for failure see Zbigniew M.
Fallenbuchl. "Poland's Economic Crisis". Problems of Communism . March-April 19S2; see also
Nelson, Poland
.
A Countr u Stud u. pp. 84-7.
Glerek rescinded the proposed price increases .und again secured Soviet loans to bandage the
economij. undouDtedlg, Glerek's on-qoing domestic ideological oirensive (especially since 1974)
that emphasized Polish-Soviet political solidarity and continued fraternal relations vith the
Soviets vas ofasistance in securing such aid. Gierek had convinced Moscov in early 1 976 that he
vas firmly in control , despite clashes vith Cardinal Wyszynski on the subject of nationalism and
divisions within the Party on the issue of proposed constitutional changes that would have
strengthened Soviet- Polish fraternal ties.
The significance of the 197i5 disturbances, though, is that in the aftermath of the riots,
se^/eral leading intellectuals, already agitated by the ideological offensive and encouraged by the
1975 Helsinki Agreement, established the Committee for the Defense of the V/orkers (Komitet
Oboronq Robotnikow or KOR). The purpose of KOR was to investigate independently charges of
police brutality during the strikes and to provide legal aid for arrested workers as well as
assistance for their families.^o For the first time in post-war history, Polish intellectual? and
workers v/ere uniting in mutual :yjpport. The intellectuals had been alone in 1968, the workers
in 1 970. KOR provided a link between the two and an organizational framework for developing the
political awareness and organization of the Polish workers.^i
In the post- 1 976 period the Church too became more assertive. Cardinal Wyszynski had long
walked the tightrope between compromise and resistance, never allowing the Church tn become
identified with a particular social or economic system, and always directing criticisms at human
rights abuses but not at Communism per se or at a specific leader. In the late 1970s, the
intellectuals began to appreciate more fully the success of the Church in resisting the government
while preserving the Polish national identity and staunchly defending human rights. This new
^'^ Nelson, Poland
,
A Countr u Stud g, p. 38.
2^ KOR organized and sponsored a "flying univerjity", .?!0 named for the vay it cnntinually
traveled all over Poland, that challenged the Party's control of education and contributed to the
circulation of clandestine publications that challenged the Party's monopoly of information.
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accept'jnceof theChurch by the intellectuals helped lay the groundvork for the close cooperation
of the Church, intellectHjab, and vorker? that would uniquely characterize the 1 960 crisis.^^
The Helksinki Agreement had aifirn'ied the position of the Church in its defense of human
rights. The election of the Archbishop of Krakov, Karol Cardinal Wojtyla as Pope in October
1 978, avakened nev self-esteem in the Polish people. The visit of Pope John Paul II to his native
Poland in June 1 979 illustrated the unifying link and crystallizing factor of the Church in Po1i:?h
society; it also served as a dress rehearsal for the future. The Pope's visit left the Polish people
vith a marked sense of their ov/n -.strength and their rulers' weakness. It also heightened the
contrast between the Church and the Party, the two mass institutions seeking to represent and
mold public opinion. The Church was increasingly seen in the role of defending the rights of the
people at large while promoting justice, truth, and honest work. The Party, on the other hand,
seemed concerned only with the welfare of its own narrow constituency.^^
The Party was not oblivious to KOR or these events. The security police actively engaged in
confisating publications, harassing and monitoring individuals, and breaking up meetings.
However, Gierek did not seem overly concerned. Moreover, he had a particular interest in
developing good relationships in the West with such leaders as '•^Vest German Chancellor Schmidt
and French President Giscard d'Estaing. Gierek, of course, wanted '•^Vestern credits and resources
to supply his economy. He also served Soviet interests in promoting such contacts with the West
and thus served as intermediary for Breshnev's meeting with GLscard in May 19yu in Warsaw
Such a role naturally gave Gierek prestige and a certain amount of apparent independence as well.
Too repressive a policy at home toward the Church or KOR could jeopardize his position and those
relationships. •^^ Gierek believed that he was basically secure with the Soviet leaders; his policy
22j. Nowak, "The Church in Poland", p. 1 2.
^^Nlcholas G. Andrews, Poland 19S0-31 (Washington, D. C; National Defense University




thus became one of defense of position and avoidance of angthinq that would rock the boat too
greatly.
C. THE 1980-81 CRISIS
As the decade of the seventies closed i n Poland, the thunderclouds v/ere qatheri nq once more. It
V!=is no secret that the econorng v/as failing, despite Partg propaganda claims of success. The
standard of living, vhich had stagnated in 1 977 and 1 978, began to decline in 1 979. Food lines
grev longer vhile vorkers v/orkeil'more v/eekends and longer hours. The Party's banner of
honesty, fairness, and morality was heavily soiled as people observed elitism, corruption, and
arrogance toward the masses. Gierek seemed not to tolerate any criticism of ineffective policies,
although by 1979 even Party members were urging economic reform. Instead, Gierek addressed
the VIM Congress of the PZRP in February 1930 and called for more sacrifices- -reduction in
unnecessary investments, cutback on lesser- priority imports to correct the balance-of- trade,
and an increase of productivity. Ho mention was made of improvement in the average worker's
living or working conditions.
Gierek did replace Prime Minister Jaroszewicz with a long-time associate, Edward Babiuch
and set him to work on an economic "reform" program. By April 1980, Babiuch concluded that
some reform of food prices (that had been basically stabilized since 1970 at the cost of huge
subsidies) was necessary. It was decided, however, not to make public announcements of the
increases to avoid drawing attention to them (although some meat prices were to increase 90- 1 00
percent). On 1 July, the meat price increase quietly went into effect. The increase was noticed;
by mid-July strikes were breaking out.^^
-^^In the seemingly endless saga of meat prices (a situation that goes on today) it is refreshing
and enlightening to hear what Poles think about it. Humor is a good conveyor of such thoughts.
Quip heard recently in Poland: "Before the war, you'd see a sign on a shop-front and it would -jay
Butcher' And you went in and you found meat. Today the same shop has a sign which says "Meat".




The story of the strikes of 1980 and the rise .und fall of SolidantLi is a fascinating one :ind
•v/orthy of separate study 1 n itself.^^ What vas particular! y notevorthy about the 1 980 str1 kes
,
and in large part responsible for their initial triumph, was the disciplined behavior of the
strikers. Violence vas avoided to deprive the government authorities of any pretext for action.
Additionally, KOR served as a clearinghouse for Information about strikes and negotiations,
provided advice to the strike committees, and maintained liaison betveen the many committees and
their leaders. The Church also lent support by organizing a support system for the strikers'
families, and by speaking out at the parish level in early support of the strikers. The .strikers
themselves were not limited to manual workers, but included engineers, middle-level employees,
and even members of n"ianagement; the university students and other intellectuals also supported
the strikers. In September, this unity was expressed In the formation of a decentralized
independent trade union known as "Solidarnosc" or Solidarity. It took as Its symbols the Polish
nag, the cross, and the banner "Workers of All Enterprises Unite".
Faced with a spreading strikes across Poland, Gierek tried first In July- August to negotiate
settlements with workers striking at Individual plants. Gierek desparately wanted to persevere in
raising prices to establish the precedent. By early August, though, the negotiated wage Increases
that had been granted to the workers at the different striking plants had hit $1.1 billion with no
end yet in sight. While Gierek was In the Soviet Union in August, apparently seeking Soviet
economic assistance and explaining how he was dealing with the situation, the prestigious Gdansk
shipyards struck and the whole situation became critical. The strike triggered even more large
2^0ne of the most readable and thorough accounts of the strikes and subsequent events through
martial law is Nicholas G. Andrews, Poland 1980-81 . Andrews is a senior Foreign Service
Officer who was stationed in Poland and witnessed the events that led to martial law and the
banning of Solidarity.
An excellent source book on the events 1s William F. Robinson, ed.. The Strikes in Poland
.
(Munich: Radio Free Europe Research, 1980). Robinson has collected documents ^nd reports,
observations and broadcasts that he has placed chronologically from 1 6 July- 22 September 1 980.
The sense of immediacy conveyed by the broadcasts is fascinating, while the collection of
documents and analysis of Soviet and East European media coverage in the appendices is unusual
andeniiqhteninq.
scale strikes 'alonq the Boiltic ports and in major industrial centers. D raving up a list of 21
demands, tfie strikers held firm. On 31 August 1980, Glerek capitulated and,, ln a ceremony
broadcast later that evening by Radio Warsav, signed the Gdansk Agreeme nt.'^'^ Perhaps most
important among the demands, the government acknovledged the right of the workers to strike and
to form independent laPor unions, and guaranteed their independence. Having signed the
agreement, Gierek repartedly collapsed mentally and physically. He vas replaced on 6 September
by Stanislav Kania, a PZRP politburo member previously in charge of internal security and
Party-Church relations.
Arthur R. Rachvald has noted that the 1980-81 Polish crisis can, as in classical drama, be
divided into three acts. The first act is "A Search for Partnership", Act Tvo is "Polarization'",
a nd Act T h ree i s " K noc ko ut - - T he Lesse r Evi 1" . 28 D u ri ng t he f1 rst stage of t he c r i si s , begi n ni ng
vith the Gdansk Agreement, the search for a /7?4?.vi''^? vfyend? seemed to characterize the actions
of Solidarity and the Party. Both sides recognized the corruption of the Glerek era and sought to
avoid head-on collision vhile attempting to assess the situation and consolidate pover. The Gdansk
Agreement endorsed the principle of one-party rule as Solidarity pledged to concern itself only
v/ith "bread-and-butter" issues and not to transform itself into a political party. Socialism in
Poland, collective ovnership of the means of production, the leading role of the Party
(Communist/PZRP), and the existing system of alliances, vere also guaranteed. The political
essence of the agreement was an attempt to restrict the "monistic nature of Communism by
1 ntroduci ng elements of 11 mi ted gover nment."2-
As J. B. de V^eydenthal pointed out in a September 1 980 analysis of Gierek's fall , "The most
important failure of Gierek's leadership, a failure that precipitated its final undoing, vas its
-^See Appendix A for text of agreement.
2®Arthur R. Rachvald, "Poland: Quo "'/adis", in Current Historu
.
November 1982, pp. 373-
391
.
His description of each act is presented in the following paragraphs.
^^Rachvald, "Poland: Quo 'v'adis'?", p. 373.
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inability to integrate the workers into the system of rule. Indeed, one could assert that the
relations between the leadership and the workers were the key factor in Polish politics throughout
Gierek's rule.'^'^' The Gdansk Agreement was an attempt to redress this failure. Through
contractual guarantees of the rights to organize, to bargain, to strike, to access the mass media
while enjoying freedom of the press, opinion and publication, and to practice the freedom of
religion, the workers sought more active participation in the People's Republic. Perhaps most
telling, the agreement contained a general clause that authorized Solidarity to "pass public
judgment on key decisions determining the standard of living of the population." For a few months
optimism in attaining the majus Vivendi reigned in Poland. Whereas the previous competitive
coexistence of the Church and Party in Poland had found common ground only in the .sentiment of
patriotism, the advent of Solidarity seemed to offer a bridge, an expansion to a more stable triad of
Party, Church, and Solidarity, since Solidarity was both socialist and patriotic.
Such optimism, however, overlooked inescapable and foreboding realities. By recognizing
worker demands, the Gdansk Agreement became an attempt to reconcile two conflicting n-iodels of
politics; "democracy" , in which power flows from the bottom up, and Communist autocracy, in
which the prevailing flow is from the top downv/ard. Despite Solidarity pledges to the contrary,
what had occurred was a de f^cto destruction of the Party's monopoly of the economy,
information, and ideology. The Party now confronted an organized, legal opposition representing
the workers, who had, in fact, gained a veto over many aspects of Polish politics. With Solidarity
membership growing toward its eventual height often million members, nearly 70 percent of the
labor force (as compared to three million Party members, one-third of whom also belonged to
Solidarity!), the entire ideological foundation of the Party's existence was challenged. As such
recognition dawned, the Party's humiliation and determination to erase this frightening precedent
increased.
^•^'J. B. de Weydenthal, "The End of the Gierek Era" in Robinson, The Strikes in Poland
, p. 19
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When Solidantg began to implement the provisions of the Gdansk Agreement into dally life, the
dichotomies became visible. As Solidarity and the Party struggled over control or the radio,
television, press, police, education, and economic organizations, distrust mounted and Party
resistance stiffened. It became increasingly apparent that Solidarity viewed the Gdansk Agreement
as the first step in the renewel of the Polish nation; the Party had thought the agreement vas to
end the process.
Using the weapons of strike and demonstration, oolidanty sought to advance its cause. The
ability of the 'oolidanty leadership to negotiate compromises became increasingly strained,
however, as the weeks passed. The reluctance of the Party to grant "further concessions" has
already been noted. In the Solidarity camp internal control of increasingly eager and militant
factions became more difficult as Solidarity became the proverbial bandwagon for every sort of
opposition to the Communist system, to 1 ncl ude advocates of the violent overthrow of the state. The
prospect of general strikes and the threat of chaos provided grounds for the government to draw a
line of no retreat and even to grab for some lost legitimacy as the holder of the instruments of
power and hence, stability through force. Government pronouncements indicated that the Party
was not about to relinquish its responsibilities (and privileges) for Poland's ultimate destiny, and
it was not slow to remind the Poles of their geographical situation and what that could mean if
thingsgotout of hand.
Act Two, "Polarization", began in July 19S1 in Warsaw with the Ninth Extraordinary
Congress of the PZRP. The rank and file of the Party itself had begun to exhibit reformist
tendencies in early 1981. The demands of these reformists for greater liberalization and
democratization of the Party pressured the leadership to agree finally to the Extraordinary
Congress in July. The reformists hoped to renew the Party from within- -to attack corruption
and economic mismanagement, and to refurbish the Party image. Aware of the power and source of
strength of Solidarity in its ability to represent popular demands, many of the Party delegates
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5im1l3rlg 5poke of populism, democracy, and the accountatiillty of P^iirty officials to their
constituencies; little vas said about Marxism- Leninism and democratic centralism.-^^
Such reformists vere not widely successful. Although a certain amount of democratization
took place vithin the Party itself- -e.g., free discussion, secret balloting, and a decrease of Party
professionals elected to the Central Committee- -the same democratization v/as definitely not
extended to the government at large.-^^ Furthermore, the nev Central Committee members,
though highly- motivated and well-intentioned, proved no match for the surviving veterans.
Instead, much of the congress was spent in settling old scores and in attempting to apportion blame
for the crisis. No program for solving the crisis was established. The red tape of the system
remained and the party bureaucracy retained intact most of its personnel and perogatives. The
changes were cosmetic and real power remained in the hands of a few, who were determined to hold
on at all costs.
In a move to broaden its power base in the face of such attacks, the professional cadres of the
Party formed an alliance with the internal security forces and the top echelon of the army. The
Polish Army had retained its popularity with the Polish people ^^ and the Party sought to co-opt
that popularity for itself. General Wojclech Jaruzelski had already been invited to become Prime
Minister in February. For the army and security forces it was a question of duty and of assisting
^^ Rachwald, "Poland: Quo Vadis?'", p. 3 75.
^^in comparing the Central Committees elected by the Eighth (1979) and Ninth Party
Congresses, the proportion of party profe-ssionals fell 50 percent to 8.5 percent, while the
combined representationof workers, foremen, farmers and intellectuals rose from 30 percent to
over 60 percent (31.3 percent workers and foremen, 13 percent intellectuals, 18.5 percent
farmers). Radio Free Europe Research, RAD Background Report, no. 221 , 3 August 1 981 , p. 5 as
cited in Rachwald, "Poland: Quo Yadis?", p. 375.
"a poll taken in 1 980 by sociologists from the Polish Academy of Sciences showed that the
1 nsti t uti ns e ni o yi ng t he g reetest co nfi de nee we re : t he Cat hoi 1 c Church (94 pe rce nt ) , So I i dan t y
(90 percent), the army (39 percent), the Sejm or parliament (31 percent), and the Council of
State (73 percent). Only 32 percent of the respondents declared confidence in the party. Anna
Jasinska and Ryszarda Siemienska, "The Socialist Personality: A Case Study of Poland,"
International Journal of Sncloloqu. no. 1, (London, 1983), p. 64, cited in Jerzy Milevski,
Krzysztof Pomian, and Jan Zielonka, "Poland: Four Years After" in Foreign Affairs
.
Winter
1 984/85, p. 342.
the government to maintain control of a tense situation. For the Party, it alloved the professional
cadres to retain control as factional struggles and forces v/ltnin the Party surfaced. The apparatus
of coercion thus became the Party's principle source of pover, negating the idea of seeking a
broader base of pover i n any process of democratization.
Folloving the Party Congress, Party dogma vas re-emphasized. The Party rejected as
unrealistic proposals to restructure Poland's political front system to give more voice to
Solidarity; Instead, it increasingly portrayed Solidarity as a counter-revolutionary organization.
Socialist pluralism vas rejected on' the basis of the impossibility of reconciling tvo parallel
authorities. Party demands on Solidarity replaced the former villi ngness to negotiate, and battle
lines ve re formed.
Against this background, the National Congress of Solidarity met in September-Octooer
1 961 .^"^ Attendance included members of the Rural Solidarity, recognized by the governmient in
May. The Solidarity Congress seemed to confirm government charges that the labor union had
become a political party. Ideological nfts surfaced vithin Solidarity as "pragmatists" battled
"fundamentalists" in debating the future direction of Solidarity and its relationship to the state.
The fundamentalists (desiring fundamental reform) vanted to replace the monopoly of the Party in
all social, economic, and cultural affairs, and to establish pluralism in politics. They also vanted
to separate political authority from economic pover, and to remove the Party's presence from
factory-level comimittees. The pragmatists regarded the union as a social, not a political
movement. They accepted the realities of the political situation, but vanted to defend vhat had
already been von. They thus called upon the government to renounce the use of force against
society, and to recognize the nev pluralistic social and cultural outlook in public life. In return,
the pragmatists pledged that the union vas not to be linked to any political party.
^"^J. B. de 'vVeydenthal provides an analysis of the Congress in "Solidanty's First National
Congress: Stage One", Radio Frtie Europe Research
.
21 September 1981.
The congress finally mJopted 'i prognm that ;3ddressecl economii;, social , cultural , and political
Issues; It also reflected a "fundamentalist" tilt. The heart of the program vas a section called "Ttie
Self-Governing Republic". It argued for a transformation of the state through the introduction of
principles of self-government, democracy, and pluralism in order to both overcome the economic
crisis, and to meet the aspirations of the Polish people.-^^ It demanded free elections to the
people's councils as a basis for territorial self-government in the state, equality before the 1av,
an independent judiciary, social control of Investigative authorities, freedom of one's convictions,
and the permission to set up union-controlled and operated radio and TV stations.
Given its size, inexperience, and the conrlicts of interest vithin the membership, the
Solidarity Congress represented something of a triumph for democratic procedure; it also revealed
major weaknesses in Solidarity. There vas a reluctance of the regions represented at the congress
to entrust too much authority to the Solidarity National Commission; instead, they preferred to
trust themselves rather than the leadership they elected. The result vas a veak national
CO mi mission and a consequent diversion of resources to regional Issues. At the same time, many
delegates assumed an attitude that could be described as overconfident or even arrogant: they
Interpreted the government's seemiing reluctance to act as a sign of veakness and disarray, ana
indicative of the lack of any vill to act. This sentiment, in turn, promoted militancy vithin the
congress.-^^ Finally, vhile still maintaining the official desire to negotiate vith the Party, the
Solidarity Congress did call for workers in other Warsav Pact countries to establish independent,
self-governing unions similar to Solidarity. The Soviet nevs agency TAS3 vas quick to label such
a call as provocative and imprudent.^"^
^^Andrevs, Poland 1960-.?]
. p. Z1 0.
^^Andrzej Korbonski, "Poland" in Teresa Rakovska-Harmstone, ed.. Communism in Eastern
Euro pe. (Bloominqton: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 59.
^^Rachvald, "Poland: Quo Vadis?", p. 390.'
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In the face of such a challenge, the Party hardened further. The troubled economy had been
further weakened by the many strikes and social chaos during the previous fifteen months. After
the Solidarity Congress the economy continued to deteriorate;^^ the political situation too
appeared to be getting out of hand. Within the Party, hardliners reasserted themselves and
gradually silenced the reformers, vho were disillusioned at the failure of the Ninth Congress to
effect real change. Criticism of Kama himself by Party members increased, as did Soviet
criticism of the seemingly paralyzed PZRP leadership, although the Soviets made no explicit
demands for Kama's replacement. Kama's resignation in October 19S1 was a consequence of the
Party in-fighting and an indicator of the paralysis and disintegration of the Party; the center no
longer controlled the local Party organizations.-^^
Unable to agree on a successor for Kania from their own ranks, the Party turned to Jaruzelski.
Jaruzelski was seen as uncompromised by factional struggle, tough- minded, and of course, he
personified the prestige of the army v/hile being able to command its employment. Aware of the
Soviet sword of Damocles that hung over Poland, Jaruzelski moved quickly to exercise his
authority, enhancing the military presence and role of the military in the government through
appointment of officers to key posts. Already the Defense Minister and Prime Minister,
Jaruzelski concentrated unprecedented power for a military leader in a Communist country into
his hands.
By late 1 981 , the possibility of Soviet intervention seemed very real in light of the Solidarity
Congress' demands and government inaction. The prospect of free elections was not likely to tie
acceptable to the Soviets, let alone to the PZRP and its control of Poland. If the experience of
1945-7 meant anything, truly free elections were simply not permissible in Poland. Even if
Poland managed free elections. Solidarity did not have the ideological unity or political expertise to
^-Johnson, "Poland in Crisis'", p. 25.
^^Johnson, "Poland in Crisis", pp. 39-40
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run the country., especially in the face of Soviet opposition. The prospects for instability, if not
chaos, appeared ominous.
For Poland, the prospect of Soviet invasion carried the possibility of reduction to Soviet
"republic" or "provincial" status. Additionally, the East Germans might be called upon to
administer "temporarily" the Oder-Neisse territories. Since such a Soviet invasion '.vould, of
necessity, be massive, probably bloody, certainly ex pensive, and would undoubtedly discredit the
4
Soviet Union in vorld opinion as had happened in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1 966, the Soviets
might just decide to attempt to settle the Polish problem permanently. Since the Poles seemed
determined to resist more forcefully than did the Czechs, the severity that such a settlement v/ould
entail could constitute a real threat to Poland's national independence and even national identity."^'-'
Jaruzelskl met in November vith Solidarity leader Lech Walesa and the nev Church primate,
Cardinal Glemp (Cardinal V/yszynski had passed avay) , to discuss differences. No agreement vas
reached as Jaruzelski found Solidarity's demands for partnership in a nev/ national economic
council unacceptable. A radical Solidarity faction's call for the formation of vorkers' guards, a
strike at the Interior Ministry's fire fighters academy, and the increasing threat of food riots due
to shortages in early December, seems to have settled the issue in respect to timing. Contingency
planning for martial lav probably had been initiated shortly after the birth of Solidarity and
concrete preparations vere certainly completed by November I'j'SI.'^^ Despite official Soviet
silence, Warsaw Pact Commander-in-chief Kulikov spent the last half of November in Warsaw and
probably advised and assisted Jaruzelski during that time.
Given such a situation, it is understandable that Jaruzelski declared martial law (actually a
state of war since no provision for martial lav/ existed in the Polish coastitution) on 1 3 December
1 9tS1
,
just prior to the two- month deadline for free elections issued by the Solidantu Congress in
"^•^Rachwald, "Poland: Quo Yadis^", p. 391. So the argument often ran in Poland itself. For
the Soviet viev/ see the section of this paper on Soviet interests.
•^^ Johnson., "Poland in Crisis", pp. 30- 1
.
ijctober. In Jaruzel ski's estimation, he had only the armed forces and the securitu apparatus to
depend upon. Bg his measure, he had tried every other avenue or negotiation and had exhiDlted
great patience and moderation. He found himself continually pushed back vith mcreasinqly little
room for political maneuver. "He was a general in the role of a politician with no political options
left.'"*- Thus, to save himself and the Communist system in Poland, he had little choice hut to use
the forces of coercion to restore order. Jaruzelski publicly explained martial law in terms of
national security, political stability, and as the lesser of two evils- -the other, of course, being a
Soviet solution by direct intervention. Polish martial law at least preserved a system
administered by the Poles themselves."^^
In retrospect, it appears that Solidarity's major weakness in the 1 980-81 crisis was its own
lack of definite and consensual goals and objectives. While such were present at the time of the
Gdansk Agreement, the very success of these efforts promoted a situation that led to a case of "too
much, too fast" as far as the Party authorities were concerned. The bandwagon effect, while
registering the dissatisfaction of the nation for its government, also diluted the focus of the
original Solidarity organization and purpose. Rising aspirations among so many generated calls
for many different objectives, both in scope and in depth. In a day and age where politics and
economics walk hank-in-hand, the attempt of a trade union, a politico-economic organization, to
favor the economic to the excl usion of the political , is vi rtuall y 1 mpossi ble. Under the pressure of
Initial success and multi-goaled mass support, the slide into political emphasis is extremely
difficult to stem or even manage; this is particularly true in a country and for a people like that of
Poland, which had been so long denied a voice in its own political affairs. When this increased
emphasis on political affairs asserted itself. Solidarity found itself without a clear-cut plan for
managing the inevitable change in emphasis, and without a coherent, articulated program to direct
^2Andrew3, Poland 1980-81
. p. 266.
*-^The underground press v/ould later print Jaruzelski 's decree alongside a similar decree of
martial law issued by the Russian governor of Poland in the ruthless suppression of the Revolution
of 1863.
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and control the force of its popular support in the achievement of lUnlted gains at a slov/er rate.
While it is arguable that such control , combi nea v/ith a moderate rate of advance , may have yielded
a more defensible position for Solidarity, and may have enabled Solidarity to retain some yams
under conditions of a government counter-offensive, it is also true that the very nature of the
economic demands in Communist Poland made eventual political confrontation unavoidable.
To be sure, it vas not all Solidarity's fault that things finally got out of hand. Solidarity
originally took the position that it should limit Itself to monitoring government programs and
activities, and to providing advice and criticism as necessary. That It eventually altered that viev
is in part the responsibility of the government itself. Solidarity became convinced that the
government was incapable of .'straightening out the economy, and concluded that only the union
itself, vith its considerable prestige, could undertake such an effort. Unfortunately for
Solidarity, there vas no consensus on exactly hov to reform the system, or on hov to change
economic policy. The only consensus vas that the the Communist system had not vorked and
therefore, had to be substantially altered.
Impetus for Solidarity's distrust of the government stemmed directly from the union's
experience in attempting to implement the provisions of the Gdansk Agreement. As the authorities
reneged on their responsibilities under the agreement once they realized the import of its
provisions, Solidarity began to seek additional institutional guarantees for vhat had been granted
in the Gdansk Agreement. This search eventually took the form of demands for the formation of
workers' councils, for asocial council to participate in devising policy for the national economy,
and finally, for new general elections. In the argument of Nicholas Andrews, the entire Solidarity
program that was adopted at the Solidarity Congress, and the union's subsequent den'iands , reflected





For Jaruzelskl, the pace and direction of events in the Autumn of 1951 simply became too
much, with the v/hole regime tremtilinq under soiidaritu"? assault, and with the Soviets looking
anxiously over his shoulder, Jaruzelski did what he thought necessary and took the only course of
action remaining to him. Using the recently -strengthened ZOMO'*^ as the spearhead in order to
spare the army's prestige and to avoid possible situations ''//here Polish regular forces might prove
unreliable in supressing their countrymen, Jaruzelski declared martial law. In the dark hours of
a Sunday evening the security forces fanned out to arrest Solidarity leaders. Over 7000 .ictivists
were interned, personal freedoms were curtailed, and Jaruzelski assumed virtual dictatorial
powers at the head of a military junta. Act Three of the drama had been performed.
•^-The ZOMO (Zmotoryzowane Uddzialy Milicji Obywatelskiej) is the Motorized Umts of the
Citizens' Militia. Although ZOMO was established in 1956 after the Poznan riots pointed out
Poland's need for troops specially trained in not control, few Poles were aware of its existence
until 1981, Operating under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, ZOMO quickly
established itself as the Jaruzelski regime's most active and least popular enforcer of the martial
law regulations. In carrying out their duties, these police units established a reputation for
cruelty and agqressivenesa that led to widespread resentment, it is popularly believed that ZOMO
1? manned, in part, by criminals. ZOMO was unsucessfully deployed in the 1970 riots, and was
afterward completely reorganized, retrained, and purged of several thousand members considered
unfit for service. After 1930, ZOMO underwent a major expansion and by 1962, had between
25,000 and 30,000 personnel nationwide. They are equipped with tear gas, water cannon, and
other riot control gear as well as light armored vehicles. In addition to riot control, ZOMO units
have also been used to control crowds at public events, such as soccer games, and to provide
support in case of natural disasters. For further information see Nelson, Poland: A Countr u
Study, pp. 331-2.
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III. POLISH POLITICAL CULTURE
Poles! If you cannot prevent, your neighbor? from devouring your nation,
make it impossible for them to digest it.
- - Jea n - Jacq ue? Ro ussea u
A. INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THEORETICAL LITERATURE
The purpose of recounting the post- World War II history of Poland from a Polish perspective
is to impress upon the reader a sense of the unflagging determination and tough- minded
perseverence that would ultimately lead ten million Poles to join Solidarity in 19S0-S1. The
Poles, alone of all the Warsav Pact peoples, managed to force a change of government not once, but
three times ( 1 956, 1 970, 1 980) , largely through popular resistance. Despite Soviet efforts to
remake Polish society on a Soviet- Social 1st model, the Poles have persisted in popular opposition
to Soviet desires, and have resisted Sovietization, collectivisation, economic exploitation and
mismanagement, and attacks on their identity and Church. While "geographic realities" and
Communist policies have not been without effect in the 40 years since the imposition of
Communist rule in Poland, the state of present reality in Poland is certainly not what the Soviets
or their Polish Communist comrades had hoped for, or imagined would be the case, after four
decades of "Socialist Progress". In the Polish experience, while all roads may lead to (or at least
through) Moscow, the Soviets had been forced to recognize the existence of not one, but multiple
roads, some of which have a distinctly Polish design and scenery. V'/hile there are certainly
several explanations and reasons for the shape of reality in Poland today, anyone who knows a
little of Polish history cannot help but be drawn to explanations that include a discussion of Polish
political culture as a large contributing factor in explaining the virulence and continued- nature of
Polish resistance to Soviet models and policies to be found in post-war Poland- -up to, .^nd
including, the present situation.- Simply stated, such resistance seems to be a Polish tradition, and
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'should be expected in the comUct between the norms and ideas of Polish political culture and those
inherent to the Soviet model or Communism.
The concept of political culture is certainly not new as a tool in the examination of nations,
although the term Itself does not appear to have been used until the late eighteenth century.^
Montesquieu, in his De rfsp^rft '^es Lois, considered it appropriate to include a discussion of
the "general spirit" or "morals and customs of a nation" when analyzing a country; similarly, de
Tocqueville, in his Democracy in Americ-s, included many accounts of the habits, manners, and
opinions which he found to animate the Americans he encountered in his travels through America
in 1 831 , and to which he believed American democratic Institutions might largely be attributed.
Of course, the idea of civic values and the question of citizenship training is to be found as early as
the writings of Plato, while Aristotle initially dealt with the relationship of political culture to
social stratification and political structure; Plutarch, MachiavelH, and Rousseau also spoke
variously of political culture concepts and influences.
Political culture as employed by modern political scientists, however, is a product of the last
thirty years. Due to rapid de-colonlalizatlon around the v/orld and the emergence of many newly
independent states, political scientists of the post -V/orld War II era were faced with studying both
a larger and culturally much more heterogeneous range of political systems than had been the case
before the v/ar. Traditional methods of classification and categorization proved unwieldly or
unable to account for all the varieties and nuances that were to be encountered in the study of these
nations, despite similarities or seeming traditionality of formal institutions. Additionally, there
was concern that political science should make a practical contribution in determining the
prospects for "democratic modernization" among the newly Independent nations, and in preserving
them from Soviet and Communist influence. Furthermore, as political scientists observed events
in Soviet -dominated Eastern Europe, those who were growing Increasingly dissatisfied with the
^F. M. Barnard, "Culture and Political Development: Herder's Suggestive Insights", American
Political Science Review
.
Vol. 63, 1 969, p, 392.
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totalltsinrjn model of Communist rule looked for a model to explain the diversity and emerging and
varying resistance to Soviet r^jle v/hich they perceived in the societies and nations of the Soviet
European empire. The growing emphasis on comparative analysis of Communist politics virtually
demanded a consideration of political culture as an explanation of emerging reality. Thus the
political scientists drew on other disciplines, particularly sociology and anthropology, in a cross-
fertilization of politcal science and in the development of political culture theory.^
As one might expect in dealing vith such an intangible concept, while the existence of
something known as political culture is generally acknowledged to exist, there is much discussion
as to its particulars and its ope rationalization; that there appear to be as many definitions as there
are theorists is thus not surprising. Gabriel Almond says that "when we speak of the political
culture of a society, we refer to the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and
evaluations of its population it is the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward
political objects among the members of the nation.^ Sidney Verba defi nes political culture as the
"sy.stem of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which defines the situation in 'v/hlch
political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation to politics." For Verba,
political culture refers to "the system of beliefs about patterns of political interaction and
political institutions." As such it does not refer to the formal or informal structures of political
interaction, to governments, political parties, pressure groups, or cliques; rather, the emphasis
is on beliefs- -empirical about what the actual state of political life is, normative as to the goals
^For a short history of the development of the concept of political culture see Stephen White,
Political Culture and Soviet Politics (New Vork: St. Martin's press, 19S0), pp. 1-21. Those
readers desiring a more detailed history of political culture theory should see Gabriel Almond,
"The intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept" in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, eds.,
The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1 980), this work is particularly
good concerning ancient treatments of the subject. For other seminal works on political culture
see Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1963), Lucian VV. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds.. Political Culture and Political
Development (Princeton, Hew Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965); and Gabriel A.
Almond, "Comparative Political Sustems" . Journal of Politics
.
Vol
. 18, 1956, pp. 391-409.
^Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture
, pp. 14-15.
or values that ought to be pursued in political life.; and belief? possessing an important expressive
or emotional dimension.'^




Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments
v/hich give order and meaning to a political process and which
provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern
behavior in the political sgstem. It encompasses both the
political ideals and the operating norms of a polity. Political
culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the
psychological and subjective dimensions of politics.^
For Lucian Pye political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political
system and the life histories of the individuals who currently make up the system; it is rooted
equally in public events and private experiences. Political culture theory constitutes an attempt
to integrate psychology and sociology in order to be able to "apply to dynamic political analysis
both the revolutionary findings of modern depth psychology and recent advances in the sociological
techniques for measuring attitudes in mass societies;" it signals an effort to apply an essentially
behavioral form of analysis to the study of such classic concepts as "political ideology,"
"legitimacy," "sovereignty," "nationhood," and the "rule of law," and seeks to make n^iore e::<plicit
and systematic much of the understanding associated with such concepts as political ideology,
national ethos and spirit, national political psychology, and the fundamental values of a people.'^'
Pye further observes that much of the v/riting on political culture seems to revolve around four
general themes: trust versus suspicion, hierarchy versus equality, liberty versus coercion, and
the subject or object of loyalty and commitment (i.e., particularism in identification to the family
or parochial groups, or a more generallzable identification such as with the nation as a whole).
"^Pye and Verba, Political Culture and Political Development
, p. 513-516.
-David L. Sills, ed., International Enc uclopedia of the Social Sciences . Vol. 1 2, (New voric: The
MacmiUan Company & The Free Press, 1 968), p. 21 8.
*='Pye and Verba, Political Culture and Political Development
, p. 8.
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The vag in vhlch different societies have developed to combine 3nd vijry these themes provides
much of the disti nctive character of each countryJ
Whereas many of the earlier political culture theorists stressed beliefs and attitudes at the
exclusion of behavior, Stephen White, in the late 19703, concluded that behavior must also be
considered. Noting that Verba had allowed a close circular relationship between beliefs and the
operation of structure, and that Pye had Included "operational norms of a polity" in his definition
of political culture, White found that other writers seemed less concerned to draw a distinction.''
White also argued that the inclusion- of behaviour is supported in sociological and anthropological
literature from which political science had originally drawn. Methodologically, two advantages
were incurred from subsuming a behavioural as well as an attitudlnal dimension v/ithln the
definition of political culture. As White explains,
In the first place, it avoids the problem of circularity v/hich
arises when political beliefs are inferred from political
behaviour and then used in turn to explain that behaviour (or
[•;>^ versi); and it avoids the related and thorny problem of
attempting to assess the extent to which political beliefs may
actually be said to have Influenced behaviour- -beliefs may be
internally contradictory, some may be" more 'actionable' than
others, and so forth.'^
Finally, White rightfully cautions those who look to political culture for explanations that it
is too much to say that a country's political culture provides a necessary and sufficient explanation
"^Pye and 'v'erba, Political Culture and Political Development
, pp. 22-23.
^For example Kenneth Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in
Marxist- Leninist Systems'", American Political Science Review , Vol. 68, 1974, p. 1173:
political culture is "a set of informal, adoptive postures- -behavioural and attitudlnal --that
emerge in response to and interact with the set of formal definitions --ideological, policy, and
institutional --that characterize agiven level of society"; and David Paul, Political Culture and the
Socialist Purpose" in Jane Shapiro and Peter Potchnyj, eds. Change and Adaptation in Soviet and
East European Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 4: Political culture is an
"observable configuration of values, symbols, orientations and behavior patterns related to the
politics of a given society."
%hite. Political Culture and Soviet Politics
, p. 1 7.
of the manner In vhlcri its political system operates; to do so vould leave one ijnable to explain
rapid cnanges in political systems tnat vouio exceed any conceivaoie speed or cnanqe in a political
culture. Similarly, to argue the reverse, that the political culture is vholly a result of the
manner in vhich the political system operates, is also unacceptable since one vould then be unable
to explain the marked difference in the manner in vhich Communist political systems have tended
to pe rate , des pi te t he freq ue nt si ml 1 a ri t u amo nq t hem i n te r ms of fo r mal st r uct u re . He nee
,
Political Culture, in fact, must be regarded as both 'causing' and
'caused": as a variable vhich mediates betv/een the political
system and its environment, providing a framevork vlthin vhich
patterns of political belief and behaviour, historically
considered, can be located, and as a factor vhich vill influence
and constrain- -though not determine- -future patterns of
development in a political system.^
^
Almond agreed vith 'vVhite vhen he in turn observed that political culture is not a
unidirectional cause of political structure and behavior. Rather,
the relation betveen political structure and culture is
interactive,. . .one cannot explain cultural propensities vithout
reference to historical experience and contemporary structural
constrainats and opportunities, and. . .in turn, a prior set of
attltudlnal patterns vill tend to persist in some form and degree
for a significant period of time, despite efforts to transform
it."il
Having been duly admonished and cautioned about assigning to political culture a too pre-
eminent and primary status in the study of any society, one cannot, hovever, deny its considerable
and significant role. ''/Vhile it may often seem subjective, and although its definition is often the
subject of heated scholarly debate, that is does exist seen^is patently obvious, such that even
materialistic Marxist- Leninist theorists grant it recognition (renamed, of course, as an
^OWhite, Political Culture and Soviet Politics
, p. 20.
^
^Gabriel A. Almond, "Communism and Political Culture Theory" in Comparative Politics
.
January 1983, p. 127.
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"objective" force in 50c1etg). Indeed, the Communists have first-hand experience of its strength,
let 3lone its objective existence, in their attempts to build Soviet- modelled socialism in the Soviet
East European empire. As Almond has observed, the Commumst regimes in Eastern Europe provide
"natural experiments" in attitudinal change and can serve as a test case for political culture
theory. He concludes that despite specific Communist attention to the attempt to shape political
culture to conform to a Soviet Socialist model, indigenous cultures, while affected, have resisted
change more than the Communists had expected.^
^
It is precisely this phenomenon of persistence in the face of determined assault that has
prompted the following discussion of Polish political culture. The Polish case, in particular, is
marked not only by persistent oppositional values and attitudes, but by derivative oppositional
behavior as well; it is precisely behavior that seems to distinguish Polish political culture at
certain times. Consequently, Pye's concept of political culture as a set of attitudes, beliefs and
sentiments, plus White's inclusion of behavior, (in short, a more traditional view of political
culture from a sociological or anthropological perspective) is the sense in which political culture
is used in this work. Although such a broad definition of political culture does tend to expand the
concept beyond the limits of precise operationalization, it is, nevertheless, in accordance with the
purpose of this particular work. The objective of the following discussion is not to engage in
argument about the identification of Polish political culture as an independent or dependent
variable in a scientific analysis of Polish society (others are certainly better equipped and
disposed to do so, as so much of the current Political Science literature on the subject
demonstrates'^); rather, it is hoped that the reader will gain from this discussion a historical
appreciation of the nation of Poland and a sense of the historical continuity and consciousness so
vital to Poles, but =.0 easily lost in anaysis limited to current events onlu. Indeed, in this regard
'^Almond, "Communism and Political Culture Theory", pp. 136-7.
'^See, for example, Lowell Dittmer, "Comparative Communist Political Culture". Studies in
!:om parative Communism
.
Vol. 26, nos. 1&2, Spnng/Summer 1 963, pp. 9-24.
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Poland becomes a prime example tending to confirm the valldltg of political culture as an area of
promising studg and as an explanation of now and vhg tne Poles vere moved to action most
recentl g, but certai nl g not fi nail gJ n 1 980-3 1
.
3. HISTORICAL ROOTS
William Woods, commenting on events in contemporarg Poland, once remarked that v he never
a Pole wants to explain some aspect of his work, or of the present situation, he starts, as a rule.
by talking about Polish historg.^'^ More than most nations, Poland seems to provide a sn^e qud
non example of the role that historical consciousness mag plag in formulating and shaping the
beliefs and attitutdes, and hence the political culture, of a modern people. Stev/art Steven observed
that the Pole-s are animated bg a Mstorg in vhich mgth is as potent a brew to the Polish
imagination as fact, such that there is not an event on the contemporarg scene that does not find
some echo in Polish historg.^^ Furthermore, this brew is often bathed in the light of
glorification, particular! g in times of current travail, resulting In the inculcation and
nourishment of a tradition of resistance to ang foreign presence that is so remarkable to most
observers of Poland. Historg, in effect, becomes a weapon for the Poles, a weapon of defense and
sel f
- p rese rvati on. As Ja n G ross w ri tes
,
In the last two hundred years, everg time Polish societg coalesced
and organized itself sufficiently to try to shake off the
stranglehold of an unwanted state organization, it found it as
necessary to conguer the past as to overcome contemporarg
institutions. In a series of almost instinctive efforts at self-
preservation, Polish society has repeatedly resisted foreign-
imposed masters not onlg bg struggling against them but also by
tring to come to grips with its own poast, to understand its own
''^William Woods, Poland: Eag le in the East (Mew York: Hill and Wang, 1 968) , p. 21 9.
^
'^Stewart Steven. The Poles (New York: MacMillan, 1982), p. 265.
.lo4'.
cources of conduct, and to perpetuate its most important actional
traditionsJ^'
The reason for the Poles to do this is historical in itself, as v/ell as being a function of the
culture that emerged from Poland's "glorious" history. M. K. Dzievanowski has observed that,
Every nation is, consciously or unconsciously, inspired by an
idea that is central to its. mentality, an idea that is a guiding
principle of its history. Both geographically and culturally
Poland cannot be understood except as a transition area betveen
the Western Atlantic world and the Eurasian continental mass
forming the heartland of the USSR.^ ^
While the observer of Polish civilization vill find both Eastern and Western elements, ^he
Poles themselves seem to have chosen to emphasize the Western elements, and have for centuries
identified themselves much more vith the West than vith the East. This unmistakable Western
orientation stems from the creation of the Polish state itself \y'hen King Mieszko I, in marrying a
Czech princess, accepted Roman Christianity in A. D. 966 as a strateqern to counter the missionary
( as vel 1 as col ni zi ng ) zeal of t he nei g h bo ri ng Te uto ns
.
The end of the first Christian millenium yes a time of growing division for Europe. To the
vest of Poland the struggle betveen the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire vas heating up. In
order to resist Teutonic pressure, Poland drev closer to the Papacy. To Poland's east, the
neighboring Slavs of Kievan Russian also accepted Christianity in A. D. 989, but from Byzantium.
The pressure of Orthodox Christianity from the east also served to strengthen Poland's
identification vith the 'West, and particularly its sense of Roman Christianity as the gap of
antagonism betveen the Latin and Greek churches videned. For Poland, statehood and Cat holism
became one in the same, vhile the growing anomolous position and identification of Poland in
Central Europe increased Poland's self-conscious uniqueness.
I'^Jan Tomasz Gross, "In Search of History" in Abraham Brumberg, ed., Poland
,
Genesis of a
Revolution (Hew '/ork: Vintage Books, 1 983), p. 3.
^"M. K. Dzievanovski, Poland in the Twentieth Centur u (New 'I'ork: Columbia University
Press, 1977), p. 253.
43
The eleventh .^nd twelfth centuries thus witnessed the founding of Poland's national identity .js
veil as the emergence of a new social structure. From its pagan period, Poland inherited a strong
clan system with a tendency toward equality among Its members similar, In some ways, to the
Scottish clans. This clannish tradition prevented the early formation of the feudal stucture
common to most European societies.'^ One of the manifestations of the emphasis on equality was
the tendency toward unanimity of decisions ln those decisions of great importance to the general
community. From this practice can be traced the establishment of the later ni>erfjir} i''^/'j^that
would give every member of the community the right to freely proclaim dissent to maionty
decisions and the right to invoke the rule of unanimity.
Despite a tradition of equality, class differentiation based on clan heads and their families did
develop. The consolidation of clans and the general martial atmosphere of the time and area
promoted the emergence of a group of soldiers and advisors to the major chieftains who came to
form the nucleus of the sz/sc/ffs or noble knighthood of Poland. The mass of Poles were free
men, small independent farmers, while a class of slaves was formed from prisoners of war ^no
debtors. As in Hungary, the principle of primogeniture never took root and hence, every
descendent of a nobleman was also considered an equal nobleman. By the sixteenth century this
noble gentry, or primary land-owning class, formed a relatively large ten percent of the
population. The gentry enjoyed full political rights and Identified itself as "the nation", although
the mass of free peasants shared in the national identity through religion and through participation
in the decisive battles to come.
The Po/fsi^f Ct^rorn'c/f of the twelfth century, written by a foreigner referred to as Gall us
Anonymous, noted that Poland, "though it is surrounded and combated by so many peoples Christian
and pagan, .never v/as entirely subjected by any one." The chronicle also glonfied the figures of
^^Dziev/anov/ski, Poland in the Twentieth Centur g, p. 4.
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victorious, just and protective rulers, the bravery ut kmqhts and their fidelity to a ruler i'?
Nonethless, the strong religious identification of the nation never allowed the development of a cult
of the holy ruler in Poland, but rather evolved a cult around the martyred bishop St. Stanislaus,
vho had opposed the secular authorities.
The identity of the emerging nation of Poland vas fired vith a particularly glorious sheen
when the Polish szUc//ts and peasantry, despite terrific devastation, successfully challenged and
slowed the Tatar invasion from the east in the Battle of Legnica in Silesia in 1241. Although
Henry the Pious at the head of the Polish forces, as v/ell as a large portion of the nobility, was
killed in the battle, the Tatars soon withdrew and Poland escaped the Mongol yoke that had fallen on
Kievan Russia. From this stand developed the first identification of Poland as the Si7t£'/}?i/r^/s-
c/}rfstsrft^ffs^ the shield and bulwark of Christian Europe against the infidel of the East. This
image was reinforced by Poland's resistance of the successors to the Tatars, the Ottoman Turks, in
the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, perhaps most dramatically displayed in Jan
SoMeski's rescue of the city of Vienna from Turkish seige in 1633. Similarly, the Polish-
Hungarian union in 1440 under Ladislaw III was created to drive the Turks out of Europe, to
liberate heseiged Constantinople, and to promote the consolidation of the merger of the Greek and
Latin Churches agreed to at the Council of Florence in 1 439. The defeat of the union forces and the
death of Ladislav/ III in the Battle of Varna ( 1 444) on the Black Sea ended these ambitions, but one
can not help but wonder at hov/ the course of history may have been altered had the crusade
succeeded.20 The growth of Polish agriculture during these same centuries resulted in Poland
also becoming thought of as the granary of Europe. For the Poles, this identification as protector
knight and provider of bread constituted the basis of self-esteem v.'ithin the Polish gentry and gave
^'Aleksandra Jasinka-Kania, "National Identity and Image of World Society: the Polish Cass'"
in International Social Science Journal
. Vol. 43, no. 1 , 1 982, p. 101.
^^Constantinople, of course, fell to the Turks in 1453 in one of the major watersheds of
history.
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it 3 feeling of superiority in relation to other?, partlcul'irly merchants, in the rest of Europe. As
J. TazDir states.
Just as each estate had its ov/n separate duties, so too every nation
was occupied vith something characteristic: the English were to
sail the seas, the Dutch were to be merchants, while the Poles
were to be the defenders of other Christian nations, this type of
duty being obviously more honourable than the others, thereby
strengthening even further their nobility.^^
If nothing else, such a "superior" view of the world convinced the Poles that foreign models of
civilization and government were useless and contrary to the Polish character.
This prideful self-view of the Poles was further enhanced by Poland's achievement of great
power status in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. The establishmient of the Jagiellonian
Dynasty in 1386 had joined the Lithuanian and Polish crowns into a great union designed,
initially, to stop the advance of the Teutonic Knights from the west. Although the kmghts of the
Teutomc Order constituted the greatest military power of the time, the Polish-Lithuanian forces
defeated them at the epic Battle of Grunwald in 1410, causing a profound shift in the power
situation in Central and Eastern Europe. By the latter half of the fifteenth century, the
Jagiellonian dynasty ruled over not only Poland and Lithuania, but Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary
Slovakia, and Croatia as well, with Prussia and Moldavia as fiefs. Thus most of the territory
between the Baltic, Adriatic, and Black Seas was under Polish rule. The Golden Age of Casin^iir IV,
the Great ( 1 447- 1 492), was at hand. Such greatness is remembered by Poles today.
The Golden Age of Casimir I Y also gave rise to the expansion of gentry political rights. The
Statutes of Nieszawa (1454) obliged the king to make no laws or binding decisions without the
consent of the representative of the nobility, and are often referred to as Poland's Magna Carta.
The first Sirjrrt (diet) of the Polish nation met in 1 493 to vote on taxes for the king. Because the
''"Vj. Tazbir, Kultura Szlachecka v/ Pol see [Gentry Culture in Poland] (Warsaw: Wiedza
Powszechna, 1 978), p. 79, as quoted in A. Jasinska-Kania, "National Identity and Image of World
Society: the Polish Case", p. 102.
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Polish nobilitg comprised so l^rqe i proportion of the country's population, Polsnij could be said to
have had at that time the most representative government in Europe in term? of the level of
participation in political decisionmaking.^^' The privilege of .•/^ ,?•;,?<?,?• .;-.5j7.^;i-'.*i5;.'7:'-w- u?s?
J^r& v'fctum (none may be arrested unless sentenced by a 1av/ court) , issued as early as 1 433,
gave the gentry the rights of li^ife-us Corps's that vould not appear in England until 1 685. The
Ijt'er^jm Vet^ had not yet degenerated into the tool of dissension and manipulation that vould
infamously characterize it in the eighteenth century, a civic spirit held svay, and foreign
observers admired the monarcfm- jnodersit$ in Poland. Political tolerance and high cultural
development, epitomized by the general European high regard for the University of Cracov/,
accompanied the political developments. Small vonder that the Poles believed their nation to be
the freest and most advanced in the v/orld.
The Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century served again to emphasize the identity of
Poland with Catholicism after some initial Protestant success in the form of Calvinism in the
15403 and 1550s. In any case, such flirtations with the nev religion did not extend to the
peasanty. If anything, Poland is more notable for the religious toleration it evidenced during these
times of European turbulence.^^ This tolerance may be attributable to the depth to vhich
Catholicism vas already established, such that it vas never seriously threatened by
Protestantism. Poland thus avoided the civil vars that plagued other countries.
More threatening, hov/ever, v/as the growing power of Russia to the east, as the Russians,
starting under Ivan III in the fifteenth century, threv/ off the Tatars and expanded the former
Duchy of Moscow; Novgorod, an ally of Poland- Lithuania, fell in in 1476. But the most
^-Harold D. Nelson, ed. Poland
,
A Countru Stud u (Vv'ashinqton, D. C: U. 3. Government
Printing Press, 1933), p. 16.
^-'Indeed, religious toleration vas even extended to some Tatars who, after one conflict, asked
to 3tay ^nd settle in Poland in the vicinity of Vilno in the early fifteenth century. Enjoumq
freedom of religion, these Tatars served Poland faithfully in peace and war after their settlement.
The descendents of these Tatars even fielded a valiant body of volunteer horsemen in the struggle
against the Bolsheviks in 1 920. See Roman Dyboski, Poland in World Civilization (New York; J.
M. BattettCorp., 1950), p. 19, and pp. 45-59.
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momentuous events were occunng within Poland itself where the civic .ind martial virtues that
had served Poland $o exernplarily Derore seemed to atrophy in an atmosphere or Leeminq
prosperity and false security. A constitutional crisis gripped the nation as the nobility continued
to limit the power of the king. The extinction of the Jaglellonlan dynasty in 1 572 began a practice
of electing kings, often foreign, as a method of balancing competing gentry interests and
maintaining gentry control of the state. Changing trade routes and a shifting of trade centers
toward the west following the fall of Constantinople caused urban and business centers in Poland to
fall while land values rose. The power of the gentry soon introduced measures of serfdom as early
as 1520 and a growing bifucatlon into "lordly" and "plebian" spread through Polish society. By
the eighteenth century the concept of a "gentry nation" was introduced, thereby excluding other
estates from the unified concept of nation that had previously marked Poland.^*^
Such Internal deterioration could not have occurred at a worse time, since in 1 648, when the
rest of Europe had exhasuted itself in the religious wars that had culminated in the Thirty Years
War, Poland was just beginning its "Deluge" that would last until the end of the century.
Expanding Russian power instigated the Ukrainian Cossacks, orthodox brethren of the Russians, to
revolt against Polish rule. The Swedes, seeking to control the Baltic trade, invaded Poland in
support of its c-andidate for the elective kinkship. The Turks continued their expansion from the
south, and the Russians, taking advantge of the Polish- Lithuanian weakness, absorbed the
previouly Polish lands in the Ukraine. By the time of the Great Northern War ( 1 700- 1 721),
Russia and Sweden were the major competitors in the area, and Poland, allied alternately with
Russia and Sweden, found that Peter was interested in manipulating Polish affairs as well.
The devastation of Poland was mirrored in the factionalization of the Polish gentry.
Extraordinary sensitivity to democracy and to freedom from a powerful monarchy led to a
situation bordering on anarchy as members of the gentry sold their votes for the kingship and
^'^A. Jasinska-Kania, "National Identity and Image of World Society: the Polish Case", p. 10/
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their use of ^ii/erum veto in the Seim to the hiqgest bidder. This inability to form i^n effective,
united Polish government v/eighed heavilg against Poland's survival in a time of emerging nev/
powers. Further, the troubles in the East vere compounded bg the re-emerge nee to the vest of
the Germans in the form of a rising Prussia under the rule of the ambitious Frederick II (the
Great), and in the form of the growing Hapsburg power to the southwest. The wars of Austrian
succession in Europe were mirrored by wars of Polish succession in East-Central Europe as
Russians, Austrians, and Prussians all vied for further interest in Poland, and found willing allies
among the nobility of Poland who were intent in pursuing thier own rivalries.
Despite a tardy revival of nationalistic feeling in Poland after Stanislas Poniatowski was
placed on the throne by the Russians, 25 Poland's fate was sealed; such attempts at reform by the
Poles only instigated their neighbors to preemptive action. The First Partition of Poland in 1 772
by Austria, Prussia, and Russia cost Poland nearly one-third of its territory, almost one- half of
its population, and more than one- half of its resources, while naturally strengthening the
partitioning powers (Prussia, for instance, annexed the Polish territory that had separated
Brandenburg- Prussia from East Prussia).
The shock of dismemberment galvanized the Poles to attempt a series of progressive reforms
that culminated in the Mag Constitution (1791), which converted Poland into a hereditary
monarchy, made cabinet ministers responsible to the Sejm, nullified iidenjm veto, and began
the first steps toward abolishing serfdom. The constitution reilected the inrluence of the Age of
Enlightenment that was in full force in Europe, and liberals throughout Europe heralded its
provisions. For later generations of Poles the May Constitution came to be regarded as "the Bill of
Rights" of the Polish tradition, the embodiment of all that was enlightened and progressive in
Poland's past, a monument to the nation's will to live in freedom, a permanent reproach to the
^-'Stanislas August Poniatovski was a former Polish ambassador in St. Petersburg and a
discardedlover of Catherine II. A man of brilliant mind but weak character, he was, as Stanislas
II, to be the last king of Poland.
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tyranny of the partitioning pov/ers."26 Even the noted English conservative, Edmund Burke,
commented thsit "Humanity must rejoice and glory vhen it considers the change in Poland. "^^
The prospect that the nev constitution v/ould regenerate Poland, revitalize the divided
country, and transform Poland into a modern state caused Catherine II of Russia to take action.
Finding support among some of the more conservative magnates in Poland who vere angered at the
limitations the constitution imposed on their former liberties, and joined too by a Prussia that
smelled the promise of spoils, Catherine sent her army into Poland to restore the old constitution.
The Poles vere defeated, the May Constitution was repealed, and Russia and Prussia proceeded to
partition Poland a second time. The irony was that v/Mle Poland had been partitioned the first time
on the grounds that its anarchy and weakness upset the power relationships in East-Central
Europe, it was nov/ despoiled precisely because it had been successfully reforming itself and had
thus started to threaten its neighbors.
The Second Partition sparked a popular uprising under the leadership of Tadeusz
Kosciu3zko.2S IntTuenced by his experience with the American militia in the American
Revolution, and by the success of the citizens' army in France at the time, Kosciuszko appealed to
the whole Polish nations to rise in arms against the oppressors. In a throwback to Legnica and
Grunvald, the Poles seized the initiative and inflicted several defeats on the Russians. Such
2^Norman Oavies, God'? Pla u round . A Histor u of Poland (New '/ork: Columbia UniverTitij
Press, 1982), Vol. I, p. 535. Davies also notes that Karl Marx later wrote of this constitution
that it was "the only work of freedom which Central Europe has ever produced of its own accord. .
.The history of the world knows no other example of such generosity by the gentry."
^"Quoted in Dziewanowski, Poland in the Twentieth Century
, p. 27.
^Sjadeusz Kosciuszko (1746-1817), soldier, statesman, and (to this day) symbol oi
Romantic military romanticism, led an insurrection in Krakov/ in March 1 794, that soon spread
throughout Poland. Though he scored some remarkable victories against both the Russians and the
Prussians, the nationwide uprising was finally crushed by superior Russian armies in f'loven^iber
of that year. A democrat in the tradition of Jefferson and Lafayette (he had offered his services to
the Continental army in 1776 and was eventually appointed by Washington as his adjutant), he
was the co-author of a manifesto granting personal freedom to Polish peasants and reducing their
dues in the way of serf labor by one-half; in 1317, shortly before his death, he granted full
emancipation to his serfs. (Biography taken from Gross, "In Search of History", pp. 298-99 )
3U
success induced the Prussians to join the Russians in findlly subduing the Poles, i'nnd in 1795,
Austria, Russia, and Prussia sought to solve the Polish problem permanently by erasing Poland
from the map of Europe in the Third Partition. Their efforts ti3 do so vouid not only prove the
resiliency of Polish traditions, but vould also permanently mark Polish political culture.
Looking back over the history of Poland prior to the Third Partition, Polish sociologist Jan
Szczepanski has observed that many of the essential traits of Polish nationality and culture vere
formed during this period. These traits include "a cult of individualism, a highly develooed
feeling of honor and personal dignitij, the intransigence of the gentry to subordination, and an
inability to organize collectively for any long-term efforts. They also include a deep patriotism,
bravery, and national pride. "^^ The identification of Poland as the "Bulvark of ChrLstendom" and
hov that identity reinforced these traits has already been noted. Additionally, memories of Polish
greatness, at a time when the rest of Europe was living in the shadow of the Middle Ages and vas
torn by recurrent dynastic and ecclesiastical warfare, would serve to fire the imagination and
pride of Poles for generations to come.
In the opinion of Roman Dyboski, equal in importance to Poland's services in the defense of
Christian Europe was its achievement of moving the frontier of Europe's Christian civilization
eastward by peaceful unions withits neighbors.-^^ The contrast to the Teutonic Knights' method of
the sword in converting pagans was even argued before the Pope at the Council of Constance
(
1 41 4- 1 41 8), with the council opting for the Polish argument. Poles thus point with pride at
how Poland was able to fashion a large and great federal state in the debatable borderlands between
Central and Eastern Europe entirely by means of peaceful association with neighboring peoples.
This "Jagielloman idea" of Polish policy uniting the middle European nations around Polish
'^'^Jan Szczepanski
,
Polish Societ u (Nev/ York: Random House, 1 970), p.
-Qpuboski
. Poland in ''iVorld Civilization , p. 20.
lesider?hip vould again be taken ijp .'jfter V'/orld V/ar I .und would be considered a political
possiDinty Dij some Ponsn politicians as late as world v.'ar ii.*^
Finally, from the history of pre- partition Poland, there vas a national heritage of peasant
folk culture reaching back to the first kings, and a tradition of peasant participation in Polish
history, from Legnica and Grunvald, to King Stefan Batory ( 1 576- 1 586), who had organized an
Infantry of peasants that helped him win decisive victories against the Russians, and Koscluszko
and his peasant forces of 1 794. The legal state of Poland may have disappeared in 1 795, but the
Polish nation was not about to submit,
C. PARTITION POLAND
The destruction of Poland infused the Poles with one moral Imperative -- that of regaining
Poland's lost independence. Paradoxically, the loss of an independent state promoted the
strengthening and broadening of national identification in Polish society. Deprived of political
sovereignty for nearly 1 25 years, until World War I, the Poles missed out on the development of
national identity that was being expressed in the creation of new nation-states in Europe. But
while the Poles failed to acquire state identity through armed struggle and revolution, national
identity was maintained, strengthened, and realized through intellectual and spiritual effort as the
Poles sought to transcend the oppressive reality of the nineteenth century.
Without going into a detailed history of this struggle, it should be sufficient to recount some of
the more salient points. First, the Poles tried to take advantage of any situation to push for
independence. The first major opportunity came with Napoleon's mastery of Europe. Naturally
drawn to the ideas of the French Revolution and to the fact that Napoleon was fighting the
partitioning powers, Poles fought in Napoleon's forces in Italy, Spain, Egypt, and Haiti ; indeed, the
Polish national anthem was written by an officer of the Polish Legion in Italy with Napoleon. Thus
^^Szczepanski . Polish Societ u. p. 15.
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it was that Polish expatriate forces accompanied Napoleon v/hen he entered Poland in 1 806; they
were rewarded with the establishment of the Duchy of Warsaw by the Treaty of Tilsit. Poland
contributed over 100,000 troops to Napoleon's Russian campaign, and Napoleon is said to have
impressed by the bravery of the Poles. Unfortunately, because the Poles had looked on Napoleon as
a liberator and had pledged him their support, they also shared in his eventual defeat.
The partitioning powers were confirmed in most of their Polish holdings by the decisions of
the Congress of Vienna, although some central provinces were organized into Kingdom Poland,
normally referred to as Congress Poland, and placed into personal union with the Tsar of Russia.
This arrangement lasted until the Polish revolt in 1830, after which Congress Poland was
incorporated into the Russian empire. The suppression of the revolt resulted in the Great
Emigration when more than 10,000 Poles of the intelligentsia, political and student leaders, and
army officers left Poland.^2 Despite further uprisings in 1846, 1848, 1863, and 1905, the
fact of foreign domination remained. What was indelibly established, though, was a tradition of
resistance to foreign oppression.
The struggle for Polish independence was deeply influenced by the Romantic era of European
culture. The Polish expatriate community was instrumental in establishing and nuorishing the






culture-in-exile, from the music of Chopin to the Romantic poetry of Mickievicz,-^-^ Slowacki .^'^
and Krasinski; and alva'ys, the central theme of this cijltural expression was the imperative to
regain Poland's lost independence, to restore the Poles to their nghtful place among the nations of
the world, and to pay homage to the idea of Poland. Tsarist police records show that this poetry
inspired the thoughts and actions of young Polish patriotic conspirators; indeed, in that Romantic
patriots made little distinction between poetry and political writings, in a certain sense literature
and politics have remained intertwined in Polish tradition ever si nee .^^
Jan Gross has observed that "to keep alive the idea of Poland as a nation, Poles developed a
particular attitude toward their country's history. Instead of viewing it as a series of facts, such
as dynastic succession, legislative acts, or some combination of extrinsic events, they proceeded to
search for the meaning of that history."^^ Such self-examination of its history tended to confirm
in Polish minds the belief that Poland was unique. Despite oft -occur ring bans on Polish schools
and universities ,of Polish institutions, and of the Polish language, sometimes even at religious
"Adam Mickiewicz (1793-1355) was Poland's greatest poet, a friend of Puskin, and an
ardent revolutionary. Forced to tlee Poland after the November 1830 Uprising, he taught Slavic
literature at the College de France for four years, and during the 1848 revolutions, organized a
Polish Legion in Italy. In 1849 he founded an international journal iii Paris called La Tribune des
Peuples . He died of cholera in Constantinople where he had gone to organize a Polish army to fight
against Russia during the Crimean War. Mickiewicz's most famous v/orks are the narrative poem
Pan Tadeusz and the play Dziady [The Forefathers]. (Biography taken from Gross, "In Search of
History", p. 298. Unfortunately, space does not permit examples of Mickiewicz's work in this
study, but a reading of his poetry is incredibly inspiring, even for non- Poles, and important for a
better understanding of partition Poland; the .spiritual element of his work is truly powerful For
an outstanding examination of Mickiev/icz's life and work and hov/ his efforts helped to shape
Polish national consciousness (an examination written by a Pole) see Waclav/ Ledmcki, Life and
Culture of Poland as Retlected in Polish Literature (New York: Roy Publishers, 1944),
especially pp. 158-21 1.
^"^Juliusz Slowacki (1309-1849) is considered by some to be equal if not superior to
Mickiewicz in poetic qenious. He left Poland in 1 331 but kept apart from the rest of the 50-called
Great Emigration. Zygmunt Krasinski (1812-1859) is considered, with Slowacki and
Mickiewicz, to be one of the three greatest Polish romantic poets. He spent most of his life abroad
,
became a prolific epistolarian, and died in Paris. (Biographies taken from Gross, "In Search of
History", p. 298).
^^Gross, "In Search of History", p. 5.
2^Gro33, "In Search of History", p. 4.
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services, the Poles held on. The family became the basic national institution and homes became the
"fortresses" of the national spirit, \-/t\er^. the glorious history of Poland was retold and the
cultural he ritaqev/as cultivated.
Insome vags one could almost describe Polish Romantic patriotism as a religion of freedom.
Thespiritualizationof the Polish struggle, as well as the strong Polish identification with Roman
Catholicism, gave rise to imagery of Poland as a figura of Christ: Poland, enslaved and
innocently suffering, was destined to atone for the sins of other nations and to redeem the world.
Poland acquired a messianic missiondf introducing the world into an era of liberty and happiness,
and Poles continued to fight around the world in struggles for freedom under the watchword of 'for
your freedom and ours." The current oppression, suffering, and injustice that Poland was
experiencing v/as actually a purification to prepare Poland to carry out its mission.*"^ A Pole
v/as to be measured by the manner in which he fought for his ideals, not by the outcome of the
struggle. The effect of such powerful imagery isstlll alive in the Polish identity.
Having briefly discussed the Romantic tradition in Poland, one must also recognize the
development of the concept of "organic work". Originating in the ordered and rationalist tradition
of the Enlightenment, it also contained elements of positivism. The program proposed to overcome
Poland's underdevelopment by transforming its social structure and by introducing reform?
modelled on more developed countries^® (the nineteenth century v/as not a century of progress or
of modern economic development for Poland due to its subject status). Adherents of this line of
thought critically evaluated the former systems of Poland and its ruling gentry class, concluding
that in their faults were to be found the sources of the country's demise. The future of Poland thus
rested in recognizing realities and in working "within the system" to- secure eventual
independence. In the meantime, the foundations for a strong Poland capable of independence and
able to compete in the modern world had to be laid.
-"^Clifford Barnett, Poland (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1 958)
,
p. 408.
^^Jasinska-Kania, "National Identity and Image of 'World Society: the Polish Case", p. 104.
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The principles of orgamc Icibor first took hold 1n Austrian-occupied Galacia, vhere Austrian
rule vas less repressive and more conducive to cooperation. The Drutal suppression of the 1 5ifi.3
insurrection bg the Russians, however, caused the concept to spread to other parts of Poland as a
backlash to the excesses of Romantic resistance that seemed to lead only to disaster and destruction.
Then too, the social and economic changes that accompanied the emancipation of the serfs and then,
industrialization in Poland in the latter half of the mneteeth century, led to problems that seemed
to demand cooperation in administrative reforms and in the development of nev municipal and
civic institutions. A nev emphasis vas placed on economic labor, a field previously disdained in
the gentry cultural values. Further, the "passage of time and the nev host of problems tended to be
dealt with differently in the three parts of Poland, such that the older concepts of Polish political
unity ve re strained.^^
The years of partition thus created traditions of both intense Romantic resistance and a less
assertive kind of positivist adaptation; both existed side- by-side, with one never far from The
other, as situations seemed to dictate. In neither tradition, hovever, vas the goal of independence
forgotten or forsaken. The cultural heritage of Poland was maintained and, indeed, vith the
redoubled efforts at Polish education that accompanied the advent of industrialization and the need
for an educated populace, nev strides vere made at strengthening that heritage.
Education had always been the mark of social distinction in Poland and had tradtionally been
the preserve of the intelligentsia. In the suppression of the nobility that accompanied the
partitionings of Poland, the intelligentsia emerged as a critical national elite that could carry on
the stuggle against foreign oppression. The effect of the Polish Intelligentsia living abroad, whose
•ideas were continually smuggled into Poland, has already been mentioned. As Aleksander Gella
observed in his comparative study of the Russian and Polish intelligentsias, the Polish




seen). "They looked to tfiernselves a the continuation of the best elements of the Poiijh gentry.
They tried to adapt the fundamental democratic ideals from the Gentry Republic to modern times. .
.
The Polish intelligentsia actually inherited some elements of the life-style of the gentry. "'^'^
Thus the old gentry values were passed and broadened as the ranks of the intelligentsia expanded.
As Gella observed,
Not only those vho were directly involved in social struggle, but
all persons vho had completed the ^i/mn6fS?i/m (if
un propertied) felt themselves to be members of it [the
intelligentsia]. The gumnazium inculcated the value system
that included comimitment to the political struggle for the
independent Polish state; the social struggle was a means to their
final goal."*^
The effect of the foreign occupation and the maintenance of the idea of a Polish nation outside
the concept of the legal state was to have other effects on Polish political culture, effects that bear
directly on the situation today. As Aleksandra Jasinska-Kania wrote in her study of Polish
national identity.
The partitions brought about a clear demarcation of the notions of
nation and state in social consciousness. National identity could
not coincide with the identity of the citizens of a state who
perceive its authority to be the representation of their interests.
Such authority was alien not only because it represented foreign
interests but also because it abolished the old order and old laws
and replaced them with new ones, often incomprehensible and
inconsistent v/ith national traditions and customs. . . A citizen's
inability to view his interests as coinciding with those of the state
and to identify himself with the authorities (always described as
"they") became permanent components of Polish national
consciousness, even after the regaining of independence.'*^
'^'^Aleksander Gella, The Russian and Polish Intelligentsias: A Sociological Perspective'
Studies in Soviet Thought. Vol. t 9, no. 4, June 1 979, pp. 314-15.
•^^ Gella, "The Russian and Polish Intelligentsias", p. 318.
•^^Jasinska-Kania, "National Identity gnd Image of World Society: the Polish Case", p. 1 04.
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I muiitudij of contemporary Poland and the problems of the current regime in establishing its
legitimacy in Poland, Paul Lewis also found historical roots in the experience of partition and
foreign domination. Levis lags part of the explanation for the PZRP's inability to legitimize its
rule to vhat many have seen as the general weakness of political authority in Poland. As a
consequence of the partitions the Polish nation developed as a stateless entity in which patriotism
was equated with resistance to government and state paver. Furthermore,
lav and legal statement were simply regarded as the command of
leadership and no basis for the emergence of any conception of a
/^ec/ftsisst existed. There was little scope for public confidence
. and trust in a legal system to develop and this has been associated
with what may be called a schizophrenic attitude to authority: a
constant questioning of that of others but an insistence on one's
personal position and authority.'^^
While the experience of partition may underlie the weakness of political authority, the same
experience served to strength the position and role of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland. The
fact that the religions of the two most repressive and culturally repressive partition powers,
Prussia and Russia, were Protestantism and Orthodoxy respectively, increased the Polish
identification with the Catholic Church. In the absence of a nationally accepted monarch it was th
Church primate who acted as need of state and maintained national unity. ^^ Already established
in deep traditions from the tenth century, the Catholic Church was a major source of continuity of
Polish national tradition and identity, and was a tradition that linked all classes and social strata in
all parts of the divided country- -a Pole was a Catholic under all partitions.
The experience of partition was thus critical in the development of the modern Polish identity
and in many of the elements of Polish political culture. The concept or idea of the Polish nation
was strengthened, albeit outside of the legal and usual structure of the state; this would affect
•^•^Paul Lewis, "Obstacles to the Establishment of Political Legitimacy in Communist Poland",
British Journal of Political ?cience
.
Vol 12, no. 2. April 1982, pp. 129-30.
'^'^Lewis, 'Obstacles to the Establishment of Political Legitimacy in Communist Poland", p.
130.
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general Polish .attitudes tovard the state in qeneral as the idea of nation became clearly established
without the state. The intelligentsia, enlarged through expanding education, assumed a leading role
in the spinrtual and intellectual struggle of the nation. The Church', already a critical element of
the uniqueness of Poland, was confirmed in its role as the keeper of the nation of Poland. Finally,
traditions of Romantic resistance and organic work developed and existed in close competition,
further complicating (and enriching) Polish political culture. The family continued as a breeding
ground of aspiration to traditional Polish values harking back to pre-partition Poland, despite the
nev pressures of foreign domination, industrialization, and urbanization. Poland continued to
exist, and Poles looked forward in fervent anticipation of the return to independence.
D. INDEPENDENT POLAND
World War I brought Poland the opportunity to again take arms in the hope of re-establishing
an independent Poland as the upheaval of war engulfed the partition powers. A Polish Legion in the
Austrian army under the command of the future Polish leader, Jozef Pilsudski, entered Russian
Poland at the commencement of hostilities; Poles also fought with the Western allies in the quest
for liberation. On 1 1 November 1913, Pilsudski, as head of state, proclaimed Poland independent.
The first task of the new state of Poland was to again serve as Europe's bulwark in the East as
Poland fought to stave off the attacks of the Russian Bolsheviks. In close and heroic fighting that
culminated at the gates of Warsav/ itself, Poland "saved Europe from Communism" and then set out
to rei nteqrate itself and to recover from the devastation of war .^^' The May Constitution of 1791
'^^It is one of the ironies of history that Pilsudski should command the Polish armies and state
in thi:5 victory. During the reiqn of Alexander 111, Tsar of Pu3oi8, a group of young Poles from
Vilno were arrested for cooperation with their Russian friends in the preparation of the
unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Alexander III. Among the Poles in this group, arrested and
sentenced to heavy imprisonment or deportation to Siberia were two brothers, Bronislaw and
Jozef Pilsudski, among the Russians setenced to death at the v=!ame tnal was Alexander Uljanov, the
older brother of Lenin. Only 33 years later the younger Pilsudski brother, Jozef, fought and
defeated the Red Army sent against Poland by Lenin, the younger Uljanov brother, when both the
older brothers, as well as Jozef, had suffered for the same cause earlier. See Gella, "The Russian
and Polish Intelligentsias", p. 320.
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provided the inspiration for ^ democratic Poland, but the country faced many real prciblems. Once
independence waa achieved, it was found that a broad range of competing political parties sought to
represent the equally broad range of Polish political experience both vithin and without Poland
resulting from the years of partition. The nineteenth century training in disobedience and
opposition had not prepared Poland for the compromises of parliamentary government and the
democracy failed in 1926. Itvas replaced by a semi -dictatorial government led by Pilsudski and
based on army support that, in turn, provided a new target for the opposition parties seeking to
restore full parliamentary democracg.'^^
Poland additionally faced the problem of foreign relations with its traditionallg hostile
neighbors. Although Austria had been removed, the problem of balance betv/een Germany and
Russia remained. Faced with the promise of recovered strength by both Germany and the Soviet
Union, Poland's best hope seemed to be a new Jagiellonian idea to unite the smaller states of East-
Central Europe in opposition to both of the powerful neighbors. Such a plan was not acceptable to
the newly independent states of the region, however-, and Poland was forced to substitute reliance
on the Western democracies and gambling on no n- aggression pacts with both its neighbors in an
attempt to maintain its independence. The events of 1939 proved the unfortunate inefficacy of
such policies.
Still, despite such daunting problems, Poles still have a high regard for their interwar
independence. As Kolankiev/icz and Taras point out, "Poland rebuilt as an independent state in the
aftermath of the First Y/orld War occupies a very special place in the national collective
memory. "'^'^ They go on to cite studies by Szacka and Possart that demonstrate the popularity of
the time among respondents in contemporary Poland. It is interesting to note that in the opinions
of Kolankiewicz and Taras, the Pilsudski dictatorship '"did little to undermine the fundamental
'^'^Szczepanski, Polish Societ u. p. 21
.
'^'^Georqe Kolankiewicz and Ray Taras, "Poland; Socialism for Everyman?" in Archie Brown
and Jack Gray, eds., Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States (New York:
Holmes and Meier, 1977;, p. 103.
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democratic ethos in Poish political culture, the best eviderice of vhlch v/as the participation in and
the results of the mumcipal elections of- 1938, which signalled the emergence of more cohesive
political groupings.'"^® One is left vith the idea that, given time, a democratic Poland more in
accordance vith its traditions would have emerged.
Such speculation, of course, was cut short bu World War II and the repeat of partitioning of
Poland by the Germans and the Soviets in 1 939. The experiences of that war, not unexpectedly,
constitute the most potent elements of contemporary Polish historical consciousness. The
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the "aband'onment" by the Western powers, the Katyn Wood massacre by
the Soviets, the cruelty of Nazi occupation, the resistance of the Home Army and the nightmare jnd
betrayal of the Warsaw uprising- -all are well-known to Poles today. Six million Poles (out of a
population of 35 million) are reported to have perished during the war. Poland claims the highest
loss rate of all the belligerent nations: 220 out of every 1000 people were killed; 35 percent of
the Intel lege ntsi a was destroyed."*^ Finally, despite the sacrifices, Poland found herself at the end
of the war material! y devastated and agai n under foreign (Soviet) domi nation.
Jan Szczepanski credits World War II v/ith effecting a basic change in the social composition of
Polish society. According to him, German occupation policies such as expropriation of land and
German exploitation of the Polish economy for the German war machine resulted 1n the virtual
disappearance of the Polish landowning class and the shattering of the older private business
elites. The heavy population losses of the intelligentsia, combined with the destruction of the land
and business elites, deprived Poland of the leadership in national life that was needed for postwar
reconstruction. Such leadership would have to come eventually from the peasant and working
classes, since they had comparatively suffered the least, retaining their fundamental structure and
'^^Kolankiev/icz and Taras, "Poland: Socialism for Everyman^", p. 103.
'^'Szszepanski, Polish Societ u. p. 35. Compare to Yugoslavia, 103 per 1000; USSR, 40;
Czechoslovakia and France, 1 5, United Kingdom, 8; US, 1 .4.
composition. Hov/ever , the development of leaders from these ranks vould take ti me. Szczepanski
vntes,
It can thus be seen that the var vas a great turning point in
Poland's social history, disrupting the continuity of the social
structure and eliminating the traditional leading social forces,
thereby opening the way for radical social change. The social
classes that had traditionally supplied the leading elites were
unable to reconstitute themselves, and so the new elites had to
come from the v/orking class, the peasantry, and the lower ranks
of the intelligentsia. It has been sufficiently shown in the history
of various nations that it takes at least two or three generations to
form a social background such as will give elites the necessary
skills in leadership and the art of government and provide them
with political insight and foresight.^o
It was into this opening that the Soviets stepped, introducing their Marxist- Lemmst ideology.
^'-'Szczepanski , Polish Societ y, pp. 40-41
.
E. THE CLASH
The Co mrnu rusts, install ijij by the Soviets in Poland .stter World War II were certainly not
unaware of the pover of political culture, since Marxist- Leninist doctrine recoqnizes its
existence. Stephen White has noted that both Lenin and Breshnev have used the tern-i "political
culture" itself.51 What seems to underlie Soviet thought on the subject, however , is that Marxism
is essentially a structural theory, i.e., for Marx, a changed political consciousness, necessary for
the new sociali.st society, is a conseqijence of underlying structural alteration. Lenin expanded on
Marx by postulating a properly indoctrinated Communist party that would lead the rest of the
society along the path to Communism by introducing structural changes in the formerly capitalist
society. The transformation of political culture was expected to occur in spurts congruent with
major structural changes and, while the process may be slow, it was asserted to be certain. Marx
would thus have sided with political culture stucturalists such as Brian Barry, Carole Pateman,
and Ronald Rogowski who hold the priority of structure in the causal interaction with -ittitude,
belief, and feeling. Changes in culture follow inevitably from changes in structure, cultural
properties have a consequential relation to structure, and attitudinal variables can explain lead
and lag in the process of historical change.^^
Lenin's treatment of the subject indicates that while he believed it was certainly possible to
properly indoctrinate a revolutionary elite, to shape their political culture so .as to prepare them
for the task of revolution, the same revolutionary transformation with the masses was expected to
be extremely difficult. Lenin expected that the peasantry, while it might be mobilized for land
reform under capitalism, would not be interested in all the details of building a socialist society
once its primary grievance was satisfied. Similarly, the workers are inclined to "bread and
butter" economic issues that do not cover the whole of the socialist agenda. The consequence of such
^'Stephen White, The USSR: Patterns of Autocracy and Industrialism" in Brown .^nd
Gray, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States
, p. 58.
^^Almond, "Communism and Political Culture Theory", pp. 1.30-31
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tendencies could thus be the persistence of peasant proprietary attitudes and residual capitalist or
pre- revolutionary attitudes that could affect productivity and even limit policy goals under the
nev Communist regime.'^-^ The task of the Communist elite thus became that of recognizing these
challenges and of striving to maintain control vhile executing structural changes and attempting to
"socialize" the masses through propaganda and through emphasis on socialist values in literature
and art, the schools, the Communist party and related organizations, and the mass media of
communication.
In a very interesting study of political culture in Marxist- Leninist systen'is, Kenneth Jovitt
has explored hovsuch a structural /organizational approach has fared in transforming the target
societies. His thesis is that all Marxist- Leninist regimes are oriented to certain core tasks that
are crucial i n shapi ng the organizational character of the reqi me and its relationshi p to society. I n
Jowitt's words, these tasks include:
• Transformation- -the attempt to alter decisively or destroy values, structures, and
behaviors which a revolutionary elite perceives as comprising or contributing to the actual
or potential existence of alternative centers of political power,
• Consol1dation--theatt.empt to create the nucleus of a new political community in a setting
that ideally prevents existing social forces from exercising any uncontrolled and undesired
influence over the development and defimtion of the new community; and
• Modernization- -the regime's attempt to develop more empirical and less dogmatic
definitions of problems and policy, a formal, procedural approach rather than a
substantive, arbitrary approach to the solution of problems, and an understanding of the
executive function that stresses leadership rather than command competences.^**
The significance of these tasks is that while the character and methods of the revolutionary
elite easily lend themselves to a clear pursuit of the first two tasks, the third task, vitally
'^•^Almond, 'Communism and Political Culture Theory", p. 1 30.
'^'^Kenneth Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in
Marxist- Leninist Systems", The American Political Science Reviev/
.
'^ol. 68, no. 3, September
1974, p. 1 174.
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necessary for the continued growth of the nev society, requires 3 change of direction. As Jovitt
says,
Transformation involves a confrontation betveen the regime and
the "unreconstructed" society. Consolidation yields a structure of
domination as the politically defeated but "hostile" society must
be prevented from "contaminating" the nuclei of the nev socialist
society. Modernization, hovever, requires a rather significant
redefinition of the relationship betveen regime and society from
mutual hostility and avoidance to the regime's selective
recognition and managed acceptance of society.^^
The events that transpired in Poland as World War II drew to a close and the Soviets installed
their supporters in pover seem to follow this pattern. The human losses that Poland sustained
under German occupation were added to by Soviet actions in the Katyn Forest, and by Soviet
inaction during the Warsaw uprising in 1944, as the Soviets allowed the Germans to crush the
Polish Home Army without lifting a finger In support. The traditional" leadership of Poland was
virtually annihilated, a conclusion to which the 35 percent destruction of the intelligent.:;!
a
attests. In such a weakened state, Polish society could do little to resist the installation of Soviet-
backed Communist rulers. The work of transformation and consolidation began immediately, with
Stalinism providing a particularly repressive and bludgeoning model for execution of those tasks.
In Jowitt's definition, Stalinism was a system- building approach that has left a legacy with
which the Polish leadership continues to struggle to this day. This approach contains three basic
components, the first of which Is the "dictatorship of the proletariat." The dictatorship of the
proletariat defines the relationship between the ruling elite and the rest of the society. It
mandates policies that focus on the separation of the regime elite from the rest of the society and,
in effect, encourages a sense of opposition between both sides. Widespread coercion and violence
are justified and used by the regime as instruments of persuasion. Finally, the Party tries to
55,jov/itt, "An Orqamzational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-
Leninist Systems", p. 1 174.
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assume complete control and direct responsitiility for the direction and pace of social development
and concentrates all decision- making povers into its hands. "What is involved here is the denial of
any i ntegritg to the public real m as disti net from the official real m."^^
The second component of the model is the rapid, forced development of the society and the
sustained mobilization of its resources. This is done through a command -structured economy and
society. Such command is not always perfect, hovever, and non- priority areas tend to be
controlled, at best, as attention is focused on priority areas; transformation is consequently mucn
slower or even nonexistent in such "omitted" areas. ^"^ The third component is a leadership with
what Jowitt terms as "production mentalities." The regime's emphasis is on achieving political,
economic, and social breakthroughs on the premise that in so doing, "the cultural domain can be
effectively circumscribed, transformed, and the few 'remnants' of bourgeois origin gradually
'mopped up'. "5^
The weakened state of Poland and the presence of overwhelming Soviet power initially allowed
the use of this model for transformation and consolidation to be implemented by the new regime.
However, the very success and virulence of the new regime in pursuing its task caused it to
disregard the warnings of Lenin about the possible renltency of the workers and the peasants.
Attempts to collectivize agriculture, decrees that raised food prices and work quotas, and attacks
on the Polish Church brought the regime into direct opposition from the peasants and workers who
became mobilized against the regime and the Stalinist model; the bloody riots of 1956 and the
reinstallation of Gomulka in a desperate attempt to defuse the situation was the result. Gomulka
found that the tasks of transformation and consolidation, let alone modernization, had not been
^^Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-
Leninist Systems", p. 1 1 75.
^"^See Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior (New 'r'ork; The Mac mi 11 an Company,
1961), p. 48 for more discussion of this "commanding heights' type orqanization and its
consequences.
5Srjowitt, "An Grganizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-
Leninist Systems", pp. 1 1 75- 1 1 76. Jowitt terms this a kind of "island- hopping" strategy.
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accomplished. He also found that as Poland developed economically and socially under the goad of
socialist progress, the rigid conception of the Party's leading role and of the unitary nature of
leadership made those Party cadresJ nciuding himself, whose political identities had been formed
during the Stalinist period, fearful that the grov/ing need for technicians and specialists would
necessitate a shift to expanded leadership and decision- making; this, of course, was seen as
threatening to dilute the Party's (and individual) power, place, and control, Gierek, rising to
power on the wave of such expanded membership, staked all on the "island- hopping' strategy that
gambled on the transformation of society in the v/ake of spectacular economic breakthroughs.
Yfhtn his economic policies fell apart in the second half of the seventies, he was left bankrupt and
with a Poland that was increasingly confirmed and proficient through experience in resistance to
the regime. Gierek's successors have been forced to readdress the problems of transformation and
consolidation, while the problem of modernization, as Jowitt defines it, remains seemingly
insurmountable for the forseeable future; rather, the current regime seems intent on the task of
maintaining itself, fearing the loss of control for the Party, control with which modernization is
perceived to be synonymous.
Thus, neither Gomulka nor any of his successors has been able to adequately accomplish tne
tasks of transformation, consolidation, and modernization in Poland. This is not to say that some
success has not been achieved; indeed, socialism has entered into the political culture of Poland due
largely to the experiential daily interaction between the regime's Com mi unist- derived structure
and Polish society itself- -political culture theorists are correct in noting the change- producing
power of structure and day-to-day contact and experience within the culture. What has r.urpn.sed
the Soviets and their clo.sest allies in Poland, however, is the stubborn opposition and resiliency
that "traditional" Polish political culture has manifested. Furthermore, the very attempts of the
regime at system- building have often unintentionally reinforced that resistance (as in 1956).
The result has thus not been the easy victory of Soviet- modelled socialism, but the emergence of a
Polish socialism that retains elements of traditional Polish political culture that not only oppose
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Soviet values, but challenge the Soviet desire of a pliant and supportive Poland as veil. As Arthur
Rachwald has observed,
Socialism in Poland is a unique, self- gene rated system vhose
content and destination are predominantly Polish; only its overall
contours resemble the Soviet mold. Socialism in Poland is a
function of the Soviet form of authority combined with Polish
tradition and values.^-
In a report summarizing the results of sociological surveys among Polish students in 1958,
1 961 , and 1 978, Stefan Novak notes that in response to the question, "V/ould you like the •..••or1d
to move toward some form of socialism?", 21 percent of the students in 1978 ansvered
"definitely yes" (1958: 24 percent), vhile 45 percent answered "rather yes" (1958: 44
percent), vith only 9 percent as "rather" or "definitely no"( 1 1 percent, 1 958).^'^ Poles seem
to have strongly embraced the propagation of egalitarian ideology of the socialist regime, and also
generally applaud the lessening of social stratification in socialist Poland. The idea of ongoing
economic and social progress is also appealing, and Polfts do generally feel that their social status
is higher than that of thei r fathers at the same age. ^' Furthermore , Solomon Ravin has asserted
that there exists an affinity between the ideology of the intelligentsia and the Socialist system in
Poland, whereby those elitist tendencies that do remain present "a ready-made pattern for
legitimation of status of the new managerial elite that emerges from Socialist industrialism. ''=-^
However, in response to the question, "Do you consider yourself to be a Marxist?", only 18
percent of the students in 1978 said "definitely" or "rather yes" (13 percent, 1958), while 46
-"^Arthur R. Rachwald, "Poland's Socialism"
,
Current Histor u. November 1 984, p. 357.
'^'-'Stefan Nov/ak, "Values and Attitudes of the Polish People", Scientific American
.
Vol
245, no. 1, July 1981, p. 51.
•^^S. Novak, "Values and Attitudes of the Polish People", p. 49.
•^^Solomon John Ravin, "The Polish Intelligentsia and the Socialist Order; Elements of
Ideological Compatability", Political Science Quarterl u. Vol. S3, no. 3, September 1968, pp.
376-77.
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percent said "rather or "definitely no" (66 percent in 1 958). '^•-' Socialism's problem in Poland
5eems not to be socialism per ss, but rather socialism as practiced by Soviet -oriented
authorities, vho can not apparently live up to their ovn ideology and promises. '^'^ Socialism in
Poland did not originate with the Soviets, but out of the socialist tradition of nineteenth century
Europe. The Polish Socialist Party played a significant role in the shaping of independent Poland
after 1 91 8, and one of its early leaders was even Jozef Pilsudski. The socialism of the Soviet
-
backed Communists, however was different. As Jowitt observed, the founding of post- World War
II socialist Poland was rooted in the Stalinist model such that the regime today still identifies with
its origins when challenged by other elements of Polish society, thus making modernization so
difficult. Indeed, Polish popular opinion holds that Communism is the main roadblock to real
socialism in Poland.'^'^
This Polish socialism in opposition to Stalinist socialism was a major theme of the 1956
unrest. Stefan Nowak's maintains that surveys conducted during the first years of Gomulka's
regime indicate that
people- stressed that they were in favor of "the Polish road to
socialism." This n'leant democratizing the political system,
removing the most drastic limitations on citizens' rights and the
major sources of their fear, promoting freedom of speech and
expression, increasing the influence of people on the government
and, after the Yugoslavian model, encouraging the participation of
v/orkers" councils in the management of factories. The "Polish
road to socialism" was also suffused with the patriotic feelings
people attach to a nation as distinguished from .state.^^
--S. Nowak, "Values and Attitudes of the Polish People", p. 51 . Respondents indicating "no
opinion" were 1 7 percent, 1 958; 55 percent, 1 978.
^'^Rachv/ald, "Poland's Socialism", p. 357,
^^Rachwald, "Poland's Socialism", p. 357.
^'^S. Nowak, "Values and Attitudes of the Polish People", p. 49.
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V/hatis particularly interesting about Nowak'5 recent surveys, hov/ever, is that he has found
that the opinions of the Polish people in 1978 have changed very insignificantly from 195S.
Despite an intervening 20 years of Communist rule, the Poles maintain their Polishness in their
political culture. The trauma of World War il and the imposition of the nev regime introduced
new values, hut Polishness has reasserted itself, thus underscoring the conrlicts in Poland today
between the people and the regime. Nowak says,
in general one can say that the value system ve found in the late
1 950"3 had formed in the interaction of values propagated by the
new system and values that persisted somewhere deep in the
people's minds. The synthesis began to exert pressure on the
course of events on the national level in about 1 956.^"^
Thus is it arguable that the egalitarian sentiment found in Polish society today is a reflection
of the older gentry concern for equality that eventually gave rise to the extremes of /f^-fn/zn
Kf/v. Similarly, the satisfaction \vith decreased social stratification today may he, in part, a
reaction to the excessive social stratification that the late gentry period and the turn toward
serfdom had introduced, as opposed to the less pronounced cleavages of the earlier Polish nation.
Furthermore, Nov/ak was struck by the general uniformity of opinion and values among Poles,
finding little evidence of a "generation gap" and only weak correlation betv/een values and the
demographic characteristics of the respondent (distinction by education provided the most visible
exception to this generalization), "It is possible, m sum, to speak about a system of values in
Poland rather than about sytems."^'^
An interesting variation on the issue of attitude? and beliefs among the Poles is presented in a
study by Janina Frentzel-Zaqorska. Building on Stefan Nowak's surveys, Zaqorska looked for any
changes in responses that might have surfaced during the Solidarity experience. Respondents in
1983, seemingly incited by the Solidarity hope, indicated only nine percent "definitely yes" and
^^S. Nov/ak, ""values and Attitudes of the Plish People", p. 50.
^^S. Nowak, ""Values and Attitudes of the Polish People", p. 47.
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34 percent "rather yes" in answer to the question "Would gou like the vorld to move tov/ard ?orne
form of Socialism?"- -a drop of 23 percentage points in the overall affirmative category itince
1 978, before the Solidarity crisis (66 to 43 percent; negative responses rose from 1 percent to
36 percent). Similarly, the number of respondents considering themselves to be a Marxist vent
from 19 percent "yes" in 1978 (3 percent "definitely yes", 16 percent "rather yes") to only 7
percent "yes" in 1983 (2 percent "definitely",, 5 percent "rather yes"); the "no" respondents to
the same question rose from 48 percent in 1978 (24 percent "rather no" and 24 percent
"definitely no") to 66 percent in 1983 (20 percent "rather no" and 46 percent "definitely
no") 69
Zagorska's interpretation is that the Poles hold "latent" or "recessive" beliefs and values that
come out of latency with great strength as soon as some possibility of free expression is restored.
The reason these were not accurately detected before was that questions about basic values were
not asked previously during the post-war upheavals.^*^ As expressed during the Solidarity
experience, the socio-political system approved and desired by Polish society may be
characterized as a an essentially democratic one- -with strong control of government by citizens,
civil rights, with freedom of speech as the first priority, based on social equality or equal chances
for all citizens. Solidarity's great strength and appeal was its demand for truth, authenticity, and
human dignity and as such should be regarded as "the spontaneous organisation of the emerging
civil society against the distrusted elite which was treated as illegitmale.""^^
Zagorska maintains that the Poles adapted to their situation under an illegitimate regime, but
that it was "adaptation through opposition to the system." Involutanly forced to be Involved in a
system they in truth reject, Poles have maintained themselves in a psychological opposition to the
^'Jamna Frentzel -Zagorska, "The Dominant Political Culture in Poland", Politics
,
Vol
20, no. 1,M3y 1985, pp. 96-97.
''''^Polish nationalist apologists, of course, argued that such beliefs and values existed,
based on the experience of Pni.'jh history, even if they v/ere not "scientifically measured".
^^Frentzel -Zagorska, "The Dominant Political Culture in Poland", pp. 88-69, 91
regime that permits daij-to-dag living,, vlth marnj basic values in recession, but vnicn also
"stores up pov/der" i'or those occasions vhen basic values can be expressed. As v/e have seen, the
Poles have considerable experience at living and "opposing" in this manner, and, if post-var
Soviet experience vlth Poland, and particularly with Solldantu, is any guide, it is arguable that
the opposition factor may becoming stronger as the "povder" for increasingly powerful explosions
is stored.
The realization of the existence and persistence of such Polish values does much to help
explain events in Poland today. Further, it is apparent that even many of the members of the
Party and regime in Poland, (ve are, of course, describing a spectrum here ranging from non-
party members in government to a fanatical few who identify much more with the Soviets than
with the Poles) realize through experience, and probably through their own Polish Identity, that
these Polish values must be recognized and often accomodated. Such a "Polandization" of
Communism is most evident In the continual expression of even liberal thoughts within the Party,
especially during the Ninth Extraordinary Party Congress in July 1981; the continued
maintenance of a sizeable private sector of the economy, particularly in agriculture; and in the
government's grudging accomodation with the Church. Similarly, while the declaration of martial
law certainly arrested increasingly divisive trends between Polish society and government, it also
shielded Poland from a possible bloody conquest and second attempt at Sovietization; the evolving
Polish model of a socialist state was thus preserved. Furthermore, there were no doubts but that
the imposition of martial law was designed only to restore order and a return to a stsfi's .^-i'v
s/iU benurn --not to return to a purer form of Soviet Communism. The Soviet acceptance of
this solution may also reilect their growing awareness of the virulence of Polish values and
traditions, and the difficulty (a difficulty to which Russian experience with Poland attests) in
imposing total Soviet orthodoxy on Poland. Such acceptance also evidences a de fscto recognition




What then are those values and attitudes, those traditions and viev/s that continue to be found
in Polish political culture, and vhich make Poland so intractable to its Party elite and the Soviet
overseers? In his introduction to a chapter on Polish values and attitudes, Clifford Barnett
identifies many of the themes that seem to explain the essential "Polishness" of the Poles. He
writes,
Poland is a Western nation. The creation of the Polish state and
itsadoptionof Christianity vere simultaneous and the Poles have
viewed themselves for centuries as an outpost of the Latin
Christian world. TTie significant attitudes and forms of behavior
of the Polish people revolve around the value placed on individual
dignity, initiative, originality, and self-expression. The
uniqueness of the Polish people in part lies in the intensity with
which they hold these and other values of the Catholic West. In
terms of Poland's present alignment with the Soviet Union, it is
significant that Poles always have identified Russia, tsarist or
Soviet, as an alien culture hallowing conformity and the
submersion of the i ndividual i n the state.^^
Here then one sees evidence of the themes we have traced throughout Polish history.
Korbonski identifies the "traditional" Polish values as:
• the basic distrust and disobedience of political or government authority;
• emphasis on egalitarian values and equality;
• fe rve nt , i f not ram pa nt nati o nal ism; a nd
t attachment to certain traditional institutions and social arrangements such as the Church. ^^
The evidence and origins of such values has been demonstrated earlier, but let us expand and then
summarize on these themes and values from the present Polish perspective.
^2 Barnett, Poland, p. 396.
^^Andrzej Korbonski, "Poland", Teresa Rakov/ska-Harmstone, ed.. Communism in Eastern
Euro pe (Bloominoton. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 63.
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A "tradition of resistance" is often used to characterize Polish actions in history. and to explain
the spirit of opposition among Poles today. As early as the sixteenth century the French political
theorist Jean Bodin observed that the Poles belonged to "those nations whose attachment to freedom
and unrestrained abhorrence of servility and slavery were especially strong. "^'^ Zbigniev
Brzezinski noted in the forward to a work by Jan Nowak, "the roots of Solidarity spring from the
unity of the Polish people forged during the uprising [in Poland during World War 11) and from a
history of struggle and resistance to foreign oppression. "^^ A spirit of resistance is, of course,
part of the national identity as the eastern outpost, the antsrnurate ctfriitaniniis, of the West
against the infidels --Tatars, Turks, or Russians- -of the East, as well as the defender of Roman
Catholicism against Islam, Orthodoxy, Lutheranism, or the secular power of the Holy Roman
Empire.^^
The experience of partition and the development of the Romantic tradition breathed fire into
the tradition of Polish resistance that burns to this day. Every schoolchild in Poland learns about
the importance of the country's Romantic authors. Not only literature textbooks, but also history
books- -which everybody must read and study- -eulogize the struggles for liberation. The
Kosciuszko insurrection and the 1830 and 1863 uprisings are key subjects in all curricula. "^"^
Furthermore, the rich tradition and history of struggle has even provided proven tactics for
adoption by modern Poles. The "flying universities" employed by Solidarity and KOR in the
current crisis, for example, were first developed in resistance to Russian rule between 1 890 and
1914.
"^^Ci ted in Anna N. Cienciala, "Resistance: A Polish Tradition", a book review in Problems
of Communism . September-October. 1982, p. 78.
"^5Jan Nowak. Courier From Moscow (Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University Press,
1982), p. 14.
'''^Kolankiewicz and Taras note that a film version of the Battle of Gr unwald has been
showing $C'me\\'tier$ in Poland almost continuously since its release in the n^nd- sixties, "Poland:
Socialism for Everyman?", p. 1 25.
^"^Gross, "In Search of History", p. 6.
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The resistance of World War II, both to initial invasion and to occupation, is, of course, a
subject of even more recent memory. One can imagine the stones told by grandfathers and even
fathers to Polish children about events in the war. The orqanization of effective underground
resistance^evenin the face of vaunted Nazi police methods, undoubtedly has provided guidance for
the establishment and preservation of an active underground in Poland today. Finally, the post-
war experience of the Poles in 1956, 1970, and 1980 has been that resistance can still be
expected to achieve some resultj.'^^
It is a historical fact that many of the most momentuous events in the most recent half of
Poland's thousand-year history have directly involved the Russians, usually in the form of bloody
confrontation with Russian i mperialism. That as strong, deep- held senti ment of anti - Russianism,
born of bitter experience, is to be found in Poland today should, therefore, not be surprising- -nor
should it be overlooked. Tsarist Russia never inspired the Poles to anything except resistance.
The Poles see Russia as a culturally and economically backward civilization, as an alien culture
that has no part in the heritage of the V/est, and one that is thus antithetical to Poland. Neither of
the two other occupiers of partition Poland- -Austria or Prussia- -followed policies as brutal or
^'^One of the greatest statements of this tradition of resistance must be Poland's national
anthem. As indicated earlier, it originated in Dobrov/skis Polish Legion fighting under Napoleon
in Italy. Despite Soviet attempts to supplant it with "The International", which is played on
official occasions, Poles much prefer their own anthem:
"Poland is mi Yet Lost"
While we live she is existi ng, Poland ! shall the foe enslave thee,
Pol a nd 1 s not fal 1 e n
;
Sadl y a nd fo reve r
;
We will wi n with swords resisti nq. And we hesitate to save thee?
What the foe has stolen. Never, Poland, Never!
Wen c ross •./ he re Wa rta 's s u rgl ng ( C ho r us
)
Gl 00 mi 1 y 1 ts wate rs
,
Ma re h , Ma re h , Da b rows ki
,
With each blade from sheath emergi nq From Ital y's Plai n;
Poland's foes to slaughter
!
Our Brethren shall meet us
Hence unto the field of glory.
Where the life bl odd's streaming;




.-js fiercely designed to deprive Poles not only of political, but also of cultural and even linquisitc
identity, as those adopted by the Russians. Similarly, Poles veil remember hov the Soviets
quickly and fiercely sought to deprive Poland of its nevly -acquired independence after World War
1, with the Poles only "miraculously" stopping them at the very gates of Warsav itself. Soviet
ruthlessnes v/as again experienced in the 1939 occupation and in the Katyn forest. ^"^ As Jan
Gross observes,
Official historiography, vhich emphasizes the ostensible
congruence of interests and historical alliance of Polish patriots
and Russian Communists (vho fought against tsarist absolutism),
is not terribly persuasive. The profound anti- Russian animus
was passed from one generation of Poles to another, if only
because it is easier to see a continuous line of conflict where two
nations are pitched against each other than to absorb the rather
subtle and meretricious idea that, at a certain point in history,
class alliance superseded a conflict of nation -states. By far the
great majority of Poles simply do not believe that Russian
imperialism miraculously evolved after the October Revolution
into something qualitatively differet>t--i.e., "Communist
internationlism." For many Poles, their recent family history
contains some striking evidence to justify their suspicions.®"^
Poles are aware too of the lower standards of livi ng i n Russia compared to Poland or tt-ie West
;
the Poles have no doubt as to which way they would like to move. It is known that Polish goods that
^"^George Kennan records that "the Soviet police authorities proceeded to deport from the
Soviet -occupied portion of Poland to the interior regions of Russia and Siberia, under conditions of
extreme brutality and cruelty, people in the number of several hundred thousand- -probably over
one million. These people were, in the overwhelming majority of cases, guilty of no specific
offenses whatsoever against the Soviet occupational authorities. ... So appalling were the
circumstances of their deportation and their subsequent treatment in the Soviet Union that a large
portion of them, as much as 50 percent it is sometimes claimed, have never been heard from
since. In addition to this, the Soviet authorities had taken into detention nearly 200,000 members
of the Polish armied forces- - mien whole sole offense consisted, so far as one can see, i n the effort to
defend their country when it v/as attacked in 1 939. And of these, nearly ten thousand officers-
-
many of them reserve officers, doctors, lawyers, the cream in some measure of the Polish
intelligentsia- -had been individually executed in the Katyn forest, in the spring of 1940, by
Soviet police detachments detailed for this purpose." George F. Kennan, Memoirs (New York;
Bantam Books, 1967), pp. 209-10.-
^^Gross, "In Search of History", p. 6
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could be sold in the V-Zest for higher prices and hard -currency are often sold instead to the Soviet
Union. Similarlg, poor quality Soviet- made goods are imported to Poland at higher prices than
would be necessary if purchased elsevhere. Poles thus see themselves as attached to a
fundamentally Third World economic country that, unfortunately, has a dominating military
power and geopolitical location \'7s-^-w?s Poland.
It is not difficult to see how such a history and how such experiences would imbue Poles with a
fervent nationalism. The contributions to such nationalism by Poland's earlier great power status
and by Polish cultural superiority in comparison with its neighbors while living in a semi-
isolated position from its brothers in Western cultural heritage also help to explain such fervor.
Stefan Nowak's survey of 1 978 shows that in response to the question, "Do you believe one should
risk one's life in the defense of country?", 82 percent of the respondents said yes. This out-
ranked family (73 percent), human dignity (46 percent), fi rends (42 percent), truth (26
percent), religion (22 percent), and "a social idea" (14 percent); only "human life" (89
percent) ranked-higher.^^
Patriotism is an ideal shared by all Poles, including those abroad. The assistance sent to
Poland today by Polish emiqrees, particularly those in the United States, follows in a tradition
established under the nineteenth century partitioning; Paderewski's efforts at persuading
Woodrow Wilson to call for Polish independence are an example. As Clifford Barnett says.
All Poles are expected to be patriots. Oppression during the
nineteenth century created a proud intelligentsia tradition of
heroic self-sacrifice in the name of national ideals, a tradition
that has since then been absorbed by all classes of society. It
glorifies courageous behavior, bravado, and fearless persistence
in the face of all attacks and the refusal to admit "moral" defeat.'-'-^
'5^S. Nowak, "'/aluesand Attitudes of the Polish People", p. 53.
^'^ Barnett. Poland
, p. 410.
Despite such patriotism that can draw Poles together in support of the nation, it must .ulso be
remembered that Poles evidence a strong individualism that has often made such common
recognition of a threat extremely difficult. Jan Szczepanski writes,
The traditional Polish personality ideal was derived from the
culture of the nobility and was composed of such traits as
readiness for the defense of the Catholic faith, readiness for the
defense of the fatherland, a highly developed sense of personal
dignity and honor, a full-blown individualism, and imposing
mien, chivalry, intellectual brilliance, and dash. This
personality ideal developed by the nobility was in some degree
assimilated by the peasants, whose sense of attachment and
fidelity to the religious faith, to their fathers' heritage, and to old
customs proved to be a vital factor in maintaining the national
existence in the nineteenth century.'^^
Poles feel that discipline is to be found in the individual, rather that enforced by society's
institutions. The ideal person is independent, strong, and self-reliant. The idea that each person
is unique and that he should be allowed freedom for self-expression is supported by the Catholic
religious concept of the sacredness of the individual and the responsibility of each person before
God for his actions and beliefs. Hence personal dignity and difference is a fundamental basis for a
Pole's behavior as a member of society and the nation. '^"^ Such emphasis on individuality is not
for material gain, but as a means of protecting identity. Honor, therefore, becomes of great
importance.
On a national scale, such individualism is reflected in the basic distrust of political or
government authority, although Kolankiewicz and Taras conclude from more recent surveys that
disobedience to government authority has lessened.'^^ This does not seem to mean that the current
regime is becoming more popular, but rather that an expanded governmental role in a modern
society is increasingly realized as necessary and consequently, once must work with it while
-'•^Szczepanski, Polish Societ u. p, 1 67.
Q'^Barnett. Poland
, p. 396.
^^Kolankiewicz and Taras, "Poland: Socialism for Everyman?", pp. 1 08-9.
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sirnultaneously jealously guarijinq one's freedoms. Similarly, there is much desire for equality of
opportunity and emphasis on egalitarian values as a vay of ensuring the recognition of the
individual. Thus Poles mag accept socialist egalitarianism while rejecting the hierarchical
authority of the Party. It is not surprising, therefore, that the old challenge of the Polish nobles
to their kings, r/jc o nas dsx nas (nothing about us without us) appeared as a slogan in the
Solidarity movement in 1 980-81
.
Poles also place a high value on freedom of speech, Kolankiewicz and Taras finding that it
ranked directly after equality of opportunity and reasonable living standards in recent research.
Freedom to speak one's mind, to express one's opinion, Is a means of reinforcing individual
identity. The right to criticize government decisions or officials (in a country where hterum
v^to once held sway and where kings were elected) is basic to Poles, although it can easily clash
with "democratic centralism".
The sister of equality is fairness, as it postulates equal treatment of individuals. Such concern
for fairness was evidenced in the Solidarity call for an independent judiciary during the 19S1
Solidarity Congress. The judiciary had seemingly become nothing but an Institution of the Party,
charged with protecting the interests and privileges of the Party hierarchy at the expense of non-
party individuals.
As one can see, such Polish attitudes, traditions, and values are often contradictory to the
ideology and purposes of the Communist party. Although the Poles rmght be expected to distrust
any government authority, Communist or not, the fact that all realize that the current Party and
its regime is a Russian derivative only adds fuel to the fire. Such a realization serves as a prod to
Polish nationalism and thus makes even "Polish" communism more palatable than any Soviet
version. The revolt of 1956 against Sovietlzation, and the initial popularity of Gomulka is
explained by this opinion. Again, during the 1980 crisis and after the fall of Gierek, a popular
saying in Poland was "Better Kania than ''/anya"--Vanya being a diminuative of the Russian name
Ivan. Thus the P2RP is often seen as a Trojan horse for Soviet plans of hegemony in Poland.
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As the foregoing demo nst rates, and as Paul Levis indicated in his study of obstacle? to regime
legitimacy in Poland, the PZRP does not have any basis for public support; there is not even a
Communist tradition during the intervar year? on which to build, the Bolshevik invasion of 1 920
having dashed any allure of the nev variant of socialism from the East. To make matter? vorse, as
the years led to the 1980 crisis, Poles became increasingly avare that corruption pervaded the
Party elite and that state funds were svelling private purses as the economy plunged into chaos and
personal incomes were cut back; the regime's "propaganda of success" only served to irritate Poles
further and heighten their distrust of the Party. Gierek's attempt at nev economic methods was
not a reform, but was based solely on the principles "of Party authority and its control of the
socio-economic system; its failure only discredited the Party further and emphasized in the minds
of many Poles, to include some Party members (especially on the local level), the desperate need
for reform and renewal. The regime was seen as being fundamentally unfair, corrupt, alien, and
narrow. As one writer stated in KOR journal in 1 976, "The events of 1 976 showed that Gierek's
technocratlsm was worth as much as the patriotism of Gomulka. . . that, in short, the leader? of the
PZRP haveonly one authentic ideology: power. The years 1971-6 have further brought a return
to the conceptions of the Stalinist period. '"'^'^
Although left here until the last, perhaps the most critical, and certainly the most continuous
element in Polish political culture has been the Roman Catholic Church. The preceding paragraphs
have amply demonstrated how the Church and Poland are wrapped up as one in the Polish identity,
the Church providing the necessary ingredient for uniqueness that first served to set Poland apart
from its neighbors. Since then it has been a constant and unduring thread through over a thousand
year? of Polish life and has become not only the guardian of the spiritual values of the nation, but
also the repository of the Polish identiy, preserving it through partition, war , and occupation.
'-'•^'A. Macierev/icz, "vValka o prawa obywatelskie", G1os (Paris: Kultura, 1 980)
, p 131,
as cited in Lewis, "Obstacles to the Establishment of Political Leqitimacg in Communist Poland", p.
1 39.
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The Church became a surroqate for the Polish Jtate durinq the period of partitions; vhen
thousands of Poles vere exiled to Siberia, clerqymen vere among the number, and the Church
shared in the suffering of the people. Back in Poland the Church continued to function, though,
nurturing the traditional, peasant patriotism of the ordinary people. .Similarly in World War II
,
the Church and the clergy widely participated in the resistance movement, suffering torture,
imprisonment, and execution.
From World War II , and until the formation of Solidarity, the Church vas the only organized
force in Poland that cut across all social groups and confronted the government vhen the latter
opposed the civil rights of individuals.' A bipolar relationship evolved betveen the Party and the
Church. The Church was aware of its uniqueness such that it repeatedly, but carefully, confronted
the regime. The strikes of 1 930 and the emergence of Solidarity as a legal third force transfromed
the role of the Church from major adversary of the regime to a much- needed mediator between the
regime and Soli da rity.^"^
Initially the nev/ role caused misunderstanding. Many Solidarity members became irritated
that the Church did not quickly side with Solidarity against the government. Although the Church
eventually did strongly support individual rights through Solidarity, the Church remained a
strong force for patient effort and negotiation to avoid violent confrontation. With such a policy
the Church undoubtedly helped extend Solidarity's success, while maintaining its own ability to
continue to function as an independent institution when martial law came. Without arguing the
question as to whether or not the Poles are strongly religious, it is enough to observe that the
Church enjoys immense popularity today because it has played, and continues to play, a spiritual
and religious role, while also functioning as the bastion of Independence from Communist control




This study of Polish political culture has demonstrated the uniqueness and resliency of Polish
traditions, attitudes, and behaviors over many centuries of history and under a variety of
circustances. The attempt of the present regime, under Soviet mandate, to transform the
traditional culture of Poland into that of Soviet socialism has failed, and all indications are that it
will continue to do so. The structural approach of Marxism- Leninism has modified some elements
of Polish culture, but has simultaneously strenqhtened some through congruence (not necessarily
in a manner helpful to the regime), and incited others to Intensified resistance and opposition. The
Soviet argument of a nevideology under the banner of socialist internationalism has foundered on
a long history of Polish experience with Russia, while the Poles in response have generated a true
representative organization, Solidarity, that has severly challenged the Soviet- backed regime's
ability to control Poland as a part of the Soviet empire. Strengthened too by great experience in
remtency, to Include continued existence of the nation even when deprived of statehood, the Poles
have proven a much more difficult nut to crack than the Soviets had imagined. What has emerged
is a Polish socialism that is often in opposition to the arrogance of the Soviet masters.
The Communists have introduced nev political and economic institutions, as veil as a nev
organization of state administration and a nev legal system. They have tried to revolutionize the
representative national culture, to direct literary and artistic creativity in such a vay as to
replace traditional Polish culture vith socialist culture. But the regime elite has found that the
strength of Polish traditional culture has not only challenged its efforts at transformation and
consolidation, but has demanded modernization along Polish lines, further threatening the elite
that had not even figured out hov to conduct modernization under its ovn control that would protect
its privileged interests.
The Church in Poland and a national consciousness and interest of a people in its unique history
have guarded the traditional values of Polish political culture; historical experience taught them
hov to do so. In hundreds of little ways, in patterns of interaction and relation, In informal groups
p, 1
and ?oci3l circles, in farnilg life and local communities as veil, the stability of Polish culture
conti-nues.^^ The peasant stratum also absorbed many of the values, traditions and behavior? of
the nobility, due to aspiration and emulation as veil as convention, and has proven to be a powerful
social force in preserving them. Reinforced by the Church and its ov/n conservatism, the peasants
have even managed to maintain their private ownership of land under a regime supposedly
dedicated to the principle of collectivization.
in commenting on the factors of continuity in Polish society, Jan Szczepanski has this to say:
Maintained in the system of education, in socialization, in
families, schools, organizations, and so on, some national cultural
values--such as, in Poland, individualism, sense of honor, pride
in national military glory, a cult of national heroes, and
patriotism in the sense of dedication to national intere.st--
comprise a significant factor of continuity. Thus, the self-image
of the Polish society remains almost the same as it vas in
interwar society. This self-image is sustained, in part, by the
mass publication of Polish nineteenth-century literature and by
the fact that the great masters of Polish literature in both the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries present in their vorks the
very essence of Polish patriotism and national pride. .. Each new
generation of young boys and girls reads the novels of Henryk
Sienkiewicz, which re-create the wars with the Cossaks and
Tatars, the Swedish invasion, and the war with the Turks in the
seventeeth century. These are written in a style similar to that
of the Alexander Dumas novels, but they are laden with patriotic
content and present a fascinating picture of past military glory.
It was in the spirit of this tradition that hundreds of thousands of
young Poles volunteered in the last war to join the underground
armies within the country or to go a long and hazardous way
abroad to join Polish armed forces fighting in foreign lands. ^''^
^'^'An indication of the extent of that stability is provided by the fact that some proverbs in
Polish thought that are used to characterize Poles emerged in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries and are still i n use today.
^^Szczepanski
. Polish Societ u. pp. 1 99-200.
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Thus one cannot under-itand the situation in Poland today, nor the prospect? for the future,
without consideration of Polish political culture. Although one could certainly arque about the
relative degree of influence of any one particular trait, value, or tradition, once must nonetheless
conclude that the sum of that culture, and its demonstrated resiliency, will compel the Poles to
continue to resist the imposition of an essentially alien political system in their land. The best
hope for some form of political stability, over the long run, is a more distinctly Polish regime.
Whether or not the Soviets will agree to allov/ this to occur remains to be seen.
I
IV. SOVIET INTEREST IN POLAND
Having raised the issue of Soviet interest in Polish events, it is instructive at this point to
depart temporarily from the Polish-centered perspective and to reviev DrierTy Soviet interest in
Poland, as veil as the Soviet calculations that preceded the imposition of martial lav/ in Poland.
Geography and history have established a Polish- Russian relationship as a geopolitical reality. As
the reviev of Polish history has shown, the Soviet Union/Russia has played a crucial role in
Polish national life since the seventeenth century; Poland has reciprocally weighed heavily m
Soviet history. The Russian playvriteChekov observed that the past "weighs upon a Russian mind
like a thousand-ton rock." If Chekov is right, then the Soviet viev/ of its historical relationship
with Poland is likely to be helpful in understanding the Soviet interest in Poland and will provide j
good place to begl n a review of that i nterest.
The sixteenth century is notable in Russian history for the defeat of the Tatars and the rapid
expansion of Muscovy under Ivan IV and his son Feodor ( 1 533- 1 593). Such Russian expansion
soon collided in the West with Poland, which was in its Golden Age at the time. Poland, in union
with Lithuania, had extended its boundaries east and south to include modern Byelorussia and much
of the Ukraine, including Kiev. In the clash of nations that followed, Russia was plunged into its
Time of Troubles (1598-1613), during which Polish armies under Sigismund II occupied
Moscow and placed the pretender Dmitri on the Russian throne.
The establishment of the Russian Romanov dynasty in 1613 reversed the Polish tide, but the
struggle between Poland and Russia has continued to this day. Russia absorbed eastern areas of
Poland in the latter half of the seventeenth century as Russia, Sweden, and Poland vied for
supremecy in the lands between the Baltic and the Black Seas. After Peter the Great knocked
Sweden out of the struggle in 1721, Poland and Russia faced each other directly. As described
earlier, Russia, in league with the empires of Prussia and the Hapsburgs, progressively annexed
Poland off the map in the partitions of Poland ( 1 772, 1 793, and 1 795). Polish troops fought for
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Napoleon in his invasion and burning of Moscov/ in 1312 (Napoleon considered thi; Polish troops
"the most loyal and aggressive"). The Congress of Vienna left Poland under Russian rule, \vtK.rt it
continued until World War I.
Independent Poland vas the first target of the nev Soviet state as the Russian Civil War drev
to a close. What the Soviet Union failed to do in the Russo- Polish War in 1 920, naaiely to return
Poland to Soviet rule, it accomplished brierly in 1939, and finally in the post-var partition of
Europe.^ Despite the unrest in Poland under Soviet rule as already noted, the Soviets ure
historically convinced of their right' of ownership of Poland, and sometimes refer to it as "the
Vistula provinces" in private conversations.^' At most Poland is thought of as some autonomous
entity under Russian supervision. Moscow's traditional fear of the threat that a strong jnd
independent Poland would pose to Russian empire seems to be at the root of such a view.^
if traditional fear and historic experience are one explanation of Soviet interest in Poland,
another is the country's strategic -geographical importance. Poland lies athwart the traditional
invasion route to Russia and, in an area of few natural impediments to attack, is often thought of as
the gateway to Russia. The three hundred miles of Baltic coast now controlled by Poland as the
result of post- World War II boundary settlements also means that Poland has a special strategic
significance in Soviet war plans. In the event of war with NATO, Poland provides the springboard
for, and Polish military forces are expected to participate in, a westward thrust along the Baltic
coast to occupy Denmark and thus gain control of the entrance to the Baltic Sea. Poland also plays a
crucial role in Soviet air defense, as it guards a large portion of the approaches to the Soviet
Union- -an importance not to be underestimated in the age of cruise missiles, theater nuclear
1 For 3 qoud grasp of the history of this continuing struggle see Arthur E. Adams, Ian M
Matley, and ''lYillian 0. McCagq, An Atlas of Russian and East European Histor u. (New 'iork:
Praeger, 1967).
^'Dimltn K. Simes, "Clash Over Poland", Foreign Polic u. Spring 1 982, p. 55.
^It is interesting to note that Marx and Engel3 endorsed the Polish struggle for independence
(Grunwald, op. cit. p,78ff) while most nineteenth century Russian liberals, including Pushkin,
fully supported Russian suppression of Polish uprisings.
weapons, and oontinued developments in anti-missle defense."^ Additionally, Poland ':: armed
forces, the largest in the area, are an important part of the Warsaw Pact's so-called 'Northern
Tier' (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic), the most important and
sensitive part of the Soviet East European empire.
Another strategic consideration is Poland's geographic position between the German
Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union. Critical Soviet lines of communication to the GDR run
through Poland such that the "Polish corridor" is indispensable to the logistical support of the
Group of Soviet Forces in Germang. A destabilized or unreliable Poland would increase the risk
that NATO forces would cut off and isolate the nineteen elite Soviet divisions in the GDR in time of
war. One solution to that risk v/ould be the withdrawal of the divisions from the GDR. The
implications of such a move, the ideological cost, and the impact of such a withdrawal on FRG-GDR
and general Soviet-NATO relations--to include the heightened possibility of German reunification
and all that it would entail --is certainly frightening to the Soviets. The prospect of Poland's
350,000 man military, the third largest in Europe, being directly on the Soviet border and not
under Soviet control, must alone cause the security-conscious Soviets to shudder violently.
The Soviet Union also has a considerable ideological -political interest in Poland. The PZRP is, of
course, a progeny of Soviet Communism. It is an article of faith and a principle of policy that
socialism will succeed in Poland. However, the Soviets are acutely av/are that Poland is not the
model of stability and friendship that Bulgaria is, or the showplace that the GDR is. As has been
shown, Moscow's approach to the 'vVarsaw regime .since 1 956 has "often appeared aimed as much at
contai ni ng Polish heresies withi n manageable li mits as at i mposi ng the prescn bed orthodoxy. The
difficultiesof dealing with 'vVarsaw have been further complicated by the remarkable ineptness of
'^Andrzej Korbonski,. "Soviet Policy Toward Poland" in Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, ed., Soviet
Policuin Eastern Euro pe. (New Haven, Connecticut: 'fale University Press, 1 984.), p. 61
.
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PolishCommunist leaders, whose repeated and dismal failure to generate popular support for the
regime has necessitated periodic propping up by the Kremlin."^
The Soviets also v1ev Poland as a conduit for alien (and qenerallg unvanted) iniluences.
Poland Is in many vays a quintessential Western country, as evidenced in its political culture.
This cultural orientation and Poland's Roman Catholicism serve to intensify the antipathy vhich
Russians historically harbor tovard the Poles. Traditional Russian xenophobia is heightened by
the secret inferiority which Russians feel toward the Poles, an inferiority that is veil -concealed
behind, and may be part of the cause of, the disdain outwardly exhibited by the Russians toward the
Poles. This "inferiority" is brought home to the modern Soviet citizen in economic comparisons.
Whereas Warsaw has been called the Paris of the East, the same can not be said of Moscow.
Economically, the Soviet Union has interests in Poland as well. The Soviets have supplied
billions of rubles in economic aid and loan rescheduling, and have sustained losses to the Soviet
economy, to support the struggling Polish economy. Among the CMEA countries, Poland is the
fourth- largest Soviet trading partner, with a 1984 foreign trade turnover of 11 ,366 billion
rubles.*^ Although Poland is less of an economic asset to Moscow than is the GDR or Czechoslovakia,
it is a source of coal, ship production, and some specialized industrial equipment. More
importantly, Poland's opening to the West in the 1 970s has made it an indirect source of Western
technology otherwise unavailable to the USSR.
Finally, in the Soviet Union's estimation, Poland shares in common with Eastern Europe a
whole set of si multaneous functions. Vernon Aspaturian descri Pes those functions as bei ng,
• a defense glacis;
• a springtoard for possible expansion westward;
• an Ideological legitimization of her universal pretensions:
-Korbonski, "Soviet Policy Toward Poland", p. 63.
^V Klochek in Ekonomicheskaga Gazeta
.
no. 12, Mar 1985, pp. 20-21 as reported in
Current Di gest of the Soviet Press . Vol 1, 19S5. This represents 15.6 percent of the Soviet
Union's trade with CMEA countries.
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• ij laboratonj for the .'application of the Soviet model of development;
• a reservoir of human, natural, and economic resources to be exploited for Soviet recovery;
• a collection of diplomatic pavns and surrogates to be used in international politics;
• a source of psychological and even quantitative comfort in international organizations and
conferences, where the Soviet Union might otherwise be isolated and alone7
Thus Poland figures importantly in Soviet interests. Y/ith a population of 36 million, Poland
is the fifth largest nation in Europe (excluding the Soviet Union). Its GNP of $111 bilion ( 1 981)
is as large as that of India with a population of over 650 million. As Andrzej Korbonski writes,
By virtue of its physical characteristics- -area, population,
resource base, and geographical location- -Poland has since 1 945
been the most important member of the bloc ne.xt to the Soviet
Union itself. Whether measured by its military or its economiic
strength, it is the largest contributor among the East European
countries both to the WTO and, at least until recently, to CMEm.
For these reasons alone, Poland has long been perceived as the
geopolitical linchpin of Moscov/'s hegemonic system in Eastern
Europe and, contrarily, as a potential catalyst of change in the
region. Any shift in Soviet policy toward its largest ally could be
expected to have a powerful, even domino effect on the rest of the
area. The most recent crisis, culminating in the imposition of
martial law in December 1 981 , underscores once again Poland's
vital importance to the Soviet Union.'^
Moscow's view of Poland as the linchpin to the Soviet East European empire served to heighten
Soviet fears about a po-ssible spillover of unrest from the Polish crisis into other East European
countries, and about the long-term effect the Polish developments could have on the rest of the
empire, to Include various Soviet republics. The economic difficulties existing in Poland are not
limited to Poland, but can be found elsewhere in the Warsaw Pact. Similarly, the alienation
between the Communist regime and the population, the seemingly intractable problem of
legitimacy and stability, is also repeated in other Eastern European countries. Lithuania, of
"^Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Eastern Europe in World Perspective", p. 1 6.
^Korbonski, "Soviet Policy Toward Poland", p. 61
.
course, has long historic ties to Polamj (jaqiellonian dgnastic Union, 1386-1572),, dnd sided
vlth Poland in the 1S31 and 1863 Insurrections. The Polish minority in Lithuania. still
comprises 7.3 percent of Lithuania's population (1979)."-^ Poland and the brietly- independent
Ukraine fought as allies against the Bolsheviks foUovIng World War I, and many Poles still live in
the Ukraine as the result of centuries of rluctuating borders. Poles can also be found today in
Czechoslovakia and the GOR, as veil as in Byelorussia and, to a small extent, in Estonia and Latvia.
Y. Stanley Yardys, a specialist in Baltic studies, asserts that the events in Poland in 1 980 did
reverberate through the Baltic regions, and that those reverberations can be documented. He found
strong evidence too of concern among Baltic Communist leaders regarding possible spillover
effects.^ "^ The leaders of Czechoslovakia and the GDR also repeatedly criticized developments in
Poland, in part, to forestall a potential spillover of labor unrest into their countries. There is
evidence too of Ukrainian labor unrest sparked by the Polish events. Thus, Soviet concerns about
the i mpact of Poland on its em pi re are real .^ ^
Despite such fears and such major interest (or perhaps, due to them), the Kremlin had little
doubt but that a Soviet invasion of Poland vould have been costly. Poland's armed forces are
certainly the largest, and are generally regarded as the most professional, most competent; and
best-equipped in Eastern Europe (vith the possible exception of the GDR). Moreover, for all the
reasons of political culture, and because the Polish military is responsive to Polish, not Soviet
Party leadership, the Soviets could not count on using the Polish military to assist in subduing
Poland during the last crisis. Even in 1 956, when the Soviet -appointed Marshal Rokossovsky and
'USSR Central Statistical Admimstration, The USSR National Ecouom u. 1922-1982
(Mn?cow, 1962), p. 3d.
^'-'Y. Stanley Yardys, "Polish Echoes in the Baltic" Problems of Communism
.
July-August
1 983. Yardys presents a detailed study of the impact of the Polish events on each of the three
Baltic republics.
^^See Jan B. de Weydenthal, Bruce D. Porter, and Kevin Devlin, The Polish Drania: 1980-
1 982 (Lexington, Massachusetts: DC. Heath and Company, 1 983), pp. 1 45- 1 67 The authors
provide a country- by-country survey of the repercussions of the Polish crisis throughout all the
countries of the Soviet East European empi re.
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hisqeneralsvere commanding the Polish army, many military units switched to Gomulka during
the crisis. Khrushchev later vas reported to have said that "As ve began to calculate v/hich Polish
regiments ve could count on, the situation began to look somevhat bleak." ^^ Indeed, the Soviets
had to give great credibility to the proposition that the Poles would fight the invading Soviet
forces.
In Czechoslovakia the Soviets had used a half million men against no resistance; Poland would
have required many more- -perhaps 750,000. Such an operation would have been different from
Afghanistan as well , and could be been expected to severely strain the Soviet military reserves.
Casualties would have been heavy, If such fighting continued for weeks or months, the contingency
planning with respect to NATO would be in a shambles. V/ith troops already in Afghanistan, the
Soviets faced the thought of suspending operations there, or of weakening their position on the
Si no -Soviet border.
The Soviets used Warsaw Pact allied troops in Czechoslovakia and woiJld have desired to do so
again with Poland, if only for the manpower, let alone the ideological justification such a concerted
action would have produced. However, serious difficulties and questions were associated with such
a proposal. With memories of 1 963 in their minds, the Czechs may not have proved useful ; the
Hungarians were reluctant in 1963, sending only a token force then. They too had a 1956 to
recall as well. The Romanians could not to be expected to participate, and the Bulgarians v/ere
precluded from playing a role by geography. Only the East Germans were really available, and
although they were probably reliable, the psychological impact of German troops invading Poland
would probably have stiffened Polish resistance.^
^
^^Alex Alexiev, A. Ross Johnson, S. Enders Wimbush, "If the Soviets Invade Poland", Rand
Report. No.P-65d9 (Santa Monica: Rand Corp., 1980), p. 2.
^
-^Johnson and Wimbush, "If the Soviets Invade Poland", pp. 5-6.
The political repercussions of irivasion would have been great also. Other East European
countries might have been sparked to revolt. Yugoslavia and many Communist parties around the
world would conceivably have tilted to the West. The one million Pofes living in the Soviet Umon
and in the Baltic republics would have required close monitoring. Finally, the Soviet? must nave
anticipated that the West would retaliate economically, thus further straining the imperial
economlesina time of need. The pipeline deal with the West would probably have been cancelled,
and the Soviet position in any number of international forums would have been discredited,
particularly the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe meeting in Madrid. In short,
invasion would have severely strained, if not completely ruptured, East- West detente. As had
happened in the 1 968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, direct intervention would have alienated France
and West Germany, and restored unity to the Western alliance. Zbigniew Brzezinski later wrote
that a Soviet intervention would have
producefd] a rupture in the political detente in Europe,
disrupt(ed] East-West economic cooperation, generateld]
increased NATO budgets, produce[d] severe strains between West
European Communist parties and the Soviet Union, further
al1enate(d] the Mo n- Aligned Movement from the Soviet Union,
possibly precipitatefd] turmoil elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, and
probably [would have led] to overt American-Chinese military
cooperation.^"^
While an invasion would have been costly, it is probable that the Soviets would have
eventually succeeded. Martial law, however, provided an option for avoiding invasion. As noted
before, the Soviets have tolerated developments in Poland that were not tolerated elsewhere in the
^
'^Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Princi ple. (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, i9o3),
p. 465. Brzezinski also claims that the United States received assurances from the German
ambassador that West Germany would adopt economic sanctions in the event of a Soviet move, and
even prevailed upon Indira Gandhi to register India's concern. Lane Kirkland of the AFL-CIO was
prepared for a worldwide boycott on Soviet shipment of goods. Cited in 'E.xploiting Fault Lines' in
the Soviet Empire: An Overview", a paper prepared for the European -American Institute
'vVorkshop on "Fault Lines in the Soviet Empire: Implications for Western Security", Ditchley
Park, England, 1 8- 20 May 1 984, p. 1 6.
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empire. The goal of the Kremlin in Poland, after all, vas control- -i.e., the issue of v/hether or
not the Polish Communist leadership remained in control of events. It vas reasonable to believe
that the Polish militarg and security forces could impose control under martial lav- -an option
preferable in the long run. If it had not vorked and Partu control vas seriously threatened, the
Soviets vould have invaded. As Edmund Burke once vrote, "most political decisions are a choice
between the disagreeable and the intolerable." The Soviets knov veil the truth of that statement
\'/ith regard to Poland.
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V. POLAND TODAY
General Jaruzelski's declaration of martial law did provide the Soviets with a disagreeable
option to the virtuallg intolerable prospect of invasion. The speed and efficiency with which the
Sunday surprise operation was executed also favorably answered the critical question of whether
or not it would reestablish the control of the Party regime. Solidarity was not organized to resist
andJ ike most Western observers, was surprised by the move. The tolerance and inaction of the
regime throughout the crisis, its seeming disarray and repeated retreats in the face of Solidarity's
advance, and the widespread belief that the Polish army would not fire on Polish citizens^ led most
of the opposition to doubt that the regi me was capable of effective i nter nal repression without hel p
from Soviet troops. At the same time, there was widespread intellectual optimism that Soviet
invasion could somehow be avoided. As one intellectual said, "The Soviets' analytic ability must not
be underestimated. They know Poland well." 'vVhat such calculations ignored, however, was the
possibility that Jaruzelski and the military high command would act in the army's name, but
would use newly -strengthened internal security forces (especially ZOMO), supported by elite
military units and backed up by regular forces, to conduct a crackdown.^
The East European governments quickly voiced their approval of Jaruzelski 's action, with the
GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria issuing the loudest support. Romania was less vocal, but
approving; Hungary was somewhat ambiguous. As a matter of interest. Yugoslavia expressed shock
and disapproval of the act.
^Jaruzelski himself had promised in 1976 that "Polish soldiers will not fire on Polish
workers' and had lent support to that statement during the 1980-81 crisis as he continually
called for a peaceful solution.
^Johnson, "Poland in Crisis", p. 37.
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The support of the East European governments is probably best explained bg their tear that
the infection of Solidarity would spread beyond Poland's borders. As fellov members of CMEA,
each also hoped that the crackdown would turn Poland's economy around. Czechoslovakia and the
East Germans in particular had been complaining that the unrest in Poland was depriving their
economies of scheduled shipments of raw materials, and was causing a drop in their exports to
Poland.
The East European governments began to change their tune, however, as some of the impacts of
the declaration of martial law began to make themselves felt. David Buchan, in an article for the
The Was hi nqton Quarterl u 1 n the Spring of 1 982, perceptively outlined somie of the serious effects
that Poland's martial law was beginning to exert on Eastern Europe.^ According to Buchan, the
situation in Poland had already:
• Heightened East-V/est tension- -such a development meant trouble for all the Eastern
European countries since each had gained some political freedom of maneuver during tin-ieo
of reduced East- West tensions. This was particularly true for Hungary, with is qroving
economic ties to the West, and for Romiania, v/ith its relatively independent foreign policy.
• Weakened Moscow's relations with the 'vYestern Eurocommunist3--the Italians, Greeks
(KKE- Interior), Spanish, Belgians, and British had severely criticized Moscow for
allov/ing such a repressive action. In the case of Italy, relations were nearly severed as the
Italians denounced not only Moscow's role in the affair, but also attacked the Soviet model
that had produced the crisis. Pravda counterattacked with language reminiscent of the
denunciations of Tito and Mao. Only the neo- Stalinist French Communist party was
equivocal, saying that they did not want to do anything to make matters in Poland v/orse.
• Raised the specter of Bonapartism in that the army had displaced, even if only temporarily,
the Communist Party in Poland. That such a turn of events could occur Tlew directly in the
face of the Communist dogma that the Party control? the gun.
• Highlighted weaknesses common to all the CMEA countries, i.e., the crisis had called
attention to the corruption, incompetence, poor productivity, overcentralism, and lack of
incentives that plagued all the CMEA countries.
•-David Buchan, "Eastern Europe: Only the Beginning", The Washington Quarterl y. Spring
982, pp. 137-141.
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• Aroused fresh doubts in the West gbout the v/isdom of lending to the East, .and about the
ability of the Soviet Union, vith increasing problems of its ov/n, to act as Eastern Europe's
underwriter. Thesizeof the growing Eastern debt ($55 billion to the West) and Moscow's
unwillingness or inability to bail out Poland (reportedly 4 million rubles were eventually
released to Poland) caused 'Western governments and banks to look more closely at CMEA
economies. What they saw was not encouraging. Any relaxation of such scrutinity could not
be expected until improvements occurred in Poland.
Meanwhile in Poland, the very fact that the crackdown succeeded quickly and completely meant
that Jaruzelski had to face the question of the future sooner than he may have anticipated. It was
one thing to identify, roundup, and intern Solidarity leaders and activists, close down presses, and
break up any spontaneous strikes and demonstrations of workers or miners- -these had the flavor
of military operations. It was another to address the problems that had beset Poland for so long
and that had proved intractable to the civilian regime.
Jaruzelski announced his task to be that of "normalization", with a promise of a continuation
of the process of "renewal" begun in 1 981 within the PZRP. Polish society, of course, had never
been "normalized" to the extent that other East European societies had. Furthermore, it was
doubtful that Jaruzelski had in mind the "normalization" that followed in the wake of the
disturbances in Hungary of 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968; such a formula would have
destroyed the principle goal of martial law, namely stability. 'What Jaruzelski probably had in
mind was the continuation of stability with enough popular support (or even apathy) to allow the
economy to revive. The sooner such a turnaround could be achieved, the sooner the army could be
pulled out of the "bad guy" position that was quickly eroding its public image and prestige.
Hoping to rechannel and control the participatory spirit spawned by Soidanty, Jaruzelski
began a program of dissolving old institutions and replacing them with new, party-controlled
ones; he also weakened the laws that had appeared in the aftermath of the Gdansk Agreement. In
July 1982, the regime-spon-sored Patriotic Committee for National Rebirth (PRON) was formed
to act as a coalition of all social forces. Additionally, new organizations for artists, writers,
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iournalists, and students v/ere established.'^ As might have been expected, the riev orqanizations
attracted little public support, most being unable to match the earlier membership levels of their
predecessors. P RON itself was vi del u criticized for not retlectinq public needs. Solidarity also
sponsored a boycott of all "official" organizations.
By the Autumn of 1982, Jaruzelkski felt confident that enough stability existed to move
against Solidarity. In October 1982, Solidarity vas formally outlawed, and .•.•as replaced vith a
1av/ establishing new unions. These unions •••.•'ere described in the law as being independent, self-
governing, and possessing the right to strike. There were, however, heavier restrictions. The
nev/ unions were permitted to exist only at the factory level , not at the regional or national level
like Solidarity had been. They were organized by branch of industry, not by region as with
Solidarity, and there was a restriction of only one organization per factory. Subsequent legislation
in July 1985 strengthened the unions by giving them responsibility for all employees at a
factory, not just members of the union, and by extending their responsibilities into the area of
social welfare. The unions took over many of the functions of local self- management councils,
areas to which many Solidarity members had gravitated as a way to continue unofficial operations,
fol 1 owi ng t he ba n ni ng of Sol i da ri t y
.
In November 1982, Lech Vfalesa was released, and in July 1983, martial law v/as lifted.
Many of the restrictions of martial law, however, were transferred into the civil code and
remained in effect. Government proclamations in July 1983 and. July 1984 released most
internees and granted amnesty to most Solidarity members in arrest or hiding. Still, while
popular defiance and open opposition were reduced, the regime was not able to achieve popular
support, nor was it able to mobilize the population toward economic and political goals.




Underground activity remains widespread ln Poland today. Althougri Jaruzelski tias orten
seemed to use the carrot in dealing vith dissent, he has also used the stick on numerous occasions..
Organizations are penetrated and demonstrations are broken up; arrests, trials, and
imprisonments continue. V/alesa, a popular figure whose reputation was enhanced by the 1983
Nobel Peace Prize, is closely watched, occasionally harassed, and recently was tried (and
acquitted) for a nti -government statements. An active underground press of over two thousand
periodicals continues to function, and many articles appear regularly in the West as well. The
Polish underground recently added video recordings to its means of fighting censorship. There are
reportedly more than 70,000 owners of video recorders in Poland today,^ many of which are
cl u bs t hat s how Weste r n fi 1 ms offi ci al 1 y u naval 1 a bl e 1 n Pol a nd . Many pari s hes a re al so 1 nvesti ng
i n video equi pment and organizi nq fil m showi ngs.
Independent cultural life is also tluorlshlng. In addition to the many periodicals, books,
photograph albums and sound cassettes are also widespread. An "alternative society" has grown
u p , offe r 1 ng i nde pe nde nt ca ba rets , t heate rs , a nd a r t ex hi bl ti o ns . T he u nde rg ro u nd al so o rga ni zes
independent educational activites raging from the av/ardlng of grants to academics to arranging
1 ect u res a nd st ud y co u rses .^ I nte resti ngl y , this u nde rg ro u nd mass medi a , w hi 1 e p rovi d1 ng a n
important source of information to the Poles, has also forced the competing ufficial media to be
more open and to address some controversial issues. Despite censorship, Poland has the liveliest
press in the Soviet bloc.''
-Teresa Hamcka, Polish Situation Report no. 3, Radio Free Europe Re-oearch, 21 Mag 1985,
Item *6. This report describes efforts being made to copy and distribute videocassettes in Poland
by NOWa, the oldest of Poland's current undergroung publishing houses.
For a detailed and thorough examination of the underground press from 1 980 to 1 983,3ee also
Anna Sabbatt-Swidlicka, "Poland's Underground Press", Radio Frf^t Europe Research.
^Hanicka, Polish Situation Report no. 8, p. 1
.
'''Mason, "Stalemate and Apathy in Poland", p. 390.
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Solidarity too carries on an unofficial existence. Members have continued to focus on carvinq
out relatively independent fields of activity, particularly through the self- management councils.
Approximately one -fifth of the v/ork force continues to pay monthly dues to underground
Solidarity structures.
Despite Solidarity opposition, the official unions today have about five million members , one-
third of v/hom are former Solidarity members. Most workers, though, have adopted a kind of "vait
and see" attitude to determine if the nev unions really mean anything. The government claims
that the unions recently negotiated a reduced price hike on food, but most workers seem to doubt
the unions' role in this.
C. THE PARTY
The mobilization of the Polish population is a task that both the government and the
underground find difficult today. Much of society seems to be keeping to itself. In the October
1 983 elections to the Sejm (the Polish Parliament), both.sides claimed victory. The government
claimed victory in that all of its candidates v/ere elected to seats by a large voter turnout that
allegedly proved the public supports "stabilization, peace and socialist development" (naturally,
there were no opposition candidates). Jaruzelski then used the opportunity to give up the post of
Prime Minister to his First Deputy Prime Minister, Zbigniew Messner. Jaruzelski then assumed
the role of head -of- state as Chairman of the Council of State. Solidarity had called for a boycott of
the election, and clai med victory based on the large number of voters who did not cast a vote : 2
1
percent (or 5.5 million people) according to official figures, 34 per cent by Solidarity
calculations. Such results are without precedence in the electoral history of People's Poland.^
The PZRP is experiencing severe membership problems, registering a drop in membership from a
'^J. B. Weydenthal, "Eastern Europe in 1985 -Poland", Radio Free Europe Research
Background Report, no. 1 50, 27 Dec 1 975. In the 1 980 Sejm elections the participation rate was
98.8 percent.
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peak of 3.1 million in 1 980 to -i rebuilt level toijay ( 1 985) of an estimated 2.1 million, or 1
2
percent of the adult vorkinq population. Of this membership only 39.4 percent vere vorkers; a
mere 12.6 percent of Poland's industrial working class and only 3.7 percent of its farmers are
party members. Limited support is also evident among the young where only 11 percent of the
PZRP is under the age of thirty, the smallest proportion in the party's history.^
The basic problem for the Party seems to be a continuing lack of direction. The Party
continues to talk of the need for discipline and political purity, but offers nothing new to mobilize
the population. At a pre- Party Congress conference in November 1 985 that was convened to work
on a Party Program for party activity to the year 2000, Jaruzelski proclaimed that the Party
was following the road toward socialist renewal, and that normalization was progressing. While
not offering specific solutions, he affirmed the Party's exclusive right to set the direction of
Poland's evolution. Although he spoke of technological breakthroughs and changes based on a
Marxist- Leninist interpretation of social conditions, he made no mention of the Issue of public
autonomy or independence from governmental control. As such, his views were traditional and
reflected none of the Gdansk Agreement reforms that had so mobilized the population six years
earlier. It seems that the Party is unwilling to compromise or to resurrect the ideas of
democratization or greater self-determination; at the same time, it is not exactly certain on how
to overcome the stagnation and inefficiency in the system.^"^'
It is not that the regime is unaware of the arguments of the opposition. Indeed, the regime is
proving very adept at weaving threads of opposition thought into its own propaganda as it seeks to
persuade people to accept the existing state of affairs, to give up resistance, and to allow
themselves to be harnassed to the task of salvaging the economy. By manipulating national
symbols, and by exploiting the popular interest in national history, the regime attempts to
^Janus Bugajski, "The Party in Crisis", Radio Free Europe, p. 207.
^'JJ. B. de 'v^/eydenthal, "The Polish Party; In Search of a Program", Radio Free Europe
Background Report no, 138, 2 December 1985.
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convince trie population of the legitimacy of Communist rule. It attempts to persuade the people
that the interests of the Party -control led regime are identical with national interests- -interests
that are largely determined by Poland's geopolitical situation (i.e., the Soviet Union). Further,
the Soviet Union liberated Poland in World War II, and since Poland has been liberated, it must
therefore be free. True, the economy may be shabby, but it is not as bad as Czechoslovakia or
Romania. Remember Kadar? Just help the Party to Jaruzelski-ize Poland and all vill be '.veil.
What Poland needs is peace, order, stability, hard vork, and trust in the state. Working together
under the local autonomy that the Soviets grant to Poland as a benefit of undivided Party rule vill
allov Poland to reach the light at the end of the tunnel.^ ^
A more cynical viev of regime efforts to discredit the opposition vas published by the
Solidarity underground in Krakov in early 1983. A meeting of senior Party members and
military commanders took place in Warsav in November 1982; those present proceeded to
confidentially discuss the situation in Poland. The underground obtained a report of their
assessment and published it in the underground press. The assessment discussed methods to be
used to compromise Lech Walesa and to vin popular Catholic personalities to PRON. It vas decided
to allov a certain degree of criticism in order to create an impression of g roving tolerance and
normalization in public life. It also related hov Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreau had
promised Jaruzelski that he vould use the lease of the American bases in Greece to bargain nev
credits for Poland from the United States. If the report is true, it also reveals the poor condition
of the Polish economy and its continued decline, in contradiction of official pronouncements of
progress. ^2
' ^ For a fascinating description of regime propaganda techniques and goals see Casmir Garnysz,
"Polish Stalemate", Problems of Communism
. May- June 1964, pp. 51-59. The examples
presented above are from this article.
^2
"A Confidential Assessment of the Situation", Survey, Vol. 26, Summer 1983, pp. 108-
110.
D. THE ECONOMY
Most observers agree that any solution to the continuing Polish crisis wm need to begin ln the
economy. Solidarity did not cause the crisis, nor did the strikes or the labor unrest; these vere
only symptoms. Rather, the strikes and the establishment of free labor unions grew out of a
rapidly accelerating economic crisis vith which the government and Party leaders vere unable to
cope. The real causes of the economic crisis lie in the system itself, a Soviet- type economic
system transplanted to Poland after World War II. ^^
The characteristics of that system have been all uded to above and 1 ncl ude:
• High concentration in a command economy. Command economies are touted on their ability
to enforce a high degree of mobilization of resources, to ensure full utilization of the?e
resources, and to direct the allocation of resources to the fulfillment of selective targets.
Command economies cannot, hovever, ensure efficiency, and become increasingly difficult
to manage, because of their sheer complexity, as economies become more technical and
more sophisticated.
• A strong element of autarkism, the establishment of a self-sufficient and independent
national economy. The emphasis vas on the expansion of industry, particularly heavy
industry, in an attempt to attajn industrial self-sufficiency. But the rav n"iaterials must
come from somewhere and Poland, like most countries, does not have all the raw n'late rials a
modern industrial nation needs. Furthermore, such a industry- heavy development strategy
in Poland played down agriculture, consumer goods, and socioeconomic infrastructure.
Finally, these nev/ industries, by their nature, were generally capital-, energy-, and
material intensive and required heavy imports; the threat of a balance -of-payments
problem was inherent from the beginning.
• A reorientation of Poland's foreign economic relations toward the Soviet Union first and
CMEA second. The requirement for Poland to construct a large military- industrial sector
after World War II was mentioned earlier. Poland was also forced to withdraw from the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and was told to reject the Marshall Plan
aid. Traditional trade links to the West, especially with Germany, France, and Britain,
were redirected to serve the Soviet economiy after the war.
'^Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "Poland's Economic Crisis", Problems of Communism . March-Apnl
982, p. 3. The characteristics of that system as discussed here are from that article.
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A5 Uie summary of Pol and "5 post- World War II history indicates, the recurring economic
crises have been repeatedly ansvered by "reforms". Such "reforms" actually are little more than
a tinkering with the economy in vhich the ends remain the same, the characteristics remain
i ntact , some mea ns a re modi fi ed , a nd vo r ke rs a re u rged to vo r k ha rde r . Eve n Gi e re k 's i ni ti al 1 y -
successful economic policies in the early 1970s were not really reforms of Gomulka's policies,
but rather the quintessential example of a commiand economy seeking rapid expansion in a policy of
i m port -led growth on a sea of foreign credit.
The Hungarian model is often cited as a pattern for Poland to adopt in order to alleviate the
economic crisis. Indeed, the Jaruzelski government initiated reforms in 1982 that alledgedly
were to restructure the Polish economy along the lines of the Hungarian model, to decentralize
some decision making, and to introduce a rational pricing structure. It soon became evident,
however, that plans were easier to make than to fulfill. By the end of 1 983, the government had
launched a media campaign against small-scale enterprises and against the very market elements
that the 1982 "reforms" had introduced. Although billing its actions as a struggle against
"speculation" and unlav/ful "enrichment", the government attacked private enterprise bij
tightening tax and administrative regulations that constrained private investmient. Hence the
economy remains stagnated as "reforms" languish in a land where the government attitude toward
market elements has grown increasingly hostile, while the private sector has experienced
mo u nti ng di st r ust of t he gove r nme nt a nd ge ne r al pessi mi sm . ^ ^
J. P. Brown and A. Ross Johnson examined the applicability of the Hungarian model to Poland in
a 1984 Rand study. They concluded that the extent of Poland's crisis and the international
economic circun>stances of the 19S0s are much less favorable than the situation Hungary faced
when it introduced significant reform in the 1960s. Additionally they found three serious
political -social problems to true reform in Poland.
I'^Rachwald, "Poland's Socialism", p. 359. See also Milewski et all, "Poland: Four Year:
After", p. 344.
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First, there 1s considerable, entrenched opposition inside the present regime to any expansion
of its ranks to bring into the decision- making apparatus the specialists, who are needed to redirect
the economy, and the vorkers' representatives, who are needed to mobilize the work force. Such
expansion would necessarily diminish the breadth of authority of current decision- makers.
Secondly, there are serious doubts in Moscow, where Soviet leaders are sometimes split over
Hungary; even when they may like parts of the Hungarian model, they are quick to point out that
Poland is not Hungary (two Hungarys may be too much).
Finally, there is a strong disinclination on the part of Polish society to make the necessary
initial sacrifices that reform would entail. Any cure for the illness is apt to be painful in terms of
unemployment, transfers of workers, higher prices, lowering of living standards, etc. The Poles
have demonstrated their reaction to such proposals before. Moreover, for any such measures to
take effect and to be accepted, society, particularly the workers, must have political trust in the
government- -in Poland there is practically none (hence the huge propaganda war between the
underground and the government). The alternative vehicle for introducing economiic reform and
overcoming the unwelcome austerity is national defeat such as Hungary experienced In the wake of
the 1956 revolution. The Poles, of course, are not about to allow that to happen, so the reforms
die, the Hungarian model is not applied to Poland, and the economy remains stagnated.^ ^'
Poland's $27 billion hard-currency debt to the West ( 1 9S5; also 4.S billion rubles to CMEA
countries) complicates Poland's situation but, like other East European countries, it is attempting
to deal with this problem by reducing imports to a minimum and by mounting export drives to
hard-currency markets. Thus 1 984 was a record coal exporting year and there is evidence that
Poland is using arms exports as a way of tackling the debt.''' In general, though, the consumer
pays for such policies, encountering more shortages, longer lines, and experiencing a further
^^J. F. Brown and A. Ross Johnson, "Challenges to Soviet Control in Eastern Europe", Rand
Report. R-5139-AF. (Santa Monica: Rand Corp, 1 984), pp. 7- 1 1.
'^Randall J. Stewart, "Warsaw Pact Arms Production and Exports", an unpublished paper
prepared for a graduate seminar, (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1 986).
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depression of the standard of liv1 ng. Thus i nflatlon i n Poland for 1985 exceeded 1 4 percent, vhlle
the cost of living has Increased 357 percent from 1980 to 1984. Some relief vas forthcuminq,
hovever, vhen the United States lifted most of its sanctions after the 1984 amnesty. Additional! y,
in July 1985, Poland's seventeen Western creditor nations agreed to reschedule Poland's debt
payment.
The future is rather bleak, hovever. The Polish Academy of Sciences studied the economiic
trends in Poland and issued a report in 1985. Its officially endorsed "Committee 2000 Report"
predicts within a fev years,
ecological deterioration, further pauperization of the populace,
disintegration of transport, a dangerous decline in the motivation
of workers, and other dramatic developments. . . .The long
limitation of investments may have in the near future social and
ecological consequences on an unimaginable scale.^"^
In a report prepared for a NATO conference of economic ministers in 1 980, Peter Broderson
expressed concern not only about the hard-currency debt, but also about an expected stagnation of
manpov/er resources in Poland by the late 1980s as a shrinking population of v/or king -age
citizens vill have to provide for a growing number of pensioners as a result of post-war
demographic trends. The Polish government will seek 'Western credits for investment projects
focusing on energy development (nuclear, brov/n coal, Vistula water projects) to offset the
decreasing energy supplies provided by the Soviet Union. The demand for and consumption of
consumer goods will also increase. Any real improvement in living standards will depend on
agriculture, but improvements in agriculture will require a restructuring of retail prices.
Broderson was optimistic about long-range prospects for production and living standards due to
^"'Liberation (Paris), 24 May 1 985, as cited in Milevski et all, "Poland: Four Years After",
p. 345.
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the great potential amJ under-utilizeij resources of the country. He vas pessimistic, hov/ever,
about the short-term possibilities to exploit this potential for grovth, due large! g to the debt J*
Despite the economic crisis, it seems the government leaders are more concerned about
maintaininq their privileged control than vith taking the risks necessary to overcome the
economic morass into which the country has sunk. Masters of the instruments of force, they seem
villi ng to continue to muddle through as long as things stay quiet. It is not that they like the
economic situation, but it appears again to be the choice of lesser evils, since the option of pover-
s ha ring is seen as a zero sum game in which no losses are tolerated. Such a policy seems short-
sighted to most Westerners, but the Polish regime also seems to have more patience (and .^e f-scto
staying power) than do most Westerners.'^
An example of this elevation of political considerations above economic ones is the situation
surrounding the Church's efforts to gain official approval for the establishment of an independent
foundation to acquire and distribute funds to modernize and aid Polish private farmers. The
Church project was proposed in September 19S2 by Cardinal Glemp. It envisioned a foundation
that would be independent of the authorities and that would act, within the framework of existing
law, as a clearinghouse for transactions involving Western donors and groups of private Polish
farmers. Western donors would supply funds that the foundation would use to purcnase V/estern
farm equipment. Thefarrners would then buy the equipment from the foundation in Polish z!oty
(currency). These proceeds would then be spent by the foundation on projects for the general
modernization and in*( proveme nt of agriculture. Such a program is necessary , says the Church,
because government policies habitually overlook the private farmer in the allocation of state
resources. As of 19:35 the Church had reportedly secured pledges exceeding $28 million, but has
IS Peter B rode rson, "Prospects for the Polish Economy in the 19803", Economic Reforms in
Eastern Europe and Prospects for the 1 9S0s
.
(Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1980).
'
'For a more optimistic view of the possibilities of evolutionary change even within socialist
regimes see Stamslaw Gebethner, "Political and Institutional Changes in the Management of the
Socialist Economy: The Polish Case" in Morris Bornstein, Zvi Gitelman, and William Zimmerman,
East -West Relation? and the Future of Eastern Euro pe. (London: George Allen '§i Unwin, 1 981 ).
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5till not been able to obtain a government go-ahead (Lech Walesa pledged his Nobel Peace Prize
avard to the proposed foundation).
The government's coolness to such a project is understandable vhen one realizes that the
existence of the large number of private farmers (80 percent of Polish agriculture is in private
hands) has long embarassed the regime, and that the Church too is a long-time embarassment and
protagonist of the government. Hov/ever, the investment is needed if the government is to achieve
other economic growth goals; it vill help keep meat on the table at no additional cost. The
government is also aware that the private farmers are the most efficient and productive element of
the economy (even if that does contradict Communist ideology). The fear is that the foundation
would operate without the clear and direct supervision of the authorites. Indeed, the government
has long been tacitly opposed to any form of Western aid to the economy unless that aid can be
directly controlled by the government itself. It thus came as somewhat of a surprise v/hen the
government announced in September 19:35 that it v/as studying proposals advanced by the
Rockefeller Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers' Fund (RF-RBF) for creating an agricultural
foundation. RF-FBF officials said it would be separate from the Church's foundation, although they
expressea a wnnngness lo cooroinaie acii vines wnn tne cnurcn. me ponsn government nas
reportedly responded by proposing that the foundation be placed under its control; negotiations
continue with kF-RBF. It certainly appears that the negotiations are a maneuver to diminsh the
significanceof the Church's initiative, while maneuvering for political advantage by pursuing the
form but not the substance of the foundation idea. ^^
^•^For additional information see J. B. de '".Yeydenthal, "The Politics of International Farm Aid
to Poland", Radio Free Europe Background Report , no. 113, 1 October 1 985.
u/
E. THE CHURCH
The Church itself continues to enjog a massive fonovinq and great prestige among the
population. A Solidarity poll conducted in May 19S4 shoved that v/hile the "underground
opposition" vas rated favorable by 54.6 percent of the respondents, the Church scored an
impressive 74.5 percent (the PZPR vas near the bottom).^^ With the banning of Solidarity, the
Church has resumed its role as the single legal alternative to the Party. The close association
established betveen workers and parish priests continues, while the Church hierarchy generally
favors a policy of "organic work", a concept born In Polish nineteenth century history in which
citizens reject overt opposition to the rulers and vork for the good of the nation, not of the
occupier or, as they consider it, the puppet regime installed by the occupler.^^
Cardinal Glernp has drawn underground criticism as he has maintained a generally
concilliatory policy toward the government and is learning how to fill Cardinal V/yszynski's shoes.
In this he seems to have the support of the Pope, whose visit in 1983 again demonstrated the
popularity and support of the Church. A kind of turning point occurred in 1 984, however, when a
government attempt to re move cruel fixes froma regional school sparked largely successful youth
demonstrations and Church resistance. A more critical juncture occurred when the Church
became decidedly more oppositional in the wake of the October 1 984 murder by the security police
of Father Popieluszko, a very popular and outspoken Solidarity supporter. Popieluszko became a
national martyr, 250,000 mourners attended his funeral (over which Cardinal Glemp officiated),
and opposition mounted against the regime. In an unusual state trial lasting from December 1 984
to February 1 985, four security officers were tried, convicted of murder, and sentenced to terms
ranging from 1 4-25 years; the trial was closely followed by the Polish media. Relations between
the Church and the government have remained sour ever since as occasional arrests of activist
21 Radio Free Europe Situation Report: Poland, 23 January 1 985,
"Brown and Johnson, "Challenges to Soviet Control in Eastern Europe", p. 8.
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priests, charges of Church conspiracg vith the outlawed Solidaritu, and press attacks on Cardinal
Glernp and even on Pope John Paul II continue.
F. SUMMARY
The internal Polish situation remains one of stalemate in an atmosphere of repression,
pessimism, and dismal economic prospects. The locked nature of the stalemate is evidenced by
(1) the Party's stubborn persistence in maintaining its position and privilege, and (2)
Sol i da ri t
y
"s refusal to die.
Developments since the imposition of martial law in December 1981 indicated that
Jaruzel ski's government has ignored all domestic opportunities to work out a compromise between
the designs of the Communist rulers of Poland and the aspirations of the Polish people. The
incorporationof mostof the regulations of martial law into the "normal" Polish legal system has
allowed the regime to pursue its policy of attempting to eradicate Solidarity, despite the official
end of martial law in the Summer of 1983. Econon^iically, Jaruzel ski's regime has emasculated
any attempt at reform that would threaten or constrain the role of the Party in directing the
economy- -despite the evidence of Polish economic history and the voices of economists that argue
of the bankruptcy of the current system and of the need for genui ne change. I n Jar uzelski "s eyes,
and in the eyes of hard-line Communist leaders, however, economic restructuring is indivisible
from political issues; "reform" thus becomes little more than tinkering with the economy, since
any changes in the economy pose a direct linkage to the institutional and personal power bases of
the Communist leaders. Hence the general observation that since the imposition of martial law,
the regime's actions and policies have been subservient to the supreme goal of maintaining, and
eve n St re ngt he ni ng , t he powe r of t he Comm u ni st Pa r t y a p pa rat us afte r i ts yea rs of decl i ne . .
This single- mi ndedness of the Jar uzelski regime has been frustrated by the viability and
vitality of Solidarity and the op position underground. The richness of the developing underground
cult u re i s a mazi ng
.
I n i tsel f a n a no mol y amo ng Comm u ni st regi mes , i t j oi ns t he u ni q ue i nsti t uti o n
luQ
of the Church in Pol and and the u nc ha racteri stickily large private agricultural sector to represent
a continuing challenge to Party goals of domination. The tradition of resistance to foreign
oppressors, and especially to Russians (and their supporters in the- Polish government) , appears
to be very real in Poland today.
VI. LI. S. NATIONAL INTEREST IN POLAND
A. NATIONALINTERESTTHEORY
Having now looked :3t Poland from the Polish and Soviet points of viev, and having brietly
described the U.S. response to the 1 980-81 crisis, what indeed is the U. S. interest in Poland in
the mid- 1 9805? Essentially, we are seeking to discuss American policy toward Poland and to do
that, few would dispute that American policy should rationally be founded on the American national
interest in Poland; thus the original question of what is the American national interest in Poland.
But while the question seems simple and logical, it is also true that the answer tends toward
significant complexity, if not obfuscation. The difficulty turns on the issue of what is the
definition of national interest, a question that appears to have as many answers or proposals as
commentators. A review of the concept of national interest, and specifically American national
interest, is thus in order in the hope that this will assist the reader in understanding the difficulty
in stating the American national interest in regard to Poland, as well as why the subject of national
interest is debated so hotly at times.
In the phrase "American (or U.S.) national interest", the word "national" in itself implies, a
legitimacy of the interest with the nation of America. If America is, as it proclaims itself to be, a
nation of, by and for the people, if it is indeed a representative and responsive government of the
American people, then the American national interest should represent to a significant measure, at
least, the interest of the American nation at large. Legitimacy in this regard usually emerges from
the political culture of a country, and thus will necessitate reflection on American political
culture. "Interest" implies somie type of need, remembering that it is the unfulfilled need that
motivates to action; in this case, it is action as policy. Needs can be thought of as a function of
where a country is, pictured in a Maslovian heirarchy.
To 5 peak of fs nation as v/e are; doing dutomatlcally catapults us beyond strictly physical
formulations, such as "state" might imply, and into the realm of ideology, values, goals, and
national identity. The material vorld is not the sum of existence, and thus any conceptualization of
something like a nation must attempt to deal vith immaterial, as veil as material realities; the
history and experience of the Poish nation is an obvious case in point. Of course, since ve are also
talking about this national interest in an actual physical vorld, any concept of national interest
must also address the issue of problematic correspondence; our concept of national interest vill
be useless unless it is capable of addressing actual vorld problems. For Americans this is,
perhaps, particularly true, since ve seem to be a nation given to action, in^ipatience, and
immediate problem resolution, rather than philosophy and patient reflection. As doers, though,
ve recognize that the vorld is characterized by changing conditions; hence our often .yi/ /i^oc
solutions to problems. Consequently, national interest must account for these changing conditions;
the definition must change vhen the problem changes, vhile still maintaining a fix on some guiding
star (in itself, ve are told by astonomers today, ever -moving as veil). Perhaps one should try
then to conceptualize national interest as a process, rather than as simply a fixed point.
Having thoroughly roiled the vaters of definition, let me point out the obvious by restating
that this is American national interest about vhich ve are thinking. The significance of this is
that America is a tremendously diverse polity deriving from a plethora of varying, and often
conflicting, philosophical and social roots. Having stated that the national interest must contain
the elements of legitimacy and national needs, that it must reflecting the nation's goals, ideologies,
values and identity, and that it must still be capable of solving real vorld problems, one is
tempted to simply throv up one's hands in despair and regret that the question vas ever posed.
Indeed, that has been the reaction of most of those thinkers vho have sought to define the
American national interest in recent years. That no universally acknovledged deflnitive statement
of the national interest has yet been published is, no doubt, partially a result of the complexity,
(some vould say impossibility), of the task. Another explanation n^iight be that ve simply have
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not get thought about it long enough. The issue of national interest in American foregin policy has
only risen to its present heights as a result of the rise to globalism of American foreign policy in
Wo r 1 d VVa r 1 1 a nd i ts afte r mat h J
As Richard Reeves observed, "national interest" is a phrase heard often in VVashington, D. C,
but rarely, if ever, heard outside Washington, New York, and Cambridge, in an interview v/ith
former- President Richard Nixon, Reeves asked Nixon how many people actually control American
foreign policy. Nixon's response was only about two or three thousand. Reeves went on to
conclude that the reason for the limited usage of the phrase "national interest" is a result of the
small number of persons directly involved in formulating foreign policy, and the fact that America
has not had need of a foreign policy until the tv/entieth century. Reeves called these policy
formulators the "national interest" elite- -the elite which believes that it is its duty to define the
national interest in regard to foreign policy. It is essentially a self- selected elite made possible
because the United States once did not need a foreign policy, and when it did need one, the
information needed to formulate policy was remote and inaccessible to the general public. Since
Americans live and govern themselves on the basis of their own life experiences, the foreign
policy elite camie to be made up of Americans who studied, spoke, sold, bought, or went to anything
or to anywhere foreign. These ventures set them apart fron"i the usual American experience and
hence, the nation. They cared about foreign policy, so they made foreign policy.'^'
While this may be a plausible explanation, it does little more than describe a state affairs and
does not come to grips with the larger issue. National interest must be more than the interests of a
single group, if it will claim to be national. Thus some writers have sought to find a national basis
in studies of America, Americans, and how the American nation evolved and perceives itself today.
This approach emphasizes the element of val ues, goals, and national identity.
^Stephen E. Ambrose sets the beginning of the rise in 1 938 and describes this rise in his book
The Rise toi31ob3lism
.
(New York: Penguin Books, I 983).
2 Richard Reeves. American Journe u. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1 982).
Ralph Henrg Gabriel is considered to have v/ritten one of the most definitive vorks of this line
of study. His major v/ork:, The Course of American Democratic Thought, is a study of the social
beliefs that emerged among Americans to serve as guides for action, as standards by vhich to j udqe
the quality of social life, and as goals to inspire humane living. It is an intellectual history of
America that seeks to support the thesis that Americans have a unique political culture that has
produced a "democratic faith" founded on a fundamental and absolute moral lav. According to
Gabriel, the primary doctrine of the American "democratic faith" is that beneath .society's
customs and institutions, there exists a lav/ not made by men that includes the natural rights of
men and the moral laws of God. Three beliefs then follov from this "democratic faith"; ( 1 ) faith
in constitutionalism and a government of lavs, not men, (2) belief in the nan and responsible
individual; and (3) the belief that America, being unique in the vorld, has a destiny in the v/orld
as the bastion of democracy. It is upon this faith and these beliefs, then, that the nation can build
its national interest and hence, find a basis for its foreign policy.-^
Some authors have attempted to pursue a study of the American Identity by usuing the myths
that Americans seem to share. James D. Robertson did just that in American M yth. American
Realit y. Robertson sav myths as being used to maintain common Ideals, common images, and
common behaviors vhile providing a means to reconcile our ideals and reality. Such myths, being
rooted in reality and ideals, serve to overcome the plurality of Americans and to unite the diverse
el e me nts of t he A me ri ca n pol i t y i nto a s ha red Ame ri ca n i de nti t y .'^ A si mi 1 a r st ud y of s ym bo1 s a mj
reality vas done vith regard to America's frontier experience by Henry Smiith. Smith vas
particularly concerned with demonstrating the impact of the American V/est on the consciousness
of Americans and in shaping the uniqueness that distinguishes Americans.^ Both writers agree
•^Ralph Henry Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought. ( 1956)
'^James Oliver Robertson, American Muth. American Reality
.
(New York: Hill and Wang Co.,
980).
^Henry Nash Smith, 'v^irqin Land
.
(New York: 'vintage Books, 1 957).
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with Gabriel as to the uniqueness of Americans, and as to the special desting that Americans feel
they have in the vorld. In the nineteenth century this self-conscious awareness of "special ness"
was expressed in the concept of "Manifest Destiny". Today it takes the form of an increasingly
world-wide concern for human rights and the spread of democracy to all men. As Richard Reeves
put it, Americans believe that the moral problems of the world have not been solved,, can be
solved, and that the last best hope for solving them is America.^
If one accepts the proposition that a certain American identity can be established to exist, and
that this identity can be described and understood, then one should be able to use it as a guide for
developing policy in the interest of that "American- ness". A school of writers has taken this tack
and have developed the concept of the public interest. As William J. Meyer contends, a concept of
the public interest is necessary if one desires to understand the behavior of men organized in a
state. For Meyer, the public interest means the indirect consequences of social transactions seen
as the affairs of the people of a state. Specifically, the public interest is the goals and strategies
society may articulate and pursue for the purpose of regulating' and controlling the conunon
condition. With the public interest (or public good) defined, Meyer proceeds to develop a concept
of pragmatism as a tool capable of dealing with pluralistic truth in testing, through experience,
the body of general beliefs in a society. Those beliefs that prove workable and satisfactory to the
public at large form the body of the public interest. Of course, as experiences and the range of
situations change, so too will the set of beliefs and the public interest.^ Thus Meyer, while
recognizing the concept of a public interest arising out of an "American" set of beliefs derived
from the American identity, also maintains that situations play a role in determining which beliefs
rise to the top in the public interest.
It is in this concept of pragmatism that Americans really began to demonstrate a sophisticated
uniqueness in the world. Whereas the settlers of America came basically out of European
-•Reeves, American Journe u. p. 275.
"^Win i am J
.
Me ye r , Public Good and Political Authoritu
.
New York: Ke n ni kat P ress , 1975).
traditions of thought that viev/ed the vorld ys dichotomoiji; betveen idealism and materialism (or
realism), the American experience vas that this traditional dichotomy did not seem applicaole in
the nev "promised land". The settlers vho vere carving out a nation from the vilderness, and
even those vho lived in the grovinq cities of the New Vv'orld, vere very much aware of the
vicissitudes and challenges of a real, material world that they enountered every day, a world
arguably more "real" to them than that experienced by their more "civilized" cousins back in
Europe. At the same time, despite the concrete, ever-present reality of this raw new world,
Americans repeatedly and forcefully experienced the power of ideas in motivating, even driving,
men and women to accomplish tasks and to achieve goals that seemed beyond rational, "realistic"
expectation or possiblity. It was from this necessity of combining idealism and realism that the
first American philosophy of pragmatism emerged. Morton White, in his monumental work on
Ame r1 ca n p hi 1 oso p h y , Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism ,^ descn bes t hi s
rejection of European forms and the development of a uniquely American philosophy at the end of
the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuMes. It is upon this foundation that Meyer
would eventually develop his theory of the public interest. White's work, combined with Meyer's,
can also be seen in the work of Frank Teti.
By now, the difficulty in framing the public interest should be apparent. Somie writers
emphasize the American identity itself and develop an e-ssentially static definition of the public
interest. Others attempt to point out the pluralism that exists even within the "American"
identity, and thus will tend towards a more dynamic, changing public interest. The v/hole role of
the situation is at times disregarded in favor of a public interest that transcends all temporal
events; in the estimation of others, actual situations play a dominant role in defining the public
interest. Many writers do not even begin with American identity, but factor it in only later,
'^Morton Gabriel White, Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism . (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1 947).
emphasizing instead the role of ideals that transcend nationality, or lavs that derive from a source
above man.
Gl e ndo n Sc h u be rt 's a p p rai sal of t he s u b j ect i de nti fi es t h ree s uc h basi c t heo ri es - - rati o nal i st
,
idealist, and realis--iri framing the public interest, none of vhich are directly concerned with the
American identity. Rationalist theory postulates self-evident truths vhich man then translates
into policy through the use of his reason and intellect: the public interest vill be best served by
those policies that best utilize the self-evident norms, hjealist theory postulates a higher lav that
policy makers seek to uncover, a lav that is above the question of public interest; the quest for the
loeai in iTseu laKes care or ine puonc mieresT. peansi Tneory lenos lo De more siiuanonai-
oriented, recognizes an ongoing conflict of goals in society, and identifies the role of public
officials as being one of mediation, thus serving the public interest ."^^
Whatever method is used, this reviev of the literature should serve to highlight some of the
va ri ed va ys of di sc ussi ng a nd 1 de nti fyi ng Ame ri ca n i nte rest . At some poi nt al 1 revi evs m ust e nd
,
and the vriter must state his ovn vievs and get on vith the vork at hand. It is mi y fervent hope
that this reviev, vhile understandably, perhaps, frustrating to the reader in that no definite,
coherent framevork for discussing American interest has emierged, vas nonetheless not too
confusing in its separate parts and thoughts. Such, unfortunately, is the state of affairs in the
field.
Before going further, though, I should clear up a couple of points. 1 have used the terms
"public interest" and "national i nte re.st" seemingly interchangeably and I trust the reader has not
become side-tracked on this issue. In the early post-VVV'/ll years as Americans for the first time
vere forced to deal extensively and systematically vith the concept of American interests, it vas
general practice to specify public interest as a domestic concept, and national interest as a concept
used in foreign policy. In recent years, hovever, this distinction has been relaxed. If v/e assun'ie
^Glendon Schubert. The Public Interest
.
(Glencoe, Illinois; The Free Press, 1960).
that public interest (whatever it is) is at the center of a modern, democratic society, then the
policies that Tlov from that society, Doth domestically and abroad, must somehov/ address the
concept of interest. This is especially true if one believes, as I do, that the public interest, though
always dynamic and changing, arises out of the interaction of the many pluralistic elements of
American society; this "public interest" then seeks both expression and affirmation through the
institutions of American democratic government, to include finding an inevitable mche in foreign
policy as well, the domain of the "national interest". Such a process means that both are but
different sides of the same coin, especially if one postulates the unity of the people and their
gove r nme nt . ^ - He nee t he fol 1 ovi ng di sc ussi o n vi 1 1 s pea k of " nati o nal i nte rest
"
, w hi 1 e recog ni zi ng
and accepti ng the existence of a domestic tie and i n put.
V^ith this theoretical background in mind, then, how have political scientists defined national
interest? V/riting shorty after World War II, Hans J. Morgenthau, one of the seminal political
scientists of our time, defined national interest strictly in termsof a quest for power. He wrote;
The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way
through the landscape of international politics is the concept of
interest defined in terms of power. . . .'vVe assume that statesmen
think and act in terms of interest defined as power. . .
Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the
political shpere. . . .He thinks in terms of interest defined as
pov/er.^^
V'/hi1e Morgenthau certainly brought new stucture and systematic thought to the field of
political science with his theory of power, his fvi/r ^e /i?rce is, nonetheless, a single- factor
analysis. It ends up with power having meaning only in relationship to other states, and thus,
when national interest is defined solely as the maximization of power, the national interest
1 "^Abraham Lincoln's formulation of American government as being of, by, and for the people
would seem to make this unity indisputable. Any arguments about "reality" versus "idealism" can
be bridged by the American philosophy of pragmatism such that the two must be connected,
although the tie may seem strained at times.
^^Hans L. Moroenthau. Politics Amiong Nations
.
5th edition, (Nev/ York: Alfred Knopf,
1973), p. 5.
becomes recognizable onlg in relationship to other states and has no clear domestic content.
Further, hov does one define the national interest of a state that is not in competition in a given
situation?
Paul Seaburg has this to note about national interest:
The idea of national interests may refer to son^ie ha'-rnl set of
purposes v/hich a nation should. . .seek to realize in the conduct
of its foreign relations. Wanting a better word, we might call
this a norm^iiive, civic concept of national interest. . . .A second
mea ni ng of eq ual i m ffo rta nee mi g ht be cal 1 descri^ii i-'?. I n t hi s
sense the national interest may be regarded as those purposes
which the nation, through its leadership, appears to pursue
persistently through time. When we speak of the national
interest in this descriptive sense, we move out of the
metaphysical into the realms of facts. . . .Disagreement about
policy and action may arise even among men who are essentially
in agreement about the general aims of their country in the
world. But policy disagreen'ients are usually due to differences
among policy- n'lakers about conceptions both of what the United
States is and what its role in world politics, even its mission,
should be. ^^'
This definition is really nothing more than a description; it does not address the essence of
national interest. The writer is unable to find a box that perfectly contains the concept of the
national interest and thus falls back on description. Unfortunately, many political scientists take
the approach of K. J. Holsti:
Even though there may be somie immutable national interests such
as self-preservation, to which everyone will agree, no one can
claim with certainty that any other specific goal or set of goals is
in the national interest. Therefore we will avoid the term and
s u bsti t ute t he co nee pt of objecti ve. ^ -^
^2p;3ul Seabury, Power, Freedom
,
and Diplomacy: The Forei g n Policy of the United States of
America, (Nev/York: Random House, 1963), p. 36.
^ 3 K . J . Hoi sti , International Politics
.
( E ngl ewood CI i ffs , New Je rse y : P re nti ce - Hal 1 , 1983),
p. 124.
Unable to define ttie national interest, it is sv/ept under the rug and the writer reverts to an
essentially descriptive method. Perhaps the key to the difficulty is the conception of the national
interest as the national Interest, as if it v/ere static and single, all-embracing and immutable.
Perhaps John Stoessinqer comes closer vhen he v/rites,
We see therefore that it Lt mi.tileading to define the national
interest in terms of any one concept. In fact, our definition of
foreign policy as the formulation of the national interest is
purely formal. . . .The formula of the national interest is
ambiguous and frequently not at all helpful when applied to a
concrete si tuation.^"^
It thus becomes clear that the question, how it is asked, and the type of an.swer expected, can
greatly aid or hinder our understanding. Rather than seeking to "define" the national interest, a
better approach may be to start with a conceptual model of what it is.
For a working model of the national interest I am partial to Frank Tetrs model as it enables an
easy grasp of a complex topic. This model identifies a historical -cultural context that interacts
with a situational context to produce a hierarchy of perceived and/or real needs that becon^ies
known as the national interest. The critical component of this model, though, is the flowing
together and interaction of the historical -cultural context with the situational context in a process
of compromise and consensus- -the heart of the Madi soman model of government that is, in turn,
the basis of American government.^ - The challenge to American government 1 n particular, and to
the American people In general, is to make n^iaximum use of the process of compromise and
consensus. Elements of the highly pluralistic historical -cultural context must be drawn into the
compromise and consensus process or they will attempt to subvert the model, and hence the
public/national interest, by directly establishing their own agendas in the hierarchy of needs.
Similarly, government, under the pressure of responding to real, fast- moving and changing
^"^John G. Stoessinger, The Mi g ht of Nations . (New York: Random House, 1 966), p. 30.
i^See Appendix B for a graphical representation of this model, I think it will make it much
clearer than can words alone.
situations, v/ill be tempted to act vithout first ensuring the foundation that derives from the
compromise and consensus process; government 'vill be tempted to deal directly v/ith the problem
in the namie of expediency and efficiency, using its own hierarchy of needs, to the possible
detriment of the public/national interest.
The.beauty of the Teti model is that it addresses both the source of American uniqueness, and
the reality of current situations. The plurality of American society, its energy, drive,
resourcefulness, and fecundity in generating nev/ ideas and approaches has long been a great source
of strength for this country; it could, of course, also be a source of v/eakness if all players do not
regularly take part in the interaction of the compromise and consensus process. The Teti n-iodel
also shovs the dynamic quality of the national interest. To speak of ?'.'^.^- national interest is to
miss its essence- -the constant, dynamic interplay of ideals and reality, of "vho ve are" vith
"vhere and vhen ve are" in the vorld. American national interest is a product that requires
constant monitoring of the formulation process, not exclusive attention on the end-product.
What the Teti model does not do is to study the hierarchy of perceived and /or actual needs in a
systematic fashion. This becomes particularly important as one begins to think about policy
formulation based on the needs expressed as national interest. For this task Donald Nuechterlein
has provided a framev/ork for categorization and study.^^ Although the model does not have the
precision of a mathematical formula, it does allov/ a focused, albeit subjective, analysis of
American interest on different questions, both absolutely and relative to other affected nations.
We vi 11 look more closely at the Nuechterlein model in the next section.
1 ^'Donald E. Nuechterlein, National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of
Priorities
. (Boulder. Colorado: Westviev/ Press, 1978).
B. AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. I NTEREST I N POLAND
The previous sections of this paper have examined the Situational Context of the Teti national
interest model with respect to Poland. Although some discussion of the American Historical
-
Cultural Context has also occurred in the preceding section, a more comiprehensive articulation is
necessary before we proceed further with the Teti and Nuechterlein models.
The wide pluralism in the American Historical -Cultural Context, the result of immigrants
from all over the world, and of the broad political and social freedoms of the land, is one of the
most striking and fascinating aspects of America. Henry James observed that the American
character is filled with contradiction and paradox and once said, "It's a complex fate, being an
American." Thus it is perhaps not surprising that when America developed its own distinctive
philosophy, it was the pragmatism of Henry James. As mentioned earlier, this pragmatism
perceived a pluralistic universe where men can discover partial and limited truths- -truths that
work for them- -but where no one can gain an absolute grip on ultimate truth.
However, despite this diversity, there also seem to be generally- held principles and ideas
with which Americans tend to identify themselves. While Americans live by experiment, they also
demonstrate a yen for broad generalities, concepts that are all -encompassing and tend toward the
universal. This may be traceable to the nurturing of America on the theology of Calvin--
elaborate, abstract and systematic as it is. This Calvinlst theology also imparted a concept of
salvation to the American mind that grew to become an almost messi&nic view of America and its
place in the world.
The American's propensity to ideology has surfaced repeatedly in American history-
Johnathon Edward's theology of Providence, the V-Zebster- Calhoun views of slavery, Woodrow
Wilson's vision of a new world order, and even John Foster Dulles' call to a virtual holy war
against atheistic communism. Americans cite with relish the foundation of their society as being
embodied in great Ideological documents such as the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution,
and even the Gettysburg Address. And yet, how many Americans are really familiar with the
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specific principles th.at. -jre contained in these cornerstones? Hov many Americans can, or even
try, to articulate the meaning of freedomi, democracy, and liberty? Actually, the fact that they are
not el a bo ratel y a rti c u1 ated i n toda y 's A me ri ca i s not u n us ual fo r A me ri ca . Tocq uevi 1 1 e o bse rved i n
the 1 8303 that the ideas of the Americans "are all either extremely minute and clear or extremely
general and vaque." He went on to observe that the ideas that vere clear dealt v/ith matters of fact
and practice; those that vere unclear vere those of theory and ideology. He vrote, "In no country
in the civilized vorld is less attention paid to philosophy than in the United States." Tocqueville
also observed, however, the fervent (to him almost nauseating) belief in the righteousness and
uniqueness of America. President Reagan captured that ongoing belief v hen he said, "I have always
believed that this annointed land was set apart in an uncommon way, that a divine plan placed this
great continent here between the oceans to be found by people from every corner of the earth who
had a special love of faith and freedom."^ ^
It is important to remember that even if most Americans cannot deliver an impromptu
dissertation on the principles of freedom, there ?s an American idealism to vhich Americans
generally subscribe, and most Americans fervently believe in that idealism. It is a belief in
Freedomi, both economic and personal, equality, the right to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness, the individual dignity of a man and the vorth of the individual. Thomas Jefferson said
in his first inaugural address, "Equal and exact justice to all men. . . .Freedom of religion, freedom
of the press, freedom of person under protection- of .^ist'eus corpfjs, and trial by juries
impartially selected- -these principles form the bright constellation vhich has gone before us."
William Tyler Page (1 668- 1 942) said it this vay in "The American's Creed":
I believe in the United States of America as a government of the
people, by the people, for the people; whose just powers are
derived from the consent of the governed; a democracy in a
republic; a sovereign nation of many sovereign states; a perfect
^
^Quoted in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Foreign Policy and the Amierican Character" in Forei gn
Affai rs . Fall 1983, p. 5.
OT
i.-j
union, une and inseparable; established upon those principles of
freedom, equality, justice and humamty for which American
patriots sacrificed their lives and fortunes, i therefore believe it
is my duty to my country to love it , to support its constitution, to
obey its laws, to respect its tlag and to defend it against all
enemies. 1^
American idealism as expressed in these beliefs, together vith a companion belief in progress
and optimism, (stemming, no doubt, from the "kno'w'ledge" that ve are specially favored by God.)
,
lay the cornerstones of American political culture. These threads run throughout our history,, and
over the decades they have dravn in and voven into the fabric of Amierican society the many
diverse strains of the seemingly pluralistic historical -cultural context. We are Americans
because we share these beliefs v/ithin our ov/n historical -cultural context.
Given the strength and and broad dissemination of these beliefs in American society, it is not
surprising that they v/ould find their way into the concept of the national interest. In
C h ri sti a ni t y , Fai t h i s st re ngt he ned a nd no u r i s hed as i t fi nds affi r mati o n i n acti on. Si mi 1 a r 1 y , t he
secular beliefs of the American historical -cultural context naturally seek affirmation in the
formulation of national interest and in the execution of resultant policy. This has led to many a
clash between idealism and realism, between the standard-bearers of the historical -cultural
context and the proponents of the situational context, as they come together in the compromise and
consensus process of America. The ziqs and zags of American foreign policy generally reflect the
temporary victory of one or the other.
Certainly the star of the national interest model is the American compromise and consensus
process. At the heart of this process if the Madisonian form of government, as set forth in the
Federalist Papers. The Madisonian model recognizes, and even encourages, the competition of
varied self-interest within the bound of law so that all may become players, and so that all can be
^
'^Written by William Tyler Page, Clerk of United States House of Representatives, 1917;
accepted by that House on behalf of the American People, April 3 1916. Printed in U. S.
Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, A Welcome to U. 5. A. Citizenshi p
,
p 2, U. 3. Government Printing Office, 1 964.
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:3CCommoiJ8ted (arid eventually co-opted into larger consensus groups) through the pov/er of
compromise and majority rule. V-Zhile the achievement of perfect mix vithin this dynamic process
is virtually impossible, the process and model do succeed in regulating the svings back and forth
such that the extremes are usually avoided, and a revolution around a moderate middle is
maintained in the long-run. Thus it is in the interest of all players to ensure the videst possible
participation both to promote one's ov/n cause and to moderate the causes of others.
It is precisely this clash and mix of the historical -cultural and the situational contexts that
we must nov address in studying American interest in Poland. Again, having covered the
situational context earlier, vhat is it- about the Polish situation, if anything, that revealed the
hi sto ri C3l - c ul t u r al el eme nts of Ame ri ca n nati o nal i nte rest ?
Richard Reeves observed in his journey through America that it is in vogue today to seem-
cynical or nonchalant about American ideals, particularly among the young, vho are searching for
".sophistication". Nonetheless, he found that in moments vhen the veneer vas stripped away, the
belief in the ideals remained. Interestingly, it sometimes takes a foreigner to spark us into an
appreciation of vhat ve have and into a realization of what we believe. Such was the case with tne
Polish Crisis.
Timothy Ash called Solidarity the "most infectiously hopeful movement in the history of
contemporary Europe," and saw its long-term legacy as one of hope.^^ Solidarity struck a
resonant chord in the American imagination as Americans watched the Poles fighting with
extraordinary courage, dignity and self- restraint for values Americans recognized as their own-
-
individual freedom, democratic government, the rule of law, free speech- -values which
powerfully reminded Americans of Poland's Western heritage. Interest v/as born in the perception
of this common bond. Young people in the West who had doubted the primacy of those values in the
modern world were suddenly seeing Solidarity banners on shipyard cranes that proclaimed, "Man
i^TimothyG. Ash, "Under Western Eyes: Poland, 1980-1982", The Washington Quarterl u.
Spring 1984, p. 131.
is born and lives free." As only a sick man knovs the full value of healthy so it took an unfree
people to remind many Americans of the real value of freedom. Finally, the popular imaqt of the
valiant Poles struggling against the forces of "the evil empire", established a Polish- American
bond that was soon translated into an ideological interest vithin the national interest. V/ith the
historical -cultural context now established in interaction vith the situational context, it is time
to apply the Nuechterlein model.
Nuechterlein identifies four different types of basic national interests:
• Defense interests- -the protection of the nation -state and its population against the threat of
physical violence directed from another state;
• Eco no mi c i nte rests - - 1 he e n ha nee me nt of t he nati on- sate 's eco no mi c vel 1 - bei ng
;
• World Order Interests- -the maintepftnce of an international political and economic system
in vhich the nation- state and its citizens can feel secure beyond their borders:
• Ideological Interests- -the protection and furtherance of a set of values that the citizens of a
nati on- state share and believe to be universally good.
Nuechterlein then provides a frarnevork for expressing the different degrees of intensity of each
of these interests:
• Survival Issues- -when the very existence of a nati on -state is in jeopardy as a result of
ove rt attac k o r t h reat by ul ti mat um
;
• Vital Issues- -V'/ hen serious harm will very likely result to the state unless strong
measures, including the use of conventional forces, are employed;
• Major Issues- -V/hen a state's political, economic, and ideological well-being may be
adversely affected by events and trends in the international environment, requiring
corrective action;
• Peripheral Issues- -When a state's well-being is not adversely affected by events or trends
abroad, hut v/hen private citizens and companies might be in danger.
Before assembling these into the Nuechterlein matrix, let us look at the U. S. position on each
interest with respect to the Polish situation.
It 1s obvious to anyone vho can find Poland on a map that there is probably a difference in the
ij.:?. and Soviet interests in Poland. Geographically, Poland, the "qatevay to Russia", is of a much
more immediate concern to the Soviet Union than to the U.S. As the discussion of Soviet interests
in Poland earlier in this paper shoved ,20 the Soviets have a long and very important relationship
vith Poland that has established the current nature and degree of Soviet i nterest i n Poland. Poland
is also critical to the Soviet position in East Europe in general, and to the Soviet control of the
German Democratic Republic in particular. The dilemma of the Polish state has alvays been the
question of hov to proceed along essentially Western lines of thought, development, and action
vhen one is constantly avare of the overpovering presence of the great Russian bear next door.
Hence, the ultimate fate of Poland lies somewhere betv/een absorption into the Soviet Union and
full alignment .v'ith the V/est. Since neither of these extremes in itself vill probably be reached,
both being absolute and opposed by historic countervailing tendencies, the important issue then is
not destination so much as direction along the range. Since World War IMn particular, the Soviet
Union has sought to weave a net of integration around Poland, and to bring Poland ever closer under
Soviet control. If we speculate on the import of this encouragement toward integration with the
Soviet Union, we soon realize that this direction of Poland's movement is of abiding interest to the
U.S. The more certain and secure that Soviet control of Poland is, the more that Poland becomes a
Soviet bridge (of outward -moving influence ) to the West. By assuring achievement, on a more or
less permanent basis, of their objectives in Poland, the Soviets would have a secure route to
Western Europe. Hence the potential military and political threat Increases in the area the U.S.
regards as holding paramount security interest.
The long-range pcssi bill ties for Western Europe under this degree of Soviet pressure break
down into two distinct areas- -fragmentation and consolidation, both equally dangerous to the
Western camp. Fragmentation of V/estern unity in the face of the Soviet Union would make each
-^See the ?ectinn in this work entitled "Soviet Interest in Poland", pp. 80-88
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jeparatt: nation more vulnerable to Soviet political pressure supported by a secure forv/ard
military position in the center or Europe. V/hile the word "domination" may not precisely
describe either the Soviet objective our this outcome, it is still apparent that Soviet influence in
the V-Zest vould be stronger, and that such an outcome could only be realized at the expense of
Western autonomy and institutions. The consolidation of the West, v/ith the United States surely
involved, could reverse the present multipolar trends in the vorld and lead ultimately to the
bi polarity seen as unstable by many because it provides the framev/ork for the "zero sum"
outcome in which one side or the other must lose all.^'^
While the prospect of Poland's move tov/ard the Soviets certainly is an undesirable outcome,
the contrary trend, that toward the inclusion of a truly autonomous Polish state into the Western
community, becomes the most desirable outcome for the U.S. The advantages for the West in this
instance are in part the reciprocals of the disadvantages of the former. Poland would become a
bridge from the West to the Soviet Union, opening it to Western pressures and traditions that it
has resisted in the past. Nor should it be overlooked that such an outcome would alter the entire
Soviet presence in Europe, while strengthening the West by making available to it the considerable
energies and resources of the Polish nation. Again, while such an outcome may be i.een as
unrealistic in today's light, the outcome as defined remains valid as providing a desirable direction
for change.
What then of Nuechter lei n's basic interests? American .v> ,'>,•?>.?• ///ieresti^ in Poland can
only be seen as very small for the present and forseeable future; using Muechterlein's labels, it
would be classified as periptferal While future events could certainly raise that degree of
interest, the present situation does not warrant a higher interest.
^U-ianiel M. Duffield, Jr, United States Securit u Interest in Eastern Europe: The Case of
Poland
.
National Security Affairs Monograph 77-6, (Washington, D.C: National Defense
University, 1977), pp. 47-8.
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Ecammic /nterest While U.S. trade vith Poland rose sharply in the 1 9 7 us, such trade has
never been of great importance to the U.S. Even Poland's large Western debt is primarily oved to
Western European lenders, not the United States (about ten percent of. the hard- currency deby is
oved to U.S. banks). Poland is at best only a .secondary market and supplier for the United States.
U.S. exports to Poland in 1 961 , before the imposition of sanctions, vas valued at approximately
$70.3 million, imports from Poland amounted to $31 .6 million.^'^ The relative size of the Polish
and American econon"iies in comparison to each other means that America is certainly more
important to Poland than Poland is to America, such that the U. S. economic interest in Poland is
"major" (as compared to vital), at best, and more likely, for the United States, perfy^en'.
In the consideration of W^yr!^ Onfer //iffrests, Poland holds a higher degree of importance
for the United States. Poland is, of course, a part of the Soviet East European empi re and thus falls
into U.S. interests vith regard to Eastern Europe as a vhole as veil. The very first comprehensive
statement on American policy tovard that region, NSC 5S (a then secret document signed by
President Truman in 1949), states that "Our ultimate aim must, of course, be the appearance in
Eastern Europe of non-totalitarian administrations villi ng to accommodate themselves to, and
participate in, the free vorld community. "^'^ The American conception of Eastern Europe that vas
to emerge after the Yalta Agreement did not in any vay envision the kind of Soviet hegemony that
one finds today. As discussed above, Soviet presence in Eastern Europe is a major U.S. concern
vith regard to American interests in Europe, our fijremost zone of security interest in today's
vorld (due to that presence). Poland, as a major linchpin of that Soviet presence, is thus of great
American interest. Hovever, it is also clear from past U .S. actions and policy vith regard to
Eastern Europe that the interests are not yet such that the United States is ready to commit





(Warsaw, 1 962), pp. 1 95, 1 97-98; a 1 981 exchange rate of 35 zhty to US$1
vas used. (By the end of 1 982 that exchange rate vas up to 86 z.^otf/ to US$1
.)
^-T.H. Etzoldand J.L. Gaddis, eds., "NSC 58: United States Policy tovard the Soviet Satellite
States in Eastern Europe (Septemiber 14, 1 949)", Co ntai nme nt : Doc ume nts o n Ame r i ca n Pol i c u
andStateq u. (Nev York: Columbia University Press, 1 978), pp. 21 1 -23.
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military forces to change the vorld order there. While the U. 3. is so committed to preserving the
Western order in Europe, the extension of that order to the East through military action is not
contemplated at this time, it is for similar reasons that the U. S. did not send military support to
Hungary in 1 956 or to Czechoslovakia in 1 968. Nuechterlein proposes that vital interests may be
defended by the use of conventional forces; hence, I vould classify the U.S. vorld order interest in
Poland as msjor.
Finally, ve come to the considertion of American hi'eoiogics^ Interest in Poland. As
discussed earlier, the events in Poland captured American interest as Americans perceived the
Poles to be struggling for many of the same ideals held dear by Americans. Perhaps this
identification with the Poles and their struggle has somiething to do vith the "frontier" experience
of both cultures, the Poles having inhabited the West's eastern frontier against the harbanans of
the East, the Americans, in effect, constituting the V/est's western frontier agmst the same.
Certainly the extremities of experience and the challenge to life that the Poles experienced in
defending their frontier and which the Americans experienced in settling the North American
frontier were similar, and thus could have forged the common reverence for freedom and the
philosophy of individualism.
Poland also cannot help but stir America's ideological identity that sees the Soviet Union as the
embodiment of evil and the antithesis of all that is good and just by American standards. Such
castigations are often bemoaned in this country by those of Reeves' "national interest elite", for
such "irritable patriotism" (Tocqueville's characterization of the American penchant for self-
nghteousness in 1831) can, in the heat of passion, apply tremendous pressure for aggressive
action. This leads to those situations in the Teti nxidel in which the Historical -Cultural Context
will seek to circumvent the Compromise and Consensus Process that seems suddenly too slow and
staid to satisfy inflamed passion; if the Compromise and Consensus Process is bypassed, however,
and inflamed passion is allowed to directly establish elements of the Hierarchy of Perceived and /or
Actual Needs, the national interest will not be best served.
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Be that as it may, the interisity of the American ideoloqical interest nonetheless sten'is, in p.irt
,
from the need of the American belief systen^i to express itself and to affirm itself in the vorld
arena. Samuel Huntington has stated that, Tor most Americans, foreign policy goals should retlect
not only the security interests of the nation and the economic interests of key groups vithm the
nation but also the political values and principles that define American identity. "^^ The 1975
Helsinki Human Rights provisions have thus received American support for just that reason;
Americans feel better about themselves vhen they publicly proclaim their beliefs and see them
affirmed in the vorld at large. The challenge of rational government thus becomes hov to
accommodate this in a manner to capitalize on its strength, without falling victim to its excesses.
As James Schlesinger once explained to the Europeans,
The United States is largely a romantic country. It has
encountered little opposition and does not tnink in terms of moves
and counter moves in a never-ending game. It sees no reason that
it can't accomplish its presumably formidable objectives. Its
history is n^iarked by a belief in Manifest Destiny- -abetted by a
Puritan past in vhich the American nation was foreordained to be
a Beacon into the V/orld. In order, therefore, to understand
American policy, one should not simply go through a careful
calculation of the national interest, Hovever important such a
calculation may be to officials of the Department of State, it 'v/ould
aquire little visceral support among the American people. . . .
[An-ierican policy finds its strength .•.•hen] the American public
believes that ;7 ;> ri^^t?-^'
While Nuectherlein normally reserves vital interests for those interests to be supported by
conventional forces, his case studies do indicate that ideological interests may assun'ie a vital
deg ree of i nte nsi t y v hi 1 e not necessa ri 1 y res ul ti ng i n a vi 1 1 i ng ness to com mi 1 1 roo ps . He nee , d ije
^'^Samuel P Huntington, "American Ideals versus American Institutions", Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. 97, no. 1 , Spring 1 982.
^^James R. Schlesinger, "An American Perspective" in Robert E. Hunter, ed., NATO: The Nest
Generation
. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 43, 45. Italics are those of
Schlesinger.
to the intensity of American attitude in reference to the Soviet Union and East Europe in general,
and toward Poland in particular, and due also to the need of the American identity and belief system
for public proclamation and affirmation of its tenets for its ovn health, I think the American
ideological interest in Poland should be classified as w.'i's/.
A similar categorization of Soviet interest in Poland using the Nuechterlein model is useful
here. As discussed earlier, the Soviet interest in Poland is much older and more intense thatn that
of the United States, due, in large part, to geographical realities. Russian experience vith Poland
has historically proven the critical impact Poland has on the existence of the Russian state; even
today, the Soviets would be extremely concerned about any threatened establishment of an
independent, hostile Poland on its borders. It is thus not im perceivable to classify Soviet l'^/f/:S^
interest in Poland as being of s^'rviv^/ intensity. In a related fashion, since Poland is the
linchpin to the Soviet Union's East European empire, as well as being a member of the Socialist
Commonwealth of nations and thus a "beneficiary" of the Breshnev Doctrine's promise of
"fraternal assistance", Soviet h'i/r/v ^r^r interest, shaped as it is to a large degree on tht
foundation of that East European empire, should be classified as at least i-vY*?/ in regard to Poland
specifically.
Many Sovietologists argue that the ideological component of the Soviet Communist Party is the
justification for its continued existence; the destruction or the debasement of that legitimizing
ideological function and basis would result in a major upheavel in Soviet government. One of the
fundamental tenets of that ideology is the irreversibility of the tide of history that has swept
nations such as Russia and Poland towards a higher social level of "socialist" organization superior
to capitalism. The Communist Party is soley charged vith guiding these "advanced" nations along
the road of socialist development to ever- purer forms of socialism and, ultimately, communism.
The rejection of these ideological tenets would necessarily destroy the Party's legitimization for
rule. Solidarity, being ultimately a creation and expression of the Polish nation and not the PZRP,
with its inference of rejection of PZRP monopoly rule, was just the sort of development that pases
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an extreme survival challenge to Party rule and existence. Of course, as the events of 1 9;:;0-i31
shoved, the disintegration of Party control in Poland threatened to spill over into neigborlnq
socialist countries and into Soviet republics, a threat that Communist leaders in those areas took
very seriously, and for good reason, as we have seen. Thus the /ife^j/i'^fcs/ interest of the Soviet
Union is also of s-o'rwfws/ intensity.
Finally, economically, the Soviet Union has invested considerable funds in the forn'i of
subsidies and loans into the troubled Polish economy. It has also structured Poland's economy into
a major supporting role for the Soviet economy as evidenced by Soviet actions in the post-var
years. Again, however, the relative .size of the Polish and Soviet economies means that the Soviet
Union is more important to Poland than is Poland to the Soviet Union in economic terms. Hence,
Soviet economic interest in Poland could be classified as major at least.
The Nuechterlein matrix allows us to place these classifications into an easily comprehensible
p rese ntati o n a nd com pa ri so n of t he i nte rests . T he res ul ti ng N uec hte r 1 ei n mat r i x fo r com pa r'i so n
of Soviet and U. 3. interest on the issue of Poland would be constructed as follows:
issue: Poland
S'Ssfc ?i7.terfS\ s-t sf^i:e /rftfnsfty of fnter^st
Survival Vital t^YjL Peripheral
Defense of homeland USSR US
Eco no mi c wel 1 - bei ng + USS R US
Favorable world order + USSR + US
ideological USSR US
As this matrix shows, the interests of the Soviet Union are clearly more intense than those of
the United States on the issue of Poland. Nuechterlein's model does not place a priority on any
particular category of interest, but rather seeks to encourage the inclusion of all in the balanced
evolution of the overall nation.sl interest and in the consequent formulrjtion of policy. Thus, vhile
the U. 3. tdeoloqical interest in Poland rnay be vital, the absolute level of American interest in the
^ther categories, and the relative comparison of all categories of interest to the Soviet Union, must
not be disregarded. Ideology, long cast as the equal opposite of realism in a dichotomous view of
American interest and policy, is thus placed in a different perspective by the Huechterlein model,
helping to form a more complete viev of the national interest. Such a view set limits on the
messianic passions of American policy, vhile continuing to recognize the inescapable role of
ideological interest in any discussion of the American national interest.
For the policy- maker, this comparison of interest, vhile basic in establishing a basis for
policy, must soon raise the question of capability as veil. A quick consultation of the geography of
Europe reveals that the Soviet Union is in a position to more easily pursue any of its interests than
can the United States. The challenge for policy- makers is thus to recognize the entire spectrum of
of national interest, the process as veil as the multiple categories, to the exclusion of none, and
then to build policy that reflects that interest both in absolute terms, and in terms of relative
comparison to other povers. The subject of policy vill thus constitute our next area of discussion.
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C. THE U. S. RESPONSE TO THE 1 980- 8 1 CRISIS
With 3 concept of the qerier^Bl theory of national interet and 8 specific analysis ;3nd
classification of IJ. S. interest with regard to Poland now in mind, let us next turn brietly to the
actual course of events during the 1980-81 crisis to see it and how U. S. policies toward Pol ana
were formulated and executed in consonance with our findings and comments on the national
interest.
The creation of Solidarity in the summier of 1 930 attracted a certain amiount of attention fromi
the Carter administration. President Carter had made human rights a centerpiece of his foreign
policy, and as recently as 7 August 1980, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie had addressed the
United Steel Workers of America in Los Angeles saying, "Human freedom is America's vision.
First is the freedom of nations, second, the politcal freedom of people within nations; third,
freedom from poverty and human misery. A narrower approach, an approach which ignores the
hopes and needs of people within nations, cannot succeed." The difficulty of such a view,
particularly as the imminent Polish crisis would show, was demonstrated when he added, "When
peaceful change is frustrated, violent and radical change can explode in a storm that damages
America's interests and creates opportunities for our adversaries."
After the Gdansk Agreement of 31 August 1930, the Carter administration faced a difficult
dilemma: should it encourage the forces of Solidarity, knowing full well the interests of the Soviet
Union in Poland and the possible chance of a repeat of Hungary in 1956 or of Czechoslovakia in
1968; or should it seek stability in the area and in East -West relations, and try to limit this
appeal for freedom? Was it really possible to promiote peaceful change in Eastern Europe'' If so,
how'' 'What would Carter pay for human rights , and how would he do it?
It appears that the Carter administration opted for caution (some would say excessive caution)
as the first priority in developing a response to the Polish situation. The initial policies of the
Carter ad miini strati on were thus designed to preclude direct American involvement in tne
develupinq crlsi:-;. The economic: nature of the SolidiiriTy move merit ynd the reality of Polind'-s
$20 DllHon deDt to the v/est m;!ide economic iiction::: the nrst mstrumients or ooncy for the
:5a rnimst ration. After the Gijansk Agreement the U. '5. administration had an opportunity to
formulate policy that v/ould have made the extension of fur+her U. 3. credits to the Polish
government conditional upon its good faith in honoring tne concessions v/ rested from' it ny
Solidarity. Such a policy vould have supported the Polish v/orkers in a legal manner consistent
v/ith President Carter's human rignts policy and tne provisions of tne Helsinki Accords: it also
could not have been construed as intervention in the internal affairs of another nation, another
principle of the Helksinki Accords. Rather, such a policy v/ould have been good business, since the
Polish government had already demonstrated its mismanagement of the Polish economy and needed
the support of the v/orkers if economic imiprovements and the repayment of the debt •..ere to be
forthcoming. Such a policy vould also have been in consonance vith the U. S. vital ideological
interest, as well as its peripheral economic interest.
Unfortunately, the Carter Administration rejected this lever and instead chose to make
unconditional grants that neither helped the Solidarity cause, nor advanced tut principle of nun-ian
rights. The policies did not even have the appearance of understanding the differences beiveeri The
Polish governn'ient and people, nor did they evidence an understanding of the situation as it vas
developing. Furthermore, the policies recognized no varying intensity of interest and thus failed
to capitalize on, or drav strength from an accurate avareness of American interest.
In an effort alledgedly designed to ease the economic situation and hence the crisis atmosphere.
President Carter approved a Commodity Credit Corporation extension of $670 million in credit
guarantees to the Polisn government. President Carter intended this to be a sign of solidarity
betveen the Amiencan and Polish peonies. As he explained to the Polish National Alliance in
Chicago on 20 September, he n'lade the approval because Poland needed food, and the credits would
provide four million tons of American grain and other farm products to Poland. Such a policy
demionst rates a failure to understand the ongoing contTlct in agriculture in Poland betveen tne state
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and the private farmer?. Thus, urifortunately, private farmer? in Pcilynd never vere able to ijse
the grains Decause the Polish government miade them availaDle Drin'ianly to the coUeotive and state
farms, not to the private farmers. One result of such a policy vas not the feeding of the Poli^sh
people, but rather a sharp reduction of the sv/ine herd in the private sector and the disappearance
of meat fro mi the market.^'^
Although American workers seemed to understand and identify vith the cause of the Solidarity
vorkers, Secretary of State Muskie v/arned AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland on 3 SeoTemiPer
against plans to provide material assistance to Solidarity, despite an appeal from Walesa for nelp
from abroad. Additionally, Muskie informed Soviet Ambassador to the U. S. Dobrymn that ttn U. S.
government had no intention of becoming involved in the Polish situation.
Soviet saber- rattling in the autumn of 1 960 v.-*as also given perhaps too miucn credence by the
Car'er Administration, another indication of extreme caution or a lack of perceptive analysis of
the situation. V/hile it v/as correct to recognize the Soviet Union's vital defense interest in
Poland, miore attention should have been oaid to hov/ difficult and hOw' costly an invasion of Poland
vould be to the Soviets. Secretary Muskie v/arned in an interview in October that "the Polish
government, the Polish workers, and the Polish people ought not to be insensitive to Russian
reactions to hov- they finally achieve and resolve the issue v/hich is before thenr . . i think the
Polish people ought not to be insensitive to pressures from outside, not only from the Soviet Union
but from other countries in the Eastern bloc."^^ It is arguable that the Polish v/orkers and peoDle
v/ere very much aware, as they have alvays been, of Soviet pressures, and had chosen to confront
them. U. S. pronouncements such as this only served to assist Soviet pressure on Polano to resolve
the issue.
-^•Richard T. Davies, "The Umted States and Poland, 1980- 62", The vVashinoton Quarter] u.
Spring 1982, p. 147.
^'"^Davies, "The United States and Poland", p. 1 46
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When the Suvieti; ijeDloyed force? i]onQ Pol and':-; border::: in Decerntier 1 960, President Carter
did v;3rn that, although the United States had no desire to exploit the crisis, an invasion of Poland
v/ould have most negative conseduences for U. "S.-jOviet relations. At the time, the Poles, the
government and the nation, seemed to find tms policy relevant and effective, i^jr it was in their
interest to forestall a Soviet invasion. That this varning v/as only designed to iirnii U. 3.
involvement vith the Soviets and v/as not designed to protect human rights or tUe Solidarity
movement vas demonstrated m other pronouncemients. Mlthouqn, in light of previous
Administration actions, it vas reasonable to assumie that actions taken in response to Polish
developments vould he economically- related, Secretary Muskie seemed to Plunt even this
1 ns t r u n"!e nt 1 n a n i nte rvi ev 1 n Decem he r arte r t he NATO mi ni ste ri al meeti ng . W he f i as ked i f NATO
vould react if the Polish Communist authorities took repressive action against Solidarity, ne
indicated that NATO sanctions vould presumably not he invoked, since the NATO povers held to the
policy of nonintervention in vhat happened betveen the Polish people and their government.
Although there vas talk in Washington during the autunui of 1930 about proposing a "n"iini-
Marshall aid plan" to Poland that vould supposedly strengthen the credibility of liberalizing
developments in that country, nothing came of it. This n'lay veil have been due to the change of
administrations that vas to occur in January. Hov much of the general administration response
vas due to election year politics, either in approving credits or m avoiding an explosive issue,
remains open to question.
January 1931 ushered in a change of admnnist rations, but Polish affairs vere not
subsequently accredited major importance during the first five months of the Reagan
administration as the President vas concerned primarily v/ith initiating his ovn don'iestic
programs. Talk of any nev Marshall plan ceased and events in Poland drifted tovard the fog. It
vas 26 March before the V/hite House Issued a statement setting forth the nev adn"iinstrat1on's
viev/ of relations vith Poland. The occasion for the announcement vas the upcoming visit of Polish
Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslav Jagielski to Washington to seek credits. The statement said.
We 'v/nijld like to make clear tn 3]] concerned our viev/ that any
external] iritef'Vt:ritii;iri in Poland, or .firiy mt^iut'in airned dt
suppressing the Polish people, vould necessarily cause deep
concern to all those interested in the peaceful development of
Poland and could have a grave effect on the v/hole course of East-
Vv'est relations. At the same time, ve v/ould emphasize our
continuing readiness to assist Poland in its present economic and
financial troubles, for as long as the Polish people and authorities
continue to oeek, through a peaceful process of negotiation, the
resol uti n of t hei r c u r re nt p r bl ems
>''='
Folloving Jagielski's visit the U. S. government authorized the sale of $71 million v.-orth of
surplus dairy products to Poland. The Poles v/ere allowed to pay in zk'^i/, but there v.'ere no
conditions attached to the deal. Simiilarly, in July, the Reagan ad miini strati on agreed to provide
$55 million in credits for the purchase of poultry feedg rains. This time the administration
requested that the Polish governn'ient agree to n'lake some of these credits available to the private
farmers. Vv'hen the Polish government refused to do so, the admhnstration alloved the deal to go
through anyway.
The Reagan administration joined fourteen other Western creditors of Poland in April in
agreeing to reschedule some of Poland's debt for 1981. The amount due to the U. S. was
approximately $400 million; again, no conditions v/ere miade to the Polish government.
Nonetheless, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Lav/rence S. Eagleberger stated, "!n
taking these steps v/e have emiphasized to the Polish authorities that we expect the Polish
government and people to make meaningful efforts to reinvigorate the Polish economy and to
resto re Pol a nd 's c redi two rt hi ness
.
"
While the Reagan administration did not seen'i to differentiate between the Polish government
and the people, it also weakened its case by seeming to ignore the Soviet ability to influence the
Polish government as well. Bowing in large part to domiestic pressure. President Reagan, on 24
-SCavies, "The United States and Poland" p. 1 47.
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April, lifted the ernbarqu on grijin i;3les \o the ooviet Union that had been imposed bu the Carter
ad ml nst rati on after the Soviet invasion or Arqhamstan. According to White Mouse sources, this
move vas made to recognize the Soviet Union's conclusion of the large and extended spring military
maneuvers on Poland's uorders ( Ji-v i'j^ 8 1 ) without having invaded Poiand.^^ The lifting of the
embarqo vas apparently made against The advice of Secretary of State Haig and contained no
conditions vith regard to Poland. By adopting a "business as usual" approach to im Soviets the
administration, whether it realized it or not, vas telling the Soviets that profits from grain sales
v/ere more important to the U. 3. than a settlement of the Polish crisis that would recognize and
preserve the rights gained by Solidarity in the Gdansk Agreement.
Jaruzelski's declaration of martial lav/ on 13 December provoked a sharp, immediate, and
emotional reaction from the President, but by then the best opportunities had passed. Vv'hile it is
one thing to seek to encourage a government to live up to agreements it has already made, it is quite
another to attempt to force a regime to reverse such an obvious and momentuous move as i mposi ng
martial lav. Even if the Polish governn'ient vere not under Soviet pressure, it vould suffer
extreme e mi harassment if it vere to allov the United States to control vhat certainly appeared *o
be nov a strictly internal matter. Furthermore, the unconditional support of ttit Polish
government by the United States throughout the crisis seemed to n'lake American denounciations of
martial lav n'lore meaningless, Jaruzelski certainly played on previous U. S, actions vhen he
rationalized his move not only on the grounds of Polish national security, but also vith the
argumeni that martial lav vas necessary to restore order, and to obtain a period of tin'ie, free of
strikes, in vhich he could reenergize the economy and begin paying off the debt to the ''rVest.
Having denounced the declaration of martial lav, U. S. faced the problen"! of deciqing an
appropriate response. The administration's first move vas to turn to its NATO allies in an atTen"ipt
to fashion a coordinated policy vith regard to Poland. The U. 3. first called for sanctions against
'-^Davies, "The United State? and Poland", p.1 48.
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both Poland and the Soviet Union, but despite the arquable riqhtness of this call, the
administration's previous actions in regard to the Soviet Union, and the fact that the Soviet Union
did not openly take part in the imposition of martial lav/, served to discredit calls for action
against the Soviet Union. Additionally, the NATO countries could not agree either on a joint policy,
or even on a joint rhetoric, concerning the violation of human rights in Poland, as the Polish
si t uati n reveal ed Ame ri ca n - E u ro pea n d1 vi si o n i n pol i c y . T he U ni ted States had d rav/ n av/a y fro rn
detente in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, a 'vithdrav/al vith vhich the
Reagan administration seemed to agree and vhich it continued. The Europeans, though, had not
given up on detente and actually seemed more concerned vith maintaining relaxed relations vitn
the East as U. 3. -Soviet relations deteriorated. The issue of Poland brought that difference in
perspective Into open viev. The continuance of detente became the primary goal of the Europeans,
v/ho refused to take any action that could jeopardize their openings to the East. As a member of
NATO's military comimittee had said a year earlier in discussions about Poland, "NATO is a
defensive alliance v/hlch does not include Poland."
The Reagan administration decided on economic sanctions against Poland, challenging
Jaruzelski to liberalize if he vanted the U. S. to lift the sanctions; no specific definition of
liberalization v/as given, nor v/ere any positive incentives provided. The sanctions assumed xt\t
appearance of punishment only, and Jaruzelski determined to persevere. These sanctions also
drev/ heated criticism from some Europeans on the grounds that they further heightened East -West
tensions. The sanctions v/ere, nonetheless, initially popular vith Solidarity activists, vho feared
that further unconditional '•.Vestern credits to the Jaruzelski regime vould only assist the regune
in motivating its supporters, rather than in providing help to Polish citizens.
By late 1983, hovever, Jaruzelski had not significantly changed his vays and vas still
acti vel y e ngaged 1 n hi s p rog ram of " no r mal 1 zati o
n
" . In Decem be r , Lee h V/al esa hi msel f as ked fo
r
re 1 ax.ati o n of t he sa ncti o ns . W hat had happened
?
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First, the Jaruzelski regime did indeed use the ssnctions to rally us supporters. The
sanctions also became an excuse for the contlned mils management of the economy and the !acK of
vill to execute genuine economilc reform in Poland. Sy pointing to the U. 5. as the "bad guy",-
Jaruzelski sought to shift the blame for the continued misery of the Polish people and to enhance
his own regime's legitimiacy by default. The denunciation of the American sanctions thus becamie a
ke y t he me of t he gove r n me nt p ro paga nda i n Pol a nd
.
Second, the imposition of sanctions also denied political maneuver room to Walesa and
Solidarity. The big bolt of amimiunitlLm had been spent and, unfortunately, it 'v/as not tied lo either
positive incentives to entice the Jaruzelski regime, nor vere the conditions of the sanctions
precise enough to pry the Jaruzelski regime into action. The Administration pronouncement was
that "if the Polish gove rnmient introduces meaningful liberalizing measures, ve will take equally
significant and concrete actions of our own."^-
Third, the Europeans failed to take an active part in finding'a solution to the crisis. Although
some did eventually endorse the U. 5. sanctions, the U. S. actions were essentially viewed as
unilateral and inconsistent, especially when the U. 3. approved new grain sales to the Soviet Union,
while trying to block the European gas pipeline deal with the Soviets. While many Europeans did
speak out against human rights violations In Poland, European credits continued to ilow to the
Polish government. Such aid was "justified" on the grounds that it would help pacify the
Jaruzelski regime.
As we have already seen, Jaruzelski continued on nis course In accordance with his own agenda.
By the summer of 1983, he had regained sufficient control to release somie internees and lift
martial law, a move which he then used to show the West of his liberalization; tne same argumient
of liberalization was repeated in 1 9S4v.''hen most of the remiaining internees were released. The
1 9o4 move was soon followed bu the liftinq of U. S. sanctions on Poland, but it should be clear that
^'-'Quoted in Current Polic u. no. 621 , 11 October 1 984, (Washigton.D. C; US. Dept. of State,
Bureau of Public Affairs.
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these :5;3ric:t1i:iri;5 did not ijrive Jyruzelski to 'liberalize". Th;3t the West 1? once ^qain trying to
forqet vhiat happened in Poland is evidenced by the agreement of the Western creditor nations In
July 1965 to again reschedule Poland's debt; again,, no conditions concerning human rights or the
no'.v- banned Soli dan tu v/ere made.
0. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The foregoing discussion seems to indicate that U. S. policy vith regard to Poland during the
1 980-81 crisis did not accurately reflect a careful analysis of U. 3. interest in the situation, nor
regcognize some of the basic realities of the events in Poland. Certainly the press of current
events at the time, U. 3. domestic concerns, and uncertainties about Soviet, as veil as Solidarity,
directions and actions gave U. 3. policy makers large challenges, v/hile also making hindsight from
today's perspective more clear and more knov/ledgeable. Be that as it n'lay, policy n'lust still be
formulated and executed. If nothing else, this study of Poland should cause one to expect n'lore
unrest in the future. It Is appropriate and vise, therefore, to present proposals and arqun'ients
nov, in the belief that preparation nov vill aid action in the future. !n no case n'lust the situation
in Poland be a1 loved to simply disappear once again into the fog of obscurity vithout provision
being made for its eventual reappearance. The folloving proposals are thus advance in the nope of
stimulating thought, discussion, and hopefully, preparedness for the next time.
Given the relative pover of the Soviet Union ^•,^y-.•i- V:S the United States in Eastern Europe
in general and, for our purposes, Poland in particular, it may be veil to recall Raymond Aron's
definition of the "sup reme alter native "in strategy as deciding vhetner " to vin or not to io.se. "^'
Recalling the discussion earlier about the direction of Polish movement, either tovard the East or
tovard the West, the '.-/est cannot allov the Soviet Union to go unchallenged in its efforts to absorb
Poland, indeed, given the repeated pattern of V'/estern neglect of East Europe In general, the West is
^'^ Raymond Aron, Peace and 'v'v'ar: A Theor u of International Relations . (Garden City, Ne',
Jersey: Doubleday andCo., 1966), p. 30.
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fortunyte. thijt the Pules .3 re the mi-elves so Wester n-orlenteij to Liegin vith; this h^s made the
Soviet t;iisk: much more oirricult v/hlle Duglng time ror the west. Still, the magriitude of Soviet
military pov/er makes the formulation of Western policy extremely difficult as veil.
In designing its policy tov/ard Poland, the United states must therefore consider long-term
plans for providing vision, direction, and guiding principles; short-tern^i plans for dealing vith
emergencies; and the general situation in Poland and Eastern Europe both as separate from, and as
an integral part of the greater v hole of Europe. The policies that the United states develoDS then,
must seek to slov the movement tovard integration that the Soviet Union is encouraging, and must
also provide for encouragement of Polish V/estv/ard movement. Thus policy will optimally seek
compatibility- -those measures that vill serve both long-term and short-tern^i goals. This
qualification is certainly not alvays possible, in vhich cases a choice betv/een conflicting
measures vill have to be made; It is understandable that the urgency ana importance of the short-
term goal 'v/in govern in most cases. This only increases, hovever, the importance of vell-
articulated long-term goals that vill put emergency measures in the oroper context and provide
the guiding light for again resuming a long-term direction after the crisis has pas.sed.
U. 3. policy must also accept the quality of Indirectness for nov/ Not only does the lover
relative intensity of American Interest not varrant a direct confrontation vith the Soviet Union
under current conditions, the United States also has at its disposal no direct means to degrade
Soviet pover In Eastern Europe or to convince the Soviet Union to change its policy of integration
tovard Poland short of violent confrontation. For nov, our national capabilities and the vill to use
them do not support violent confrontation. Sumlarly, the U. S. miust be circumspect in avoiding
policies that present ultin'iatums to the Soviets, or that cast the situation into the context of an
obvious "zero sunV game.
Such indirectness should not be vritten off as synonymous vith "ineffective." As Evan Luaro
observed, the rules of diplomiatic intercourse have changed over the last forty years such that
governments around the vorld recognize the issue of human rights on the international political
isqenda. To c-cimpletely deny the efficacy of human rights discussion is to reject all cases \'-t\f:-ff;-
international pressure or concern on the issue has led to improvements in the human rights
policies of particular states. V'/hile certainly not unqualified successes, the Soviet Union's Jev/ish
emigration policy, the practices of Brazil and even Argentina, and the recent events in the
Philippines, South Africa, and m Haiti, to name a fev, see mi to indicated at least a luniieo response
to international concern for human rights. While such governme nt.s would be un willing to admit a
modification of policy as a result of humian rights discussion and concern, such discussion does
bring offending governments to the 'realization that there may be some external costs to their
policies; additionally, it is at least arguable that the foreign offices in such governments, usually
most avare of foregin criticisms, may become an influence vithin the governn^ient n'lachine for a
reform of policy. Also, human rights campaigners in such countries n'lay be given nev hooe and
encouragement, mai ntai ni ng and encouragi ng them i n thei r efforts to secure reforms. Fi nail y , the
establishment in the international realm of nev norms of behavior to be expected from civilized
governments can not be regarded as vithout benefit or effect .-^-^
These considerations lead the U. 5, to the proposition of supporting those factors ln Poland
itself that encourage the natural resistance of the Poles to the Soviets. Poland's basic Wester n-
ness should be encouraged, especially in contrast to the Eastern- ness of the Soviet Union. The
earlier discussions of Polish political culture and its many shared Ideals vith Americans should
n"iake this task somevhat easier, vhile capitalizing on the strongest of U. S, interests in Poland for
the mobilization of domestic support of U. 3. policy. The United States thus can find it profitable to
encourage both Moscov and Warsav/ to move tovard reconciliation v/ith the Polish people. To the
extent that contradictions within Poland are resolved in favor of the Polish people the "true"
legitimacy of the Warsaw government is strengthened in place of the artificiality conferred by
Soviet support, and Polish uniqueness with additional distance fromi Moscow is achieved.
-'^Evan Luard, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy", international Affairs , vol. 56, no. 4,
Autumn 1980, p. 568.
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One can not avoid the charge that it is easier to describe such policies than to enn unci ate them.
Hov/ever, n-iucn or the dirnculty revolves around a lack or understanding or the Polish situation, a
problem which I hope this paper has somev/hat alleviated. It is this proDlen'i of imprecise
assessment that I feel resulted in the ineffective policies of the U. 5. response to the 1980- -31
crisis. Little distinction seemed to be made between the Polish government ana the Polish people;
little recoqnitionof the glaring contradictions between the Polish people and government surfaced
in U. 3. policies. Instead, credit and moneg was provided without qualification; when martial law
was declared, economic sanctions were unposed as punishment, not as instruments of constructive
policy. Indeed, bg the time martial law was declared,, the best opportunities for effective action
had passed. While the sanctions certainlg had the effct of expressing American opposition to events
in Poland, the need for such a forum was only necessary because previous opporties nad oeen
overlooked. American policy could be accused of being only an attempt at crisis n'lanagement, an
attempt severely hampered by a lack of control or even i ml ue nee due to long neglect. The need for
a nd 1 ac k of 1 o ng - te r m vi si o n a nd pol i ci es was evi de nt
.
What policies should we then have? In a move to address the most intense American interest
in Poland and in Eastern Europe, American policy should begin by recognizing and openly stating
that there is nothing God -given about Soviet hegemiony of Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the West
has tht right to challenge that hegemony, and will do so as situations permit. Neither The Yalta
agreements nor any other international law precludes the U. 3. fromi sy mi pat hi zing with, and
declaring public support for the aspirations of the Polish people for human dignity, freedom, and a
voice in their own affairs. While it is true that the U .3. should not encourage violent action, since
this will only generate violent 3oviet backlash and repression while demonstrating aqain the
inability of the United States to provide material assistance as in Hungary in 1 956, it is certainly
permissable for the U. 3. to encourage that such aspirations be resolved through peaceful n'leans.
The United States should not allow Moscow to assume that the U. 3. considers the Soviet sphere of
influence to be sacrosanct, especially when the Soviets do not hesitate to aid Amierica's foes in the
v/estern hemisphere. The United Stiates jhoijld ;iipply the Soviet trick oTdt least being on the ?ide of
change in the "march of history." Such a declaration is needed for American self-esteem and self-
image as 'v/ell. The Helsinki, Accords provide a further forun'i for such declarations. The Poles
knov/ that the Helsinki Accords cannot liberate Eastern Europe from the Soviets. The accords do,
hov/ever, create the diplomatic means to assist efforts to make the system more humane and less
repressive v/ hi I reinforcing those shared Polish and American ideals. As President Reagan has
demonstrated, detente in the form of Soviet appeasement is not the only alternative to cold var.
What about economic policies? The peripheral U .3. national economiic interest in Poland
means that the United States is not constrained by trade to any particular course of action. The
United States should realize from its experience in the Polish crisis, though, that sanctions '.vill
influence behavior only on issues of less than vital interest to the country on vhich they are
imposed. Sanctions designed to influence a regime are most effective vhen implicit rather than
explicit, positive rather than negative. Further, U. S. economic leverage in Poland is,, frankly,
rather limited. Finally, even pu native sanctions, though they may feel good as signals of
displeasure, send effective messages only vhen they involve a credible threat of escalation to a
level sufficient to stop the offender.-^^ There vas no credible threat of escalation in the Polish
case
.
Still, economiic instruments can play a role in policy if used v/isely. It is arguable, and the
distinction is important, i think, that v/hile East- West trade has not forced the Soviets to
liberalize, it has had somie interesting results in Eastern Europe. It is not that economnc pressure
has been proven useful indirectly intluencing the behavior of the Warsav/ Pact; indeed, it vould
seem that vith the major exception of technology transfer, trade has relieved Poland of certain
problems, only to be confront it vith by many more. Indeed, trade seems to have introduced n'lore
contradictions into Poland that can ferment for further resistance to Soviet integration. Poland
^^Dimitri K. Simes, "Clash Over Poland", Foreign Policu
,
Spring 1 982, p. 6"
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needed Western capital to modernize, and consun'ier goods to keep its people productive. It ended uo
vitri a n'lasslve dePt and an un nappy population. Western imports have pointed out more clearly
the deficiencies of the Polish commiand economy system, vhetted consumer appetites, increased the
need for reformi, and entangled the whole of Eastern Europe in heavy debts. Exposure to
international trade niakes inefficiency more expensive, so market incentives and rational prices
become even more urgent.
The overall objective of our economic relations vlth Poland, and those of the West in general
,
should not be volume for its ov/n sake, or even balance betveen imports and exports. What
matters is hov trade can have an impact on certain aspects of the Polish economiy and on social
contradictions. Thus, our objective should be to exert Influence tovard the rationalization of the
Polish economy and its integration in the Western economic system. The objective is long-term
and the means of achieving it evolutionary. Without going into a detailed exa mil nation of the Poish
eco nom y , a fev o bse rvat1 o ns v1 1 1 s uffi ce
.
Rationalization does not mean that Poland vill no longer be socialist. Rather, the aim would be
to encourage the forces pressing for decentralization of economic decision- making and greater
reliance on market factors, both domiestlc and external. The pov-'er of those forces vas
demonstrated in the demiands of the Solidarity miovemient. Economic assltance ained at
modernization \v'ould encourage such trends. The support of the Catholic Church's agricultural
fo u ndati o n vo ul d be a n excel 1 e nt v/a y of e nco u ragi ng t hese t re nds .^'^ Joi nt ve nt u re a r ra nge me nts
such as projects to develop Polish coal or vater for energy production could be pursued on a basis
that provides ties on the managerial and sales levels rather than simply providing eguipn-ient or
capital. A long-term goal could be to eventually establish the convertibility of the z'^f;/ -^'
The next fev years seem to indicate a devl oping situation in vhich the Easter European countries
v1ll remain politically dependent on the Soviet Union, but could become economically n'lore
^^'5ee the section on the Church in Poland today, this paper, for details.
^^D uffi eld, United States Securit g interests in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland , p. 5
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dependendent on the West. This provides opportunity for Western integration versus Soviet and
opportunities for U. S. policy, especially if one is willing to ^accept a policy of "not losing" for riov.
Much has been said about tieing credits to qualifications or conditiuns. It is critical That any
conditions be specific and provide incentive, not punishment or unreasonable ultimatun'is. Since
the establishment of conditions by the U, 3. could appear highly political and thus likely to be
rejected, an indirect approach could be found that v/ouid be based on a growing role of the
International Monetary Fund (INF) and World Bank. Such institutions v/ould be able to make
dema nds \s' hi c h vo ul d be u nacce pta b1 e from Weste r n ba n ks o r gove r n mie nt . -^^ Fo r i nsta nee , t he y
can demand not only different prices, but different methods for setting prices; they can ask for
nev/ administrative structures to favor exports, or nev/ incentives for the more efficient use of
materials. Demands such as these are generally incompatible v/ith centralized planning and
protection from 'vorid markets and could thus force cracks in the system. The inter relatedness of
economics and politics can thus be used also to pry concessions aimied at greater productivity.
Thus trade union pluralism at least at the local level could be sought, as veil as the ful] and
genuine observance of equal rights in economic activity for all ovnership sectors: private,
municipal, cooperative and state. Furthermore, such economic inroads should require remioval of
secrecy and censorship from economiic matters (excluding military) so that son"ie independent
monitoring of the nev policies vi 11 be possible.
The objective of recognizing and cultivating Poland's Western- ness is easily addressed through
increased cultural ties and are probably the most obvious policy means. Hovever, Decause they
are also the most difficult to assess in terms of effectiveness, "rationalists" tend to discount their
use. We must not forget that education, information, science and culture are z^art of the
battleground today as veil. The United States vhould make clear to the Polish nation through every
possible device our great respect for its historic tradition and our conviction that its rightful
•-'-See Richard Davy, "Eastern Europe: Nev Policies for Old", The Washi qton Quarterlu .
Spring 1 964, p. 40.
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destiny is m a member of the Wester n community. U. 3. policy should focus on the intelligentsia
ana the students , vnile giving recognition to laoor leaders v/ho seek moderate change like Lech
Walesa. By emphasizing programs such as exchanges of scholars specializing in medicine,
agriculture, and education the U. 3. can pursue cultural reinforcement v/nile also providing
humanitarian aid. A Proadened cultural exchange in information, e.g., books and films, can attack
the Party's monopoly of information vhile appealing to a demonstrated thirst for uncensored
kno\viedge among the Polish people. In this regard too, the United Stares should increase
investment in radio broadcasting to F'oland in the Polish language. Above all , the effectiveness of
the program should not be measured in terms of numerical balance of exchange. If U. S. policy is
to affect the drift of Poland tovard the Soviet Union, then our policy vould be served if all the
"exchange" tlov/ed from the U .3. to Poland. If the balance seems to favor the Poles at times , then it
is also true that America can alv/ays learn something about this too -oft neglected and, vhile
Pol i s h ex pos u re i n Amen ca v/i 1 1 cate r to t hat fu nda me ntal fact of Ame r i ca n pol i c y t hat A me r i ca ns
must believe i n vhat they are doi ng.
A final area to address in prescribing U .3. policy is that of integration of policy 'wi-h our
European allies. That contingency plans for future crises in Poland and Eastern Europe should be
v/orked on continuously should be obvious. It is also critical that the United States re men"; be r the
relative value of its Polish policy to its V'/estern Alliance policy v/hen confrontations vith our
allies do occur. In this regard the U .3. decision to go ahead and declare sanctions on Poland after
the declaration of n-iartial lav/ v/ithout raising its disagreement v,''ith the NATO allies to an all i a nee
-
splitting level does deserve conunendation. I think, though, that there is much that the Europeans
themselves are better suited to doing than is the United States. The general pull of European unity
is something that Americans do not understand. We tend to concentrate on the divisions that mark
European history rather than the European concept of its ovn European- ness. The division of
Europe into East and West is a moral and spiritual v/ound for Europeans that has not healed. While
Americans may not be able to understand this, they vould find greater unity vith the Western
allies if they vould accept it and tie themselves (on the basis of U .3. interests) to this en'iotional
cause of Europeans. In so doing the United States v/ould find a goal v/orthy of its ov/n idealism and
one capable of galvanizing a shared sense of historic purpose vith the Europeans.
The Soviet Union is, of course, a major obstacle to this goal. It is vital to the understanding of
the problem, though, to realize that European restoration cannot be accomplished as an A mien can
victory over the Soviet Union; nor can it be pursued as such if the United States vants tne helo of
the Western allies in pursuing U. 3. goals in Europe. The Soviet Union v-'ill certainly not yield
voluntarily and thus the pursuit of the freedom of Eastern Europe vill require the joint strength
of the Western alliance. Historical stealth v/ill serve the United States better than violent
confrontation.
In this regard, Zbigniev/ Brzezinski, discussing the "future of Yalta", envisioned a common
strategy combining five broad political, economic and military din'iensions.-^"^ Briefly, he
proposed the foil ov/ing.
First, on the symibolic plane, it vould be appropriate for the heads of the democratic V/est as a
v/hole to clarify jointly, through a solemn declaration, the West's attitude tov.-'ard the historic
1 egac y of Yal ta . I n p u bl i cl y rep udi ati ng t hat beq uest - - 1 he pa rti ti o n of E u r"o pe - - 1 tie West s ho ij 1 d
u nde r 1 i ne i ts com mii t me nt to a resto red E u r o pe , free of ext ra - E u r o pea ri co nt rol . Its tio ul d st ress
the existence of a genuine political identity, the heir of European civilization, and affirm the right
of every European nation to choose its sociopolitical system in keeping with its o'.vTi history and
tradition. It should explicitly reject and conden'm Moscov/'s imposition on so many Europeans of a
systemi that is culturally and politically so alien to them. The declaration should also pledge thyt
the establishment of a more authentic Europe vould not entail the extension of the American
s p he re of i nfl ue nee to t he bo rde rs of t he Sovi et U ni o n
.
77^.
•See Zbiqniev/ Brzezinski, "The Future of Yalta", Foregin Affairs . Winter 1 964/!
Secona, the West should slmultaneousiy recorifirm its commitment to the helsiriKi Finyl Act
conrirminq the duns hi lit y or existing frontiers in cent nil and eastern Europe; this is essential to
reassuring the East Europeans. The context of the Helsinki Accords should be explained as a
healing of the East -West rift offering the European people the opportunitu to participate fully in
vider all -European cooperation, not the dismantling of any existing state. Thus the division of
Germany v/ould not need to be undone through formal reunification, but could be recast in a less
threatening loose confederation of the existing states.
Third, V'/estern Europe should strive to create the maxim u number of opportunities for East
Euro pea n pa r ti ci pati o n i n va ri o us al 1 - E u ro pea n bodi es
.
•Fourth,, Europe should intensify its aid to those East European vho are struggling actively for
the political emancipation of Eastern Europe. West European should take the responsibility of
undertaking to provide the support for activities that America has generously, for Europe's sake as
veil as its ovn, sustained for more than three decades. A continuation of the division of labor in
.v'hich the United States is seen alone in support dissent and "subversion" vhile the Europeans
engage exclusively in official courtship, is self-defeating.
•Finally, as the above v/ould indicate, the time has come for a n'lore fundamental rethinking of
the relationship betveen Western security and political change in Europe as a vhole. America is
needed in Europe to deter the Soviets from con"imittinq both military aggression and political
intimidation. The European role in that deterrence n'just be increased, hovever, since the
American presence there tends to reduce the incentive for European unification v/hile
simultaneously increasing the incentive for the Soviets to stay entrenched in central and eastern
Europe.
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Thu;:;, in the final analysis, only E urn pea ns can restore Europe; it cannot be done for tnern by
others. The time has come for Americans to realize that the emergence of a more vital Europe
vould be a positive outcome, for ultimately a pluralistic v/orld is in America's true interest of
vorld order. Our examination of U. 3. interest in Poland leads inescapably to the conclusion that
the United States has maximalist objectives as a product of its ov.'Ti historical -cultural context,
but has only minimal tools for pursuing those goals in Poland due to the real constraints of the
present situational context. Additional strength and tools are available in coordination v/itH our
allies. The policies outlined above should promote the protection and implementation of the real
American interests in Poland, vhile recognizing the constraints v/ithin which w'e operate.
n-7
VI 1. CONCLUSION
As this study h8s shown, the Poland th;3t lies behind the fog ofWestern popular iniittention .ind
V/a rsyw / Moscow camo utl aqe effo rts i s 4 Pol a nd dee pi y t r u bl ed a nd restl ess . Pol i s h nati nal i t y i s
yearning for free expression a state, institutions, and an administration of its own origins and
making. Instead, Poles see themselves as, in effect, occupied by a foreign oppressor, and ruled by
a regime and institutions essentially foreign to their culture. What is so noteworthy ooout tms
situation is the virulent renitency and resiliency the Poles nave demonstrated in continuing to
resist this oppression, despite over fourty years of Soviet efforts to counteract such attitudes and
behavior. Indeed, if anything, the 1980-31 crisis and the emergence of Solidarity n"iay be
Interpreted as indicating that this renitency is even Increasing.
A primary, though certainly not exclusive or singular explanation for this continued
resistance is Polish political culture.. The case of Poland has thus become an oft studied and
frequently cited example of the efficacy of political culture theory.^ Poland is a Wester n nation
historically, culturally, and ideologically, and long established in an identity of defender of the
V'/est against the infidels, heretics, and barbarians of the East- -labels that have been applied to
the Russians in the past and, more guardedly, to the Soviets today. It rejected Asia, Byzantium,
and Moscow early in its history and has resisted efforts to redirect this orientation to this day. if
allowed to develop "naturally," Poland could be expected to develop into a Western socialist
democracy of central Europe, rather than being assigned a role In Sovit Eastern Europe as it Is
today.
Poland Is a country built around a strong sense of nationhood that has historically proven its
ability to maintain itself, and even fluorish, without the logical expression of a state. The
^See Dziewanowski, Poland in the Twentieth Centur u. pp. 251-253. for an interesting
comparison of Poland to Ireland and to Spain.
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Romantic traditions of the struggle for survival that v/ere born In the partition experience find
eager ears in Poland even today. The Polish experience and faith is that such renitency vill
eventually lead to liberation and the establishment of state and nation as one on Polish terms.
Post-var boundary redefinitions, population migrations, and life under oppression itself have
molded the Poles into a homogeneous people exhibiting a marked uniformity of belief?; and values, a
uniformity borne out by modern reserch. Using the Church as a type of surrogate state, and
spurred by its long tradition of resistance, the Poles seem prepared for the long battle that they
knov they must wage, but vhich they also expect to vin.
This does not mean that all is rosy or victorious for the Poles; on the contrary, defeats are
generally the rule against the pov/er of the regime. The beliefs, values, and actions described
above and expressed so vividly during the 1980-81 crisis are necessarily often forced into
latency, as they v/ere following the imposition of martial lav. V/hile underground activists
continue the struggle directly, many Poles practice opposition through adaptation, waiting for the
next revival . But it can be argued that stalemate is a victory of sorts, for it stri k;es di recti y at the
Soviet -desired transformation of Poland into a loyal proponent of the Kremlin.
Thus there exists in Poland today a tripartite division of the population into supporters of
Solidarity, ad he rents of the Party regin'te, and a large middle group that seems to prefer to 'wait
and see" after the not -so -distant events of 1980-81, or to turn away from social and political
activism altogether for the time being. The economy has shown minimal improvement, despite the
stability imposed by martial law. In fact, national income has not yet recovered to the 1978
levels and in some areas (e.g., livestock), production is less than it was in the 1 9605. Despite the
fact that Jaruzelski claimis to have achieved a degree of stability and "normalization" since 1 981
,
his regime has not been able to achieve the legitimacy needed to mobilize the work force m
attacking the economic situation. Consequently, hopes to gain a miodicum of legitimacy through
economic growth and gradual improvement in the standard of living have foundered in a catch- 22
type situation. Political democratization and the inclusion of more of Poland's emerging technical
c 5
and specialist groups into the political decision- making process in the manner of the Gdansk
Agreement would help to mobilize the needed support; it would also contradict the ideologu of the
Communist regime and destroy its reason for existence. Moreover, such a threat would run the
risk of generating a Soviet backlash.
Despite its recognized and considerable military might, the Soviets face a dilemma in Poland.
The Poles have proven more resistant to Sovietization than any other East European country,
challenging the structuralist transformation tenets of Marxist- Leninist ideology. While such
continual resistance has caused ideological embarassment for the Soviets and the threat of
spillover to neighboring peoples, both in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union itself, the Soviets
have grudgingly allowed the situation to continue for significant geographical and political reasons.
Poland is a critical member of the Y/arsaw Treaty Organization in geographical, military, and
strategic terms. To force Poland into line would be extremely costly in military, economic, and
political terms. Although direct intervention is an option that the Soviets always keep open (They
periodically remind the Poles that they do so), they have always made a search for other options
before playing their hand. The result of this is that the Soviet Union has allowed Poland to get
away with more questionable things for a longer timie than any other country in its European
empire. The professional, nationalistic, and significant Polish armiy that Moscow tried to clone in
the 1950s, and then allowed to develop with more freedom in the 1960s and 197us, eventually
saved the day in the 1 980-61 crisis, but the motivations of the army were arguably not to help
the Soviet Union, but to protect Poland. Furthermore, the loyalty of the Polish army to Soviet
di rectives except i n the case of di rect NATO attack is i ncreasi ngl y suspect.^ While the i mportance
of Poland to the Soviet Union and the intensity of Soviet interest in Poland n"iean that the bottom
line of Polish alliance to the Soviet Union cannot be transgressed as long as the Soviets have the
-^See Karen A. Pntchard, The Reliabilit u of the 'vVarsijw Treat u Organization: Can the Soviet
Union Depend on its Northern Tier Allies'^
.
(Masters Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate
School. 198.5).
pove r to e nfo rce i t , t he vi go r of t hst si 1 i a nee i s ofte n taxed . Ce rtai nl y t he Sovi et5 have fi r-jt - ha nd
knowledge ofScylla and CharybdTs vith respect to Poland.
U. S. policy- maker? face a similarly Herculean task in developing policy that is in accordance
with U. 3. national interest. The first problem is that of determining just v/hat is the U. S.
interest in Poland. The Teti model of the national interest reveals that the national interest is
more a process that a single interest; indeed, a survey of the literature on the national interest
soon leads one to conclude that attempts to ask v/hat is f/>e national interest are doomed to failure.
The Teti model demonstrates hov national interest grows out of America's historical -cultural
context; its confluence with the situational context in the compromise and consensus process is
what produces the hierarchy of perceived and/or actual needs that is the basis of national interest,
By applying the Wuechterlein model of national interest classification, one is able to construct
a matrix to compare Soviet and American national interest in Poland. Such a comparison quickly
reveals the deeper intensity of Soviet interest in Poland. Nonetheless, the United States has an
intense ideological interest in Poland, both from the standpoint of American idealism and value,
affirmiation, and from the obvious role that Poland, as the linchpin of the Soviet East European
empire, plays in Amierican world order interests. Aware of the dominating geographical and
military position of the Soviet Union i'';>-^-i''/.>- Poland, the task remains for American policy
makers to form ul ate circumspect policies that strengthen the qualities of Polish political culture
and V'/estern-ness that in themselves naturally resist Soviet attempts to integrate Poland more
closely, while avoiding direct confrontation with the Soviet Union itself. Such policies are
possible, but require a detalied understanding of the situation in Poland, the assistance of U. S.
allies, and a great deal of patience.
Above all, it is vital for the United States in this fifth decade since the division of Zurooe and
the rise of the superpowers, to carefully analyze its interests and options not only with regard to
Poland, but in regard to Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Europe as a whole, and the Soviet Union
as the leading military power on the Eurasian landrnass. The United States miust give careful
3/
consideration to v/hat it desires in its relationship vith Europe, and should prod the Europeans to
take an increasinqly active role in their ovn development and extension. That the map of Europe
vill someday change, even if not in the near future, must be postulated, and the processes of that
change, already in progress, must be sought and identified today. The international reakn is not
static, but dynamic, and the United States must be a part of that dynamism. As peoples around the
world seek the inalienable rights of human dignity and freedom, Americans n'lust not shirk theit
leadership role in this process. This means that a situation like Poland cannot be allowed to drift
into the fog of Inattention, Long-term policies that preserve and reinforce Amierican ideals while
providing long-range vision are crucial to this process. Short-term policies, developed from a
thorough understanding of the situation, must be vigorously executed, even when indirect, to
protect and advance U. S. interest abroad. Such policies obviously require extensive study and
derivative preparedness for success. Finally, the pursuit of these policies will seemingly
necessitate a modern reevaluation of U. 3. relations with its allies and a reexamination of U. S.
i nte rest i n E u ro pe i n ge ne r al
.
The significance of the 1980-81 crisis is this: Forty years after the establishment of the
Soviet empire in Eastern Europe the imposed political systems are widely regarded as artificial
and illegitimate. Solidarity became the first mass movement to strive for the peaceful
transformation of the Communist system, while accepting a leading role for the Communist Party
and alliance with the Soviet Union, Furthermore it was a movement of primarily industrial
workers, the "righteous" proletariat in Marxist ideology, that spearheaded the drive in a People's
Republic. The arrest of that movement by martial law seemed to emphasize the bankruptcy of
Communist attempts to overcome that illegitimacy and artificiality. As Jan de Weydenthal has
observed.
The ultimate me.s.sage of Gdansk v/as that embers are smoldering
beneath the socialist reqin^ies of the East. Regardless of how
successful the Soviet Union and the Polish reqime are in brinqmq
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sibout ;i meaiiure of normalizatiori in Poland, those ember:5 are
cer+iain to flan; up gqain 50mew hen? in E^^tern Europe. When the
Soviet Union can no longer control the burninq, its domination of
the region v/ill end. That tin'ie is probably decades av/ay. . . .
History argues, hovever, that the life span of every empire is
limited. A century from now historians may veil look back on the
signing of the Gdansk Agreement in August 1 980 as the beginning
of the inevitable end. -^
Thus it is time for the West to undertake more steadfast observation of these events in Poland,
to rip avay the fog that conceals the reality, and to call the present order in Poland and Eastern
Europe by the name that it is- -Soviet empire, not brotherhood. Furthermore, the Polish crisis
dramatically challenges the v/idespread assumption that Communist regimes in Eastern Europe
will gradually (or even inevitably) liberalize peaceably if given the right opportunity to do so;
the totally incompatibility of democracy and communism, of plurality and democratic centralism
makes this so, as Solidarity found out. The short-term U.S. i nterest thus becomes that of blocki ng
Polish eastward drift- -in effect, a policyof "not losing". The long-term policy 1s that of ireeing
Poland and East Europe from the Soviet grip without generating violent confrontation with ^.h-r:.
Soviets. The challenges and implications of these policies are indeed as exciting as they are
difficult.







Tiif's protocol wss sfgnecf on tehsff of ti*ie stikers by Lech WaIoS'5 (President of
the MKS), Andrzej Kosadziej sno Sogdan Lis (vice-presiderfts), 1^1r. and i^irs. L.
asdi'ovsi'i, if'. SroszewsA'i, .4. Su-'isids, S. /zdehsi'i, J. A':77ieci.ir, Z. A'ohg/ins/ri, ;i.
Krzg\vonos, S. Leh-'sndowsii,. 4. Pieniowsks, Z. Przghgisi'i, J. Sii'orsi'i, L.
Shiexze.i', f. Stsnng, i^. '/f's/enti/nou-'icz, snd f. H''isnie\fSji'i.
it \t''ss signed for the government commission hg: Chsirman tHeczgsisv-
Jsgie/siri {'vice-prime minister.); /V. Zieiinsi'i, memher of the Secretsrist of the
Centra/ Committee of the PZPP; T. Fiszhach, president of the Partg Committee of
Sdans.i' I'divod and the magorofCdansi\, J. K'o/odziejski.
The govermental commission and the Interfactory Strike Committee (MKS),
after studying the tventy-one demands of the vorkers of the coast vho are on
strike, have reached the following conclusion:
On Point No. 1, which reads:
"To accept trade unions as free and independent of the partg, as laid down
in Convention ^o. 87 of the 'LO and ratified hg Poland, which refers to the
matter of trade onions rights, " the following decision has been reached:
1. The adivitg of the trade union of People's Poland has not lived up to the hopes and
aspirations of the vorkers. We thus consider that it will be beneficial to create nev/ union
organizations, v/hich vill run themselves, and v/hich vill be authentic expressions of the vorking
class. Workers v/ill continue to have the right to join the old trade unions, and ve are looking at
the possibility of the tv/o union structures cooperating.
2. The MKS declares that it vill respect the principles laid dovn in the Polish Constitution
/hile creating the nev independent and self-governing unions. These new unions are intended to
defend the social and material interests of the workers, and not to play the role of a political party.
They will be established on the basis of the socialization of the means of production and of the
socialist system that e:<i3t3 in Poland today. They v/ill recognize the leading role of the PZRP in
the state, and will not oppose the existing system of international alliances. Their aim is to ensure
for the workers the necessary means for the deter mi nnation, expression, and defense of their
interests. The governmental commission will guarantee full respect for the dependence and self-
governing character of the nev/ unions in their organizational structures and their functioning at
all levels. The government will ensure that the nev/ unions have every possibility of carryint out
their function of defending the interests of the workers and of seeking the satisfaction of their
material, social and cultural needs. Equally it will guarantee that the new unions are not the
objects of any discri mi nation.
'Taken from Abraham Brumberg, Poland
, pp. 285-295.
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3. The cn?atiori amJ the functioning of free and self-governing tri^de unions is in line vith
Convention S7of the ILO relating to tr8ije unions right? end Convention 93, relating to \he right?
or nf:e association and collective negotiation, Doth' of vnich conventions have been ratified hg
Poland. The coming into being of more than one trade union organization require? change? in the
lav. The government, therefore, vill make the necessarg legal changes as regards trade unions,
workers' councils, and the labor code.
4. The strike committees must be able to turn themselves into institutions representing the
workers at the level of the enterprise, whether in the fashion of workers' councils or as
preparatory committees of the new trade unions. As a preparatory committee, the MKS is free to
adopt the form of a trade union, or of an association of the coastal region. The preparatory
committees will remain in existence until the new trade unions are able to organize proper
elections to leading bodies. The government undertakes to create the conditions necessary for the
recognition of unions outside of the existing Central Council of Trade Unions.
5. The new trade unions should be able to participate in decisions affecting the conditions of
the workers in such matters as the division of the national as.sets between consumption and
accumulation, the division of the social consumption fund (health, education, culture), the wages
policy, in particular with regard to an automatice increase of wages in line with inflation, the
economic plan, the direction of investment, and prices policy. Thge government undertakes to
ensure the conditions necessary for the carrying out of these functions.
6. The enterprise committee will set up a research center whose aim will be to engage in an
objective anal ysis of the situation of the workers and employees, and will attempt to deter mi ne the
correct ways in which their interests cah be represented. This center will also provide the
information and expertise necessary for dealing with such questions as the price? index and wages
index and the forms of compensation required to deal with price rises. The new unions should have
their own publications.
7. The government will enforce respect for Article 1 of the trade union law of 1949, which
guarantees the workers the right to freely come together to form trade unions. The new trade
union will not join the Central Council of Trade Unions (CRZ2). It is agreed that the new trade
union law will respect these principles. The participation of members of the MKS and of the
preparatory committees for the new trade unions in the elaboration of the new legislation is also
guaranteed.
On Point No. 2, vhich reads:
7> gij'Srariiee the right to strike, ^nd the security of strikers end those \\''ho
he?p them, " It has been agreed that:
The right to strike will be guaranteed by the new trade union law. The law will have to define
the circunstances in which strikes can be called and organized, the ways in which conflicts can be
resolved, and the penalties for infringements of the law. Articles 52, 64, and 65 of the labor code
(which outlaw strikes) will cease to have effect from now until the new law comes into practice.
The government undertakes to protect the personal security of strikers and those who have helped
then and to ensure against any deterioration in their conditions of work.
With regard to Point Ho. 3, vhich reads:
To respect t'reedor/7 of expressiort and puh^icetion, ss uphe-d hg the
Constitution of Peopie 's Poiend, end to tske no measures against
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fMeper/^ent pu^Ncatw/ns, -is \v'e/? ss to grant access to ttsc mass m&dia
to reprfrseinifves of all religions, " it has been added that:
1
.
The government will bring before the Sejrn (Parliament) within three months a proposal
for 3 law on control of the press, of publications, and of other public manifestations, which will be
based on the following principles: censorship must protect the interests of the state. This means
the protection of state secrets and of economic secrets in the sense that these will be defined in the
new legislation, the protection of state interests and its international interests, the protection of
religious convictions, as well as the right of no n believers, as well as the suppression of
p u bl i cati ns w hi c h offe nd agai nst mo ral i t y
.
The proposals will include the right to make a complaint against the press control and similar
institutions to a higher administrative tribunal. This law will be incorporated in an amendment to
the administrative code.
2. The access to the mass media' by religious organizations in the course of their religious
activities will be worked out through an agreement between the state institutions and the religious
associations on matters of content and of organization. The government will ensure the
transmission by radio of the Sunday mass through a specific agreement with the Church hierarchy.
3. The radio and television as well as the press and publishing houses must offer expression to
different points of view. They must be under the control of .society.
4. The press, aw well as citizens and their organizations, must have access to public
documents, and above all to administrative instructions and socioeconomic plans, in the form in
which they are poublished by the government and by the administrative bodies that draw them up.
Exceptions to the principle of open administration will be legally defined in agreement with Point
No. 3, par. 1.
With regard to Point No. 4, vhich reads:
"To reosiaifiish iha rights of paopla who wore ^isnfisseo after the strikes
in 1970 an-f 1976 and of students who have been excluded from
institutions of higher education because of their opinions, fhj to fee a//
political prisoners, inciuding fdmund Zadrozunski, Jan A:oz/owski and
i^larek Kozlowski, (c) to cease repression against people for their
opinions, " it has been agreed:
(a) to immediately investigate the reasons given for the sackings after the strikes of 1970 and
1976. In every case where injustice is revealed, the person involved must be reinstated, takin
into account any new qualifications that person may have acquired. The same principle will be
applied in the case of students.
(b) the cases of persons mentioned under point (b) should be put to the Ministry of Justice, which
within two weeks will study their dossiers, in cases where those nientioned are already
imprisoned, they must be released pending this investigation, and until a new decision on thier
case is reached,
(c) to launch an immediate investigation into the reasons for, the arrests of those mentioned (the
three na med i ndi vi d ual s )
.
(d) to institute full liberty of expression in public and professional life.
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On Point No. 5, vhtch reads:
"Tft inform the piji^iic about ihe cf&6iior( of the NKS and its dem-iffo's..
tilrcug/f ttii- msss me'^^-i, " it has been decided that:
This demand shall be met through the p u hi i cation in all national mass meia of the full text of this
agreement.
On Point No. 6, vhtch reads:
"7"^ fmp.^eri^erfi f/f^ measures rfecesssri/ for resoh'iii'^ lA-.f cr?sU\, sUrf?'/^
\v'?t/) t/te pijbJicsiion of &}} the reUvsrii informsfion on the socioeconomic
siiustion, -iiVj to sZ/ou-- <?// groups to psrtfcipste in * discussions on s
program of iconomic reforms, "the folloving has been agreed:
V.'e consider it essential to speed up the preparation of an economic reform. The authorities
vill vork out and publish the basic principles of such a reform in the next few months. It is
necessary to allow for wider participation in a public discussion of the reform. In particular the
trade unions must take part in the working out of laws relating to the enterprises and to wokers'
self- management. The economic reform must be based on the strengthening, autonomous
operation, and participation of the workers' coucils in management. Specific regulations will be
drawn up in order to guarantee that the trade unions will be able to carry out their functions as set
out in Point No. 1 of this agreement.
Only a society that has a firm grasp of reality can take the initiative in reforning the economy.
The Government will significantly increase the areas of socioeconomic information to which
society, the trade unions , and other social and economic organizations have access.
The MK3 also suggests, in order that a proper perspective be proviced for the development of
the family agricultural units, which are the basis of Polish agriculture, that the individual and
collective sectors of agriculture should have equal access to the means of production, including the
land itself, and that the conditions should be created for the recreation of self-governing
cooperatives.
On Point No. 1 , vhlch reads:
"To psy sit tbe wori^crs wbo hsve tsi:en psrt in the striii'.e for the period of
the strike ss if theu \v'ere on paid hoJidsg throughout this period, \\'-ith
psundent to he mede from the funds of the CRZI, " the folloving decision has
been reached:
Workers and en'i pi oyers participating in the strike will receive, on their return to work, 40
percent of their wages. The rest, which will add up to a full 100 percent of the nominal basic
wage, v/ill be calculated as v/ould holiday pay, on the basis of an eight- hour working day. The MK3
calls on workers who are members to work toward the increase of output, to improve the use of
materials and energy, and to show greater work discipline, when the strike is over, and to do this
in cooperation with the management of the factories and enterprises.
On Point No. 8, vhich reads,
Vo incresse the minimum wsge for ei'-erg iv-orker hg 2',000 ztotgs s month
to compensate for the incresse in prices, " the folloving has been decided:
These wage increases will be introduced gradually, and will apply to all types of workers and
employees and in particular to those who receive the lowest wages. The increases will be worked
out through agreements in individual factories and branches. The implementation of the increases
will take into account the specific character of particular professions and sectors. The intention
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will be to increase vages through revising the wage scale or through Increasing other elements of
the wage.
V'/ hi te -collar v/orkers in the enterprises will receive salary increases on an indiviijual basis.
These increases will be put into effect between now and the end of September 1 980, on the basis of
the agreement reached In each branch.
After reviewing the situation In all the branches, the government will present, by October 31
,
1980, in agreement with the trade unions, a program of pay Increases to come into effect from
January 1 , 1 981 , for those who get the least at ttie momient, paying particular attention to large
families.
On Point No. 9, vhlch reads:
"7i; gusrantee the stidirtg scsU-, "the fol loving decision has been reached:
It is necessary to slow down the rate of Inflation through stricter control over both the public
and private sectors, and in particular through the suppression of hidden price increases.
Following from a government decision, investigation will be carried out into the cost of living.
These studies will be carried out both by the trade unions and by scientific insitutlons. By the end
of 1 980, the government will set out the principles of a system of compensation for inflation, and
these principles will be open to discussion by the public. V/hen they have been accepted, they will
con"ie into effect. It will be necessary to deal with the question of the social minimum in
elaborating these principles.
On Point No. 10, vhlch reads:
"To ensure the supply o-f products on the interns* msrket, and to export
onig the surplus, "
and Point No. 11, vhlch reads:
"to suppress oon7,'nerofs/ prices sno the use of foreign currencu in ssies on
the interns/ nferi-et,
"
and Point No. \2, vhlch reads:
"to introduce rstion cords for most snd n7est- hosed products, until the
market situation can he hrought under controls, "the fol loving agreement
has been reached:
The supply of meat will be improved between now and December 31, 1980, through an
Increase In the profitability of agricultural production and the limitation of the export of meat to
what is absolutely indispensable, as well as through the import of extra meat supplies. At the
same time, during this period a program for the improve mient of the meat supply will be drawn
up, which will take into account the possibility of the introduction fo a rationing syusten through
the issue of cards.
Products that are acarce on the national market for current consumption will not be sold in
the PEW EX ships; and between now and the end of the year, the population will be informed of all
decisions that are taken concerning the problems of supply.
The MKS has called for the abolition of the special shops and the leveling out of the price of
meat and related products.
On Point No. 13, vhich reads:
"To introduce the principle of cadre selection on the hasis of
gualifications, not on the hasis of memhership of the partg, and to aholish
the privileges of the police (hlCO and the security services {'SffJ, and of
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it^fi-^iijgli f/is ^4^i/-i/f\rs^f\f/i- vf fsmffif' St'f^u>'-iAXi'S, sU-. " w© have reached the
roiioving agreement:
The demand for cadres to be selected on the basis of qualifications and ability has been accepted.
Cadres can be members of the P2RP, of the SD [the Democratic Party, which draws its
membership from small private enterprises)!], of the ZSL [the Peasnat Party- -these three
parties make up the National Front], or of no party. A program for the equalization of the family
allowance of all the professional groups will be presented by the government before December 31
,
1980. The governmental commission states that only employees" restaurants and canteens, such
as those in other work establishments and offices, are operated.
On Point No. 14, vhlch reads:
"7i3- S/'tv'U-' ivork'^rs to- retire -it fif-jj ije-irs for xv-orrten and fifi)j-five for
men, or -sfter tfiirti/ yeers- of worii: for women, snu tfifrt-i/'-ffve for men,
re^sro'Iess of sge, " it has been agreed that:
The governmental commission declares pensions will be increased each year, taking into
account the real economic possibilities and the rise in the lowest wages. Between now and
December 1 , 1 931 , the government will work out and present a program on these questions. The
government will work cut plans for the increase of old age and other pensions up to the social
minimum as established through studies carried out by scientific institutions; these will be
presented to the public and submitted to the control of the trade unions.
The MKS stresses the great urgency of these matters and will continue to raise the demands for
the i ncrease of old age and other pensions, taki ng 1 nto account the i ncrease of the cost of livi ng.
On Point No. 15, vhich reads:
'To incre-ise it>e oJd-S'ijie pensions to the level psi'i >jnder the nev
sijstem, " it has been agreed:
The governmental commission states that the lowest pensions will be increased every year as a
fuction of rises in the lowest prices. The government will present a program to this effect
between now and December 1 , 1 981 . The government will draft proposals for a rise in the lowest
pensions to the level of the social minimum as defined in studies made by scientific institutes.
These proposals will be presented to the public and subject to control by the unions.
On Point No. 16, vhich reads:
'To improve working oonditions and the heeith services soss to ensure
better medics/ protection for the workers, "it has been agreed that:
it is necessary to increase immediately the resources put into the sphere of the health
services, to improve medical supplies through the import of basic materials where these are
lacking, to increase the salaries of all health workers, and with the utn'iost urgency on the part of
the government and the ministries, to prepare programs for improving the health of the
population. Other measures to be taken in this area are put forward in the addendum below.
Addendum to Point No. 16:
1
.
To introduce a "Charter of Rights for Health Services Employees."
2. To guarantee supplies for sale of an adequate amount of protective cotton clothing.
3. To reimburse health service workers for the purchase of work clothes from the material
expenditure fund.
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4. To provide a guaranteed vage fund that vould make possible rewarding all those who have
performed outstanding work in accordance with the theoretically existing possibilities.
5. To set up funds for additional payments upon the completion of twenty-five and thirty
years of work.
6. To establish additional payment for work under difficult or harmful working conditions,
and to introduce additional pay for shift work by nonmedical employees.
7. To restore additional payment to those attending patients with infectious diseases or to
those handling contagious biological material and to increase pay for nurses on might duty.
To recognize spinal diseases as occupational for dentists.
To allocate good -quality fuel to hospitals and nursuries.
To recognize additional payment for years of service to nurses without secondary school
diplomas, to bring them up to the earnings level of graduate nurses.
To Introduce a seven- hour workday for ail skilled workers.
To introduce free Saturdays without the requirement of making up the time otherwise.
To pay a 1 00 percent increase in wages for Sunday and holiday duties.
To make medici ne available free of charge to health service workers.
To make it possible to make a partial refund of housing loans from the social fund.
To increase the allocated apartment space for health sevice workers.
To make it easier for nurses living alone to he allotted apartments.
To change the award fund i nto a thi rteenth monthl y salary.
To give a six -week vacation to health service workers after twenty years of service and to
make it possible for them to receive an annual paid vacation for health reasons, as is
enjoyed by teachers.
To give people working for their M.D.'s four -week vacations and those working for
specialized degrees tweo-week vacations.
To guarantee a doctor the right to a day off after night duty.
To give workers in nursuries and kindergartens a five- hour schedule, as well as free
board.
To introduce allocation of cars for basic health service workers and a mileage limit or a
lump sum refund for business travel.
Nurses with higher education should be recognized and paid the same as other workers
with a higher education.
To create specially trained repair groups in the ZOZs (facotry health centers) to protect
health sevice buildings from further deterioration.
To increase the per -capita standard allowance for medicines for hospital patients from
1 , 1 38 slot us to 2,700 zlotys, since the latter is the actual cost of treatment, and to
Increase the nutrition allowance as well.
27. To set up a system of food vouchers for the bedridden.
28. To double the number of ambulances--this being a real need today.
29. To take steps to guarantee purity of air, soil, and water, especially coastal seawater.


















On Point No. 17, vhich reads:
"To ensure sufficient ofsces in fjSfj nursuries S/?':/ n/sp'scweiy/s ;>." fi/e
children of ifit \y'orking \\''ornen, "it has been agreeed that:
The government commission is fully in agreement with this demand. The provincial
authorities will present proposals on this question before November 30, 1 980.
I
Or Feint fto. t6. vdicA reads.
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I
^e^gfti of m^t^rfi^ti/ lesve to t/tree ge-srs to ^How <? mottmr
to bring up tter chiio, " it has been decided that:
Before December 31 , 1 980, an analysis of the possibilities open to the national econorng will
be made in consultation vith the trade unions, on the basis of vhich an increase in the monthly
allowance for women who are on unpaid maternity leave will be worked out.
The MK3 asks that this analysis should include an allowance that will provide 1 00 percent of
pay for the first year after birth, and 50 percent for the second year, with a fixed minimum of
2,000 zlotys a month. This goal should be gradually reached from the first half of 1 981 onward.
On Point Mo. /9, vhich reods:
"To roduci- t/,e Kv'.iitiog period for the ai^ocsiion of housing, " the fol loving
agreement has been reached:
The district authorities will present a program of measures for improving the housing
situation and for reducing the waiting list for access to housing accomodations, before December
31 , 1 960. These proposals will be put forward for a wide-ranging discussion in the district, and
competent organizations, such as the Polish Town Planners' Association, the Central Association of
Technicians, etc., will be consulted. The proposals should rmr both to ways of using the present
building enterprises and prefabricated housing factories, and to a thoroughgoing development of
the industry's productive base. Similar action will be taken throughout the country.
On Point No. 2Q, vhich reads:
"To increase the trsveiing ^ilovsnce from 40 to '00 xfotgs, sno' to
introduce a cost of living honus, " it has been agreed that:
An agreement will be reached on the question of raising the travelling allowance and
compensation, to take effect from January 1 , 1 981 . The proposals for this to be ready bu October
31,1980.
On Point No. 21, vhich reads:
"To mske Ssturdsu s hoiidsg in factories \\>'here there is continuing
production, where there is s four -shift sgsten?. 5'sturdsg yor/: must he
compenseted for bg s commensurste incresse in the number of hoiidsgs, or
through the estsblishmeni of -another free day in the veei(, " it has been
agreed that:
The prime pie that Saturday should be a free day should be put into effect, or another method of
providing free time should be "devised. This should be worked out by December 31, 1980. The
measures should include the increase in the number of free Saturdays from the start of 1981.
Other possibilities relating to this point are mentioned in the addendum, or appear in the
submissions of the MKS.
Addendum to Point No. 21:
1. Change the Council of Ministers* decree concerning the method of calculating vacation pay
as well as sickness benefits for those working under the four -shift system. At present, an
average of thi rty days is used (while they v/ork twenty -two days i n a month) , This method
of calculation decreases the average day's wages during short sick leaves and lowers the
vacation equivalent.
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2. We demand regulahzation, by one legal act (a Cuuncil of Ministers' decree), of the
pri nci pies governi ng calculation of earni ngs for periods of absence from work i n i ndividual
cases. The obscurity of the rules at the moment is used against v/orkers.
3. The lack of Saturdays off for workers on the four-shift system should be compensated for
by additional days off. The number of days granted in the four -shift system is higher than
anywhere else, but they serve as additional periods of rest after exhausting work, not as
real days off. The administration's agrument that such compensation should be granted only
after the number of working hours in both systems have been made th same does not seem
justified.
4. \'^e demand all Saturdays off every month , as i n the case i n other socialist countries.
5. We demand removal of Article 147 from the Labor Code, which permits extending time to
nine hours a day in a week preceding additional days off, as well as Article 1 48. At the
moment, we have one of the longest working weeks in Europe.
6. Upgrade the importance of agreements concerning remuneration by introducing appropriate
changes in the Labor Code. These should specify that changes in both individual salary
grading or in other components of pay, and also a change in method of payment (from daily
wage to piecework) require notification by the employer. One should also introduce the
principle that the system under which individuals are classified for purposes of setting
piecework rates be made to cove basically all types of work performed by the worker. It is
also necessary to systematize the ways in which yuong workers are made use of, in keeping
with their qualifications, so that the above settlement does not become an additional obstacle
to their professional advancement.
7. Employees working night shift should be granted up to a 50 percent supplement if under
the daily wage system and 30 percent more real pay if under the piecework system.
After reaching the above agreement, it has also been decided that.
T he gove r nme nt a nde rta kes
:
to ensure personal security and to allow both those who have taken part in the strike and those
who have supported it to relurn to their previous work under the previous conditions;
to take up at the ministerial level the specific demiands raised by the workers of all
enterprises represented in the MKS;
to publish immediately the complete test of this agreement in the press, the radio, the
television, and in the national mass media;
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